Wyrażanie przymusu w języku staroangielskim by Nykiel, Jerzy
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Title: Expressing obligation in Old English  
 
Author: Jerzy Nykiel 
 
Citation style: Nykiel Jerzy (2007). Expressing obligation in Old English. 
Praca doktorska. Katowice: Uniwersytet Śląski 
 
University of Silesia
Jerzy Nykiel
EXPRESSING OBLIGATION IN 
OLD ENGLISH
Supervisor: prof. US dr hab. Rafał Molencki
Katowice 2007
Uniwersytet Śląski
Jerzy Nykiel
WYRAŻANIE PRZYMUSU W JĘZYKU 
STARO ANGIELSKIM
Promotor : prof. UŚ dr hab. Rafał Molencki
Katowice 2007
Table of Contents
Chapter 1 Introduction......................................................................................................................1
1.1 Aims of the study.......................................................................................................................1
1.2. The layout of the study.............................................................................................................3
Chapter 2 The framework.................................................................................................................. 5
2.0. Introduction................................................................................................................................. 5
2 .1. A traditional view of modality.................................................................................................. 5
2.2. Representation of modality......................................................................................................10
2.3. Concepts of modal meanings...................................................................................................12
2.4. Semantic change in the English modal system......................................................................18
2.5. Mechanisms of the semantic change in the modals.............................................................. 20
2.5.1. Subjectification..........................................................................................................21
2.5.2. Inferencing................................................................................................................ 22
2.5 .3. Metaphorization and metonymization.................................................................... 23
2.6. Grammaticalization.................................................................................................................. 25
2.7. The verb in Old English...........................................................................................................30
2.7.1. The pre-modals and the preterite-present verbs.................................................... 31
Chapter 3. The pre-modal verbs.....................................................................................................48
3.0. Introduction...............................................................................................................................48
3.1. agan........................................................................................................................................... 49
3.1.1. agan with the sense of possession...........................................................................50
3.1.2. agan (to) infinitive.................................................................................................... 52
3.1.3. agan to geldanne...................................................................................................... 52
3.1.4. Possession vs. deontic necessity in agan (to) infinitive........................................56
3 .1.5. agan (to) infinitive with the meaning of deontic necessity.................................. 57
3 .1.6. agon (to) infinitive with negation............................................................................ 66
3.1.7. Indeterminacy o f possession and deontic necessity 70
3.1.8. Summary o f agan......................................................................................................72
3.2. pearf........................................................................................................................................... 72
3 2.1. pearf with NP complements....................................................................................73
3.2.2. pearf with the infinitive...........................................................................................76
3.2.3. Syntactic considerations........................................................................................... 77
3.2.4. pearf With the meaning of necessity........................................................................78
3.2.4.1. PI necessity of pearf...................................................................................... 79
3 .2.4.2. From PI to PE/deontic necessity...................................................................82
3.2.4.3. PE and deontic necessity o f pearf................................................................ 84
3 .2 .5. pearf with negation...................................................................................................90
3.2.6. pearf with other than necessity-related meanings................................................ 95
3.2.7. Summary of pearf.................................................................................................... 97
3.3. sceal........................................................................................................................................... 97
3.3.1. sceal with N P ...........................................................................................................99
3.3.2. From sceal+NP to sceal + infinitive....................................................................... 101
3.3.3. sceal with the infinitive -  syntactic points............................................................103
3.3.4.The semantics of sceal+infinitive.......................................................................... 105
3.3.41. Deontic necessity o f sceal + infinitive........................................................ 107
3 .3.4.2. Indeterminacy between deontic necessity and futurity............................ 115
3.3.5. A note on sceolde....................................................................................................115
3 .3 .6. Negation with sceal+infinitive............................................................................ 118
3 .3 .7. Summary of sceal....................................................................................................121
3.4. mot............................................................................................................................................ 122
3.4.1. Syntactic considerations.........................................................................................126
3.4.2. mot with the sense of PI/PE possibility................................................................ 128
3.4.3. mot with the sense of permission.......................................................................... 129
3.4.3.1. Permission in affirmative and interrogative clauses.................................133
3.4.3.2. Prohibition.....................................................................................................138
3.4.4. Permission/prohibition vs. deontic necessity....................................................... 141
3.4.5. Deontic necessity of mot........................................................................................143
3.4.6. Indeterminacy between permission and deontic necessity..................................150
3.4.7. Summary o f mol..................................................................................................... 151
3.5. mceg........................................................................................................................................ 151
3.5.1. Syntactic considerations.........................................................................................155
3 .5 .2. mceg with the sense of PI, PE and epistemic necessity.......................................156
3 .5 .3. mceg with the sense of permission......................................................................... 158
3.5.4. Summary of m e#.................................................................................................. 159
Chapter 4. Verbs of necessity other than the pre-modals......................................................161
4.0. Introduction............................................................................................................................. 161
4.1. Verbs of PI and PE necessity.................................................................................................162
4.1.1. hatan.........................................................................................................................163
4.1.2. bebeodan and beodan............................................................................................. 165
4.1.3. median, behofian and bepurfan............................................................................ 168
4.2. Verbs of permission and prohibition.....................................................................................173
4.2.1. forlcetan and Icetan...................................................................................................174
4.2.2. lyfan and alyfan.......................................................................................................176
4.2.3. fo r  beodan................................................................................................................ 178
Chapter 5. Conclusion.....................................................................................................................181
Bibliography..................................................................................................................................... 186
Streszczenie....................................................................................................................................... 203
Texts from the Helsinki Corpus used in the study..................................................................205
iii
List of Abbreviations
* an unattested or ungrammatical form
7 Old English and (Tironian sign)
ACI accusative and infinitive
AdvP adverb phrase
Aux auxiliary
B&T Bosworth and Toller
DOE Dictionary of Old English
Gmc Germanic
IE Indo-European
ME Middle English
MED Middle English Dictionary
NP noun phrase
OE Old English
OED Oxford English Dictionary
PDE Present-Day English
PE participant-external
PI participant-internal
PIE proto-Indo-European
PP prepositional phrase
S sentence
V verb
VP verb phrase
Chapter 1 
Introduction
1.1. Aims of the study
The present dissertation is a study of the system of obligation expression in Old English with 
a proviso that the focus is on verbs only. As such it aims to contribute to the vastness of 
literature devoted to modality. Situated as it is in the center of interests of legions of 
contemporary linguists, modality has been extensively studied as a notional category with 
reference to English (for example, Palmer 1974, 1979, 1986, Lyons 1977, Hermerén 1978, 
Coates 1983, Perkins 1983, Nuyts 1994, Westney 1995, Hoye 1997, papers in Facchinetti et 
al. 2003), from a historical perspective (for example Bybee et al. 1994, papers in Hart 2003, 
Traugott and Dasher 2005), as well as from a contrastive viewpoint (for example, Matthews 
1991, Salkie 1996, de Haan 1997, Cerrnak and Klégr 2004, papers in Faccinetti and Palmer 
2004). There is also no shortage of studies that cut across these categories, e.g. papers in 
Kakietek (1991), van der Auwera and Plungian (1998). In light of the proliferation of 
contributions to the field, while approaching the topic of modality 1 can hear the words of 
Perkins (1983: 4) issue a warning that ‘doing research on modality is similar to trying to move 
in an overcrowded room without treading on anyone else’s feet.’ Today, over twenty years 
after Perkins’ s study, despite even more feet taking up whatever is left of the free space left in 
the room, I consider the effort worthwhile since, as we learn from Lass (1997: 278), 
‘extensive talk about something is no guarantee we understand it.3
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One of the preliminary queries that needs to be raised is what kind of obligation is 
meant in the title of this study, which will help specify the focal semantic area to be 
investigated. A check of OED turns up the fact that the word obligation (Latin obligatio ‘an 
engaging or pledging, a binding agreement or bond,’ derived from obligare ‘to bind or tie 
around, bind up, bind by an oath, promise or a moral or legal tie.’ Obligare itself is a prefixed 
form: ob ‘towards’ + ligare ‘to tie, bind,’ ligare going back to PIE leig- ‘to bind’ (cf. OED 
and Watkins 2000)) has a number of meanings in Present-Day English, the most important of 
which seem to be 1) ‘an agreement whereby one person is bound to another,’ 2) ‘moral or 
legal constraint, or constraining force or influence,’ 3) ‘an action, or an act, to which one is 
morally or legally obliged.’ It is fair to say that a context of obligation in every day use of 
English depicts a situation in which somebody, who is sometimes referred to as an obligee, 
finds his or her actions influenced by a usually unpleasant constraint originating in a source 
outside of the obligee. When transferred to the plane of modal theories, the situation 
construed as shown is describable in terms of deontic necessity (cf. Lyons 1977, Palmer 
1986). True as it is that deontic necessity provides a springboard for the present exposition, it 
is not the sole object o f the following discussion. Even a superficial overview of deontic 
necessity makes it reasonable to extend the discussion so that it would also cover a scenario in 
which the constraint comes from the obligee himself or herself, that is, the meanings of 
participant-internal necessity (cf. van der Auwera and Plungian 1998), as well as permission 
and prohibition. The inclusion of participant-internal necessity stems from the semantic 
affinity between deontic necessity and participant-internal necessity in that they differ in the 
location of the source of the constraint only. As for permission and prohibition, these two 
notions can be placed in a broader context alongside deontic necessity by showing that 
prohibition is by and large synonymous with deontic necessity when the latter occurs with 
negated proposition (cf. Lyons 1977, de Haan 1997). It should then be borne in mind that the 
term obligation as used in the title is a catch-all label which centrally stands for deontic 
necessity but which also embraces the related meanings such as participant-internal necessity, 
prohibition and permission.
Central to the thesis of this study is the fact that in Present-Day English, studies of 
obligation coincide with and focus on the study of the modal verbs. It appears that talking 
about the modals as a vehicle for obligation is indispensable when talking about obligation in 
Present-Day English, which works such as Jacobsson (1979), Ney (1979), Palmer (1979, 
1986), Myhill (1996, 1997) and others stand to prove. Even if some other exponents of 
obligation are analyzed, they are usually shown to play a secondary role and to be somewhat
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less attractive. Part of the reason why linguists tend to be much taken with studying the PDE 
modals is that they bring along the attractive lure of the morphosyntactic peculiarities with 
them, the roots of which can be sought in the past. The morphosyntactic features of the 
modals together with their semantic characteristics lead Perkins (1983) and Westney (1995) to 
argue that the modals are unmarked, other modal expressions being marked. The unmarked 
status of the modals in the area of semantics translates into ‘their essentially vague or 
minimally specified meanings’ (Westney 1995: 214).
Given the above considerations, I intend to seek tokens of obligation among the OE 
predecessors of the PDE modals, the so-called pre-modals. The task looks promising and 
challenging as it, among other things, involves juxtaposing well established and frequent 
items like sceal with brand-new additions to the pre-modals of obligation like agan. Inspired 
by the bias cherished by the researchers o f Present-Day English, I devote most of space 
available to the pre-modals, yet I consider the obligation carried by OE lexical verbs in its 
own right as well.
An overarching aim is to elucidate the types and shades of the meaning of obligation 
as expressed by the two kinds of OE verbs and traceable to OE texts. Importantly, the 
semantics of the pre-modals in this study is viewed essentially diachronically. In scrutinizing 
a sample of the corpus occurrences of a pre-modal, I take the meanings of the verb to be a 
reflection of a process of semantic change rather than of a synchronic state. Such an outlook 
has the advantage of providing a more in-depth insight into, for example, the differences 
between the obligation of sceal, agan and other pre-modals. In the case of the lexical verbs, 
the approach is less detailed and hence largely synchronic, which should not, however, 
preclude me from verifying the tenability of the bias in favor of the pre-modals in Old 
English.
1.2. The layout of the study
Five chapters converge to make up the body of this dissertation. Chapter 2 lays down the 
theoretical grid, introduces the terminology to be utilized throughout the ensuing chapters and 
designates the pre-modals as the focal object of the study. I begin with delineating the 
semantic notion of modality in section 2.1. and show how it can be realized in a language in 
section 2.2. With the focal realization of modality being the verb, in 2 .3 . I proceed to fish out 
theories of modal meanings relevant for the further research. Sections 2.4 through 2.5.3. are 
when the problem of the semantic change in modal meanings appears on the scene. In 2.6. the
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semantic change is joined by syntax in the issue of grammaticalization as vital for the modal 
verbs in English. Starting with section 2.7. I delve into Old English so as to include 
consideration of the types of OE verbs. With the class of the pre-modals being highlighted, 
section 2 .7 .1. takes up the theme of the controversial syntactic status of the pre-modals in Old 
English and later periods.
Chapters 3 and 4 constitute a research part of the present study. The former undertakes 
a corpus analysis of five premodals whose meanings center on the expression of obligation- 
related notions: agan, pearf, sceal, mot and mceg, each verb being discussed in a separate 
section. Eleven lexical verbs, which split into two groups, that is, verbs of necessity and verbs 
of permission, take prominence in Chapter 4. The results of the research are assembled in 
Chapter 5 and illustrated by showing the meanings of the pre-modals and the lexical verbs on 
the continuum of deontic modality. Inevitably, the obligative semantics of the pre-modals and 
the relevant lexical verbs is also seen from a comparative perspective.
The approach adopted in the present research is corpus-based. I make use of two 
corpora of Old English texts, the Old English part of the Helsinki Corpus and the Dictionary 
of Old English corpus (DOE). With each verb I look into a sample of examples made 
available by the searching and concordancing program Wordsmith Tools. The details of the 
codification of examples retrieved from both corpora are elaborated on in section 3.0.
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Chapter 2 
The framework
2.0. Introduction
A proper study of obligation cannot but start with an insight into the theory of modality where 
obligation naturally belongs. A commonly acknowledged difficulty to struggle with in the 
course of any undertaking of this type is the vague nature of modality. Hence the multiplicity 
of approaches to modality. The focal points of attention in this chapter are three-fold: a 
pursuit of the notion of obligation in the semantic category of modality as seen by various 
scholars, introduction of the nomenclature to be made use of throughout the research, which 
will determine the direction of the research and, finally, elucidation of some issues pertaining 
to the semantic and syntactic change in the case of the OE pre-modals.
2.1. A traditional view of modality
The most influential conceptualizations of modality in linguistics have been contributed by 
Lyons (1977) and Palmer (1986). Both build on earlier tradition when it comes to making 
internal divisions within the domain of modality. The names of special importance here are 
Jespersen (1924) and von Wright (1951). The former is ascribed somewhat symbolic 
significance by virtue of introducing two categories of mood: one ‘containing an element of 
will’ and the other ‘containing no element of will’ (Jespersen 1924: 320-321). The former 
category is composed of the following: Jussive (go!), Compulsive (he has to go), Obligative
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(he ought to go), Advisory (you should go), Precative (go, please), Hortative (let us go), 
Permissive (you may go i f  you like), Promissive (I will go), Optative (may he still he alive), 
Desiderative (would he were still alive) and Intentional (in order that he may go) whereas the 
latter is made up by: Apodictive (twice two must he four), Necessative (he must be rich or he 
could not spend so much), Assertive (he is rich), Presumptive (he is probably rich), 
Dubitative (he may be rich), Potential (he can speak), Conditional (if he is rich), Hypothetical 
(if he were rich) and Concessional (though he is rich). If the details of this classification are 
debatable, the premise that underlies the very division has been recast on numerous occasions. 
Von Wright (1951: 1-2) arrives at a more elaborate system of modality within which he 
identifies four modes:
the alethic modes or the modes of truth (necessary, possible, contingent, impossible) 
the epistemic modes or the modes of knowing (verified, undecided, falsified) 
the deontic modes or the modes of obligation (obligatory’, permitted, indifferent, forbidden) 
the existential modes or the modes of existence (universal, existing, empty )
Palmer (1986: 11) observes that central to this classification of the modal modes are epistemic 
and deontic modes ‘which correspond, very roughly, to Jespersen’s (1924) two types.’ The 
very terms ‘deontic’ and ‘epistemic’ both filter through to Lyons’ (1977) and Palmer’s (1986) 
theories. The fundamentals of Lyons’ (1977) stance on modality are in essence based on the 
laws of logic. With the distinction being drawn between modality and proposition, he points 
to possibility and necessity as the core of modality. The two ingredients are intertwined due to 
a fine-grained logical relationship holding between them which is formulated by Lyons (1977: 
787) in the following way: ‘if p  is necessarily true, then its negation, ~p cannot possibly be 
true; and if p  is possibly true, then its negation is not necessarily true.’ The relation can be 
represented by means of modal operators, as shown below:
nec p = ~poss ~p 
poss p = ~nec ~p
Both in logic and language possibility and necessity have two dimensions: deontic and 
epistemic. While deontic modality has to do with what people do, it ‘is concerned with the 
necessity or possibility of acts performed by morally responsible agents’ (Lyons 1977: 823), 
epistemic modality focuses on the state of peoples’ knowledge and belief. The two­
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dimensional nature of modality brings about internal divisions within this category which are 
graphically represented in Figure 2.1.:
— — Deontic Epistemic
Possibility deontic possibility = 
permission
epistemic possibility
Necessity deontic necessity = obligation epistemic necessity
Figure 2.1. A graphic representation of modality according to Lyons (1977)
The two areas of epistemic modality, i.e. epistemic possibility and epistemic necessity, define 
different degrees of the speaker’s commitment to the truth of the proposition. The speaker can 
qualify a proposition as possibly or necessarily true. Within the realm of deontic modality, the 
possibility and necessity receive the respective labels of permission and obligation. This 
implies that deontic modality comprises the acts of granting/refusing permission, imposing 
obligation, etc. Performative in nature, a deontic utterance is a directive whereby the speaker 
shows their attitude to the proposition by allowing or obliging someone to act. Optionally, 
rather than authorizing permission or obligation, the speaker can produce a deontic statement 
by acknowledging that either is binding on someone. What then figures prominently as a 
difference between epistemic and deontic modality, one of a few differences to be precise but 
one of special relevance for this study, is that deontic possibility and necessity each time 
originates in what Lyons (1977: 843) calls ‘a deontic source.’ In a performative utterance, the 
deontic source would be the speaker, a deontic statement usually implicating some other 
source, be it a set o f legal regulations, religion or another person.
Palmer (1986, 1987, 2003) further advances this model of modality. First of all, he 
sees the need to recognize dynamic modality besides deontic and epistemic. The meanings of 
willingness and ability are subsumed under this heading. In his earlier work, Palmer (1979) 
speaks of dynamic possibility and dynamic necessity, which are illustrated in (2.1) and (2.2):
(2.1) Signs are the only thing you can observe.
(2 .2) If the ratepayers should be consulted, so too must the council tenants.
(both examples from Palmer 1979: 71, 91)
Dynamic possibility can be either subject-oriented (then it equals ability) or neutral. (2.1) is a 
case of neutral possibility as the ability to observe, rather than stemming from the subject, is 
conditioned by external, if non-specific, circumstances. Dynamic necessity, which can only be 
neutral, is brought into existence when, as in (2.2), there is no specific deontic source. On 
second thoughts, however, Palmer (1986) hesitates to include neutral possibility and necessity 
under dynamic modality as they, in fact, exhibit so much affinity with deontic modality that 
indeterminate contexts are not out of place. After all, neutral dynamic modality and deontic 
modality seem to differ only in respect of the specificity of the deontic source, which leads 
Palmer (1986) to the issue of subjectivity. What undoubtedly shapes up as a differentiating 
factor behind deontic, neutral and dynamic contexts is subjectivity and lack thereof.
Parallelism between modality and subjectivity is a deep-seated construct in linguistics. 
As has been noted earlier, if epistemic modality centers on the expression of the speaker’s 
certainty, belief, opinion and if through deontic modality the speaker reveals his attitude 
toward acts to be preformed, subjectivity must be part of this system. Indeed, a question arises 
whether modality exists without subjectivity. As Palmer (1986: 16) observes, ‘modality in 
language is (...) concerned with subjective characteristics of an utterance, and it could even 
be further argued that subjectivity is an essential criterion for modality. Modality could, that is 
to say, be defined as the grammaticalization of speakers’ (subjective) attitudes and opinions.’ 
This being said, literature abounds in attempts at coping with the problem of not every modal 
utterance being equally subjective. It seems obvious that each of the following sentences 
carries a different amount of subjectivity:
(2 .3) He must be a cousin of mine (I am sure he is) - epistemic necessity
(2 .4) He must be a cousin of mine, (it is the only logical option) - epistemic necessity
(2.5) You must be back by 10. (said by a mother to her child) - deontic necessity
(2.6) You have to be back by 10. (repeated by a sister to her brother) - deontic necessity
Intuitively, examples (2.3), where the speaker shows her conviction as to the truth of the 
proposition He be a cousin o f  mine, and (2.5), where another speaker issues a directive that 
binds the subject to be back by 10, embrace more subjectivity than examples (2.4), where the 
speaker draws a logical conclusion based on evidence available, and (2.6) which has the 
speaker dissociating herself from the obligation imposed by someone else. In (2.1) and (2.2), 
with the respective speakers making a judgment of necessity and possibility contingent on 
external circumstances, the level of subjectivity is substantially decreased. Lyons’ (1977,
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1982) remedy is to draw a sharp distinction between subjective epistemic and deontic
modality, as in (2.3) and (2.5) respectively, and objective epistemic and deontic modality -
examples (2.4) and (2.6). Traugott (1989: 36), while subscribing to the very nature of the 
distinction, questions the term objective modality.
(...) I prefer to refer to 'less' and 'more' subjective modality, or 'weakly' and 'strongly' subjective. Thus.
Lyons’ four way ambiguity for You must be very careful (1982: 109) can be restated as:
[2.7] a. You are required to be very careful, (deontic, weakly subjective) 
b. I require you to be very careful, (deontic. strongly subjective)
a. It is obvious from evidence that you are very careful, (epistemic. weakly subjective)
b. I conclude that you are very careful, (epistemic. strongly subjective)
Traugott (1989: 36)
Palmer (1986) also conjectures that the key to subjectivity is the speaker’s involvement. Thus, 
in his view, epistemic modality is primarily subjective, deontic modality admits some non- 
subjective contexts (with no speaker’s involvement, as in (2.6)), neutral possibility and 
necessity being ‘more problematic, for they are not always clearly distinct from deontic 
modality, in the strictly subjective sense. There is thus indeterminacy, leaving completely 
indeterminate the dividing line between what is modal (and subjective) and what is non-modal 
(and objective, declarative)’ (Palmer 1986: 103). It is only ability and volition that are marked 
as non-subjective domains within modality as in these contexts the speaker’s involvement is 
usually ruled out.
Also, cognitive research sheds new light on subjectivity in modality. Sanders and 
Spooren (1997) argue that two different types of subjectivity are involved in deontic and 
epistemic modality. Deontic meanings become subjective via perspectivization, which means 
that in a default case the modal content generated by the speaker is directed to ‘a subject in 
the discourse’ (Sanders and Spooren 1997: 105), that is, the obligee or permisee in a given 
context. Subjectivity in epistemics is achieved by means of subjectification -  the modal 
content arises in ‘a subject of the discourse’ (Sanders and Spooren 1997: 106), that is, the 
speaker, as their assessment of probability or necessity of a proposition. Subjectivization, 
being confined to the speaker themselves, their opinion, belief, etc., signals more subjectivity 
than perspectivization which binds the attitude of the speaker with another participant in the 
discourse. Drawing on the tradition of Lyons (1977) and Palmer (1986), Sanders and Sporen 
(1997) allow for more and less subjective instances within both deontic and epistemic
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modality. Thus, for instance, deontic examples with the source of obligation other than the 
speaker contain less subjectivity than performatives but more than those in which obligation 
follows from objective circumstances. It is also conceded that instances of ability and physical 
necessity, since they involve no perspectivization or subjectivization, must be regarded as 
non-subjective.
Indeed, it turns out that no study of modality, be it synchronic or diachronic, comes 
into play without taking subjectivity into account. While I will return to the question of 
subjectivity viewed from a diachronic perspective shortly, a reader is referred to Stein and 
Wright (1995), Westney (1995) and Verstraete (2001) for a more in-depth treatment of 
subjectivity inside and outside modality.
2.2. Representation of modality
So far modality has been present in this dissertation as a semantic category and I have not 
made any explicit reference to the ways in which it can be realized in a language. Some 
implicit bonds between modality and the PDE modal auxiliaries can be gathered from the fact 
that in all the preceding examples the presence of modality coincides with the use of the 
modals. Indeed, the modals in Present-Day English constitute what Palmer (2003: 2) calls ‘a 
modal system,’ one of two possibilities, the other being ‘mood,’ when it comes to the 
materialization of modality in the grammar of a language. A rationale behind the modal 
system in Present-Day English is that it comprises a number of grammaticalized items, i.e. 
modal auxiliaries, which are devoted to the expression of modality. The grammatical side of 
the system permeates the formal properties whereby the modals are set apart from main verbs 
(cf. Huddleston 1976: 333 on the NICE properties of the modals) as well as from other 
auxiliaries (cf. Palmer 1979: 9 on the modal criteria). Crucially, as Palmer (2003) sees it, the 
system does not preclude graded membership -  there are more and less central members of 
the system. The system is also active -  some items may leave it in the course of 
demodalization (cf. vein der Auwera and Plungian 1998) and new items can enter it via 
grammaticalization (cf. Bolinger 1980, Krug 2000 and Verplaetse 2003). The modal system 
as the one in Present-Day English, which contains only modal auxiliaries, is just one of a few 
possibilities attested cross-linguistically. In the group of Western Nilotic languages, as shown 
by Bavin (1995), a modal system in Lango includes modal verbs romo ‘can,’ twero ‘be able 
to’ as well as the indeclinable particle myero ‘must’ developed out of the former lexical verb 
myero ’to be fitting for.’ In another language of the group, i.e. Dhopadhola the verbal prefix
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ripo ‘must’ is part of the modal system. Modal mood, on the other hand, rather than being 
confined to a set of verbs, can be marked on any verb whenever a modal meaning is called 
for. A well known instantiation of a modal mood is the subjunctive, or, more precisely, ‘mood 
is exemplified by the contrast between indicative and subjunctive in many classical and 
modem languages of Europe. A very similar contrast is made for other languages, especially 
in the Native American languages and the languages o f Papua New Guinea in terms of 
“realis” and “irrealis”’ (Palmer 2003: 2). As for the features characteristic of a modal mood, 
Palmer (ibid.) notes that:
a. a verb when used in a context is either marked for the mood, say, the subjunctive, or not
b. a modal mood can in time come to serve strictly grammatical purposes and is then 
devoid of any semantic modality, as it frequently happens in the Romance languages.
As the present study is concerned with the emerging modal system in Old English, 
there is no point in dwelling on the modal mood in any significant capacity. Nevertheless, it is 
of some theoretical interest that the two remain in a state of mutually exclusive dependency. 
According to Palmer (2003), the development of a modal system at a given time in a given 
language usually takes place at the expense of a modal mood and vice versa.
It should also be remembered that modality in a language extends beyond its 
grammatical representation. Most of literature on modality in Present-Day English deals with 
the ins and outs of the modal system and only a handful of scholars reach for an account of 
modality in other areas. Thus, for instance, Perkins (1983) writes about the linguistic 
expression of modality by means of the modal auxiliaries, lexical verbs, adverbs, tense, IF- 
clauses and questions, Matthews (1991), applying an utterance-based approach, considers 
modality (Mod) a structural part of an utterance, a whole range of expressions, including the 
modals, being eligible to fill Mod, and Hoye (1997) looks into the reinforcement of modality 
through adverbs which accompany the use of the modals. Cross-linguistically, as made clear 
by Comrie (1991), languages can be encountered, e.g. Haruai or Japanese, where no 
grammatical category or lexical items are reserved for modality. In Haruai, for example, a 
modal interpretation can arise from a pragmatic situation-based reading of a sentence marked 
for the future tense.
In this study the focus is two-fold: I take into account elements of the modal system as 
well as lexical verbs that converge to express obligation in Old English. Admittedly, a 
question arises whether one is entitled to speak about a modal system in Old English, whether 
the predecessors of the PDE modal auxiliaries exhibit enough morphosyntactic independence 
to collectively merit the name ‘a modal system.’ I seek to answer this question by presenting a
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plethora of linguists’ views on the morphological and syntactic standing of the pre-modals in 
relation to main verbs in Old English in 2.7.1. Meanwhile, I proceed to highlight different 
aspects of the nature of modality, aspects discussed with reference to the PDE modals and, 
thus, crucial for this research.
2.3. Concepts of modal meanings
The view of a modal meaning as carried by an item that will be utilized in my study draws 
inspiration from Coates (1983). It seems that Coates (1983) once and for good does away with 
the notion, which is entertained by Lyons (1977) and Palmer (1974, 1979) for example, that 
modal meanings are discrete. As she empirically shows, a feasible way of representing the 
meaning of a PDE modal is to show that it is structured like a fuzzy set, the concept of fuzzy 
sets being lifted from Zadeh (1965, 1970, 1971, 1972). What a fuzzy set implies is that a 
modal meaning has its center (‘core’), transitional area (‘skirt’) and borderline area 
(‘periphery’). The occurrences of the verb emblematic of the core are describable in terms of 
a number of features which define the core. The further away from the core an occurrence is, 
the smaller number of the features are conformed to. Understandably, peripheral examples 
share the smallest number of features with the core and, hence, they may be subject to 
interpretation as indeterminate between this and another meaning. The discrepancy between 
the nature of the core and periphery needs emphasizing: the core membership is contingent 
upon the fulfillment of strict conditions. Failure to comply with one or two of such conditions 
pushes an occurrence away from the core. The periphery, on the other hand, is blurred. The 
periphery of one meaning may resemble the periphery of another meaning, hence the 
overlapping of fuzzy modal meanings. The skirt is understood to be filled with occurrences of 
the modal that vary in fuzziness between the core and the periphery. The range of the degrees 
of the fuzziness, with the core and periphery as the two opposite poles, receives the label 
‘gradience’ (Coates 1983: 13).
In Coates’s (1983) view, the fuzziness does not discriminate between non-epistemic 
and epistemic meanings. She goes on to explicitly demonstrate that the occurrences of a given 
PDE modal form a cline of modal strength and subjectivity, the former referring only to a 
modal with non-epistemic semantics. The modal strength of an example depends on its 
positioning in relation to the core, the core examples being strong and the peripheral examples 
being weak. It also bears remarking that Coates (1983) chooses, following Hofmann (1976) 
and other scholars such as Ney (1978) for example, to handle all the non-epistemic modality
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under the collective heading ‘root modality.’ The justification of her choice rests on the 
argument that the meaning of a particular modal often cuts across the deontic/dynamic 
division. Thus, the term ‘root modality’ helps ‘capture the fact that all the meanings of non- 
Epistemic MUST (for example) are related and can be shown to lie on a cline extending from 
strong ‘Obligation’ (the core) to cases at the periphery where the sense of ‘Obligation’ is 
extremely weak (where a more appropriate paraphrase would be ‘it is important that...)’ 
(Coates 1983: 21). Importantly, the adoption of the alternative nomenclature is far from 
implying that the concept of modality is essentially different. Quite opposite, Coates (1995) 
makes it clear that, in much the same mode as Lyons (1977) or Palmer (1986), modality is 
based on the notions of possibility and necessity extending through the root and epistemic 
domain. For the purposes of this study, however, the root/epistemic distinction is not 
sufficient. Since I seek to integrate the diachronic aspects into the description of the obligation 
expressions in Old English, a more detailed division within the sphere of non-epistemic 
modality will be called for. The notation adopted will be explained presently.
Another perspective that has a bearing on the present study is Talmy’s (1985, 2000) 
treatment of force dynamics as a category that underpins an understanding of a large portion 
of semantics, including modality. It is made explicit, however, that the force dynamic 
framework, as developed by Talmy (2000), applies primarily to deontic modality. Thus, in 
compliance with the pivotal premises of force dynamics, a given deontic modal meaning is a 
scene of the clash of two opposite forces. The forces are brought into existence by two 
participants, called Antagonist and Agonist, who are indelibly etched in the context of a 
deontic. In example (2.8)
(2.8) John can’t go out of the house.
(example taken from Talmy 2000: 412)
John, the person subjected to the force of prohibition, would be the Agonist and he is 
understood to be willing to leave the house. The presence of the Antagonist, the other 
participant, although prototypically not shown overtly in the sentence with a modal, can be 
inferred from the context. The Antagonist might be John’s father who insists on the boy’s 
staying home. Inevitably, the opposite inclinations of the participants clash thereby producing 
a result dependent on the strength of the two forces. In the context of can’t of prohibition, the 
implication is that the force of the Antagonist prevails, that is to say, in (2.8) John stays home. 
Also, Talmy (2000) integrates instances of internal necessity, as with must or need, into his
scheme. In such cases, the force opposition is played out within the subject’s self, one part of 
the self, the Antagonist, pressing the subject to act in a particular way and the other part, i.e. 
the Agonist, being determined not to act. Talmy (2000: 431) refers to such a situation as ‘the 
self divided. ’
While Talmy (2000) generalizes the operation of force opposition over deontic 
contexts, it is Sweetser (1990) who takes the theory one step forward and claims that it spills 
over epistemic modality as well. Concurring with Talmy’s (2000) idea of force opposition 
underlying deontic modality, Sweetser (1990) believes that the operation of forces in language 
has a metaphorical basis Just as the operation of physical forces is metaphorically extended to 
the social interaction (deontic modality), so are the social forces, such as permission or 
obligation, subsequently projected upon the world of reasoning (epistemic modality). This 
point is explained using the example of may of permission and may of epistemic possibility:
Given that the epistemic world is understood in terms of the sociophysical world, we can see why general 
sociophvsical potentiality, and specifically social permission, should be the sociophvsical modality' chosen 
as analogous to possibility in the world of reasoning. May is an absent potential barrier in the 
sociophysical world, and the epistemic may is the force-dynamically parallel case in the world of 
reasoning. The meaning of epistemic may would thus be that there is no barrier to the speaker’s process of 
reasoning from the available premises to the conclusion expressed in the sentence qualified by may. My 
claim, then, is that an epistemic modality is metaphorically viewed as that real-world modality which is its 
closest parallel in force-dynamic structure. (Sweetser 1990: 59)
While I will return to the issue of the significance of metaphor in the change of modal 
meanings in 2.5.3 ., at this point I should remark that a force-dynamic reading of deontic 
modality will figure significantly in my research. It is also of importance that the presence of 
an intentionally generated force ‘that has an interest in the event either occurring or not 
occurring’ has been noticed the outside of cognitive linguistics by Heine (1995: 29) and 
Coates (1995). Curiously enough, in Heine’s (1995) view, the operation of the force is what 
helps distinguish between deontic modality (his agent-oriented modality), where the force is 
actively present, and epistemic modality, which is free from it. Although I consider 
Sweetser’s (1990) force-dynamic treatment of epistemic modality sound reasoning, which in 
its own right has inspired further research (cf. Loureiro-Porto 2003, 2005), epistemic modality 
falls largely outside the scope of this dissertation and will be dealt with only marginally.
Another theoretical ingredient of the present study is de Haan’s (1997: 47-54) 
‘continuum model.’ According to this line of reasoning, which goes back to Hengeveld (1987)
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and Siewierska (1991), modal meanings form a continuum, separately in the deontic and 
epistemic domains. Obviously, it is the deontic continuum that is of interest here. The deontic 
continuum which stretches from weak modality to strong modality is made up by three 
notions, permission, weak obligation, strong obligation. The modal system of the PDE 
modals, when confronted with the deontic continuum, yields the following sketch:
Weak Strong
may should must
(permission) (weak obligation) (strong obligation)
Figure 2.2. The continuum of deontic modality (based on de Haan 1997: 49)
De Haan (1997: 15) digresses that, say, may on the weak end of the continuum is used to 
represent the notion of permission rather than instantiate any particular occurrence of the 
verb. Hence the absence of can or ought. The position of the three notions on the continuum 
depends on the intensity of these notions. ‘The analysis relies on the fact that there is a 
gradual difference in intensity among the modals. For instance in [Present-Day] English, must 
is stronger in intensity than may and can’ (de Haan 1997: 48). Although de Haan (1997) does 
not specify exactly what is meant by this intensity, I suggest that we view the intensity of 
permission and obligation through a force-dynamic perspective. Permission is less intensive 
than obligation in a sense that it involves a force which the Agonist perceives as favorable. 
The attitude of the Antagonist, which Sweetser (1990) sees as a barrier withheld, does not 
restrict the Agonist’s freedom of choice, rather, it leaves them carte blanche to act as they 
wish. In a context of obligation, be it weak or strong, there is a force generated by the 
Antagonist that significantly impinges on the Agonist’s freedom to act. Consequently, the 
force is prototypically considered unpleasant by the Agonist. Weak obligation, like that of 
should, is less intensive than strong obligation in that the Agonist is in a position to oppose it 
much more efficiently than in the case of strong obligation. The fact that obligation ranges 
from weak to strong depends, then, on the strength of the force exerted by the Antagonist. The 
fuzziness of the modal meanings guarantees that the borderlines between the meanings on the 
continuum are blurred, so we can expect some amount of indeterminacy. In other words, it 
may not always be clear what kind of a force, weak or strong, favorable or unfavorable, is 
involved in a particular case.
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Armed with this model of modality, I can finally unveil the nomenclature and the 
details of the division of non-epistemic modality to be used in the present study. For the 
purposes of this research, which are both synchronic and diachronic in nature, I have selected 
the theory of modality formulated by van der Auwera and Plungian (1998). The theory 
divides the field of modality in the way shown in Figure 2.3 .:
Types of modality
Possibility
Non-epistemic possibility
Participant-internal
possibility
Participant-external possibility
Epistemic possibility
(Dynamic possibility, 
Ability, Capacity)
(Non-deontic
possibility)
Dcontic possibility 
(Permission)
(Uncertainty)
Participant-internal |
(Non-deontic
necessity)
Deontic necessity 
(Obligation)
Epistemic necessity 
(Probability)
necessity (Need)
Participant-external necessity
Non-epistemic necessity
Necessity
Figure 2.3. Types of modality according to van der Auwera and Plungian (1998: 82) and van
der Auwera (1999: 55)
Essentially, van der Auwera and Plungian’s (1998) division is a recasting of Lyons’ 
(1977) notion that modality pivots on possibility and necessity. The novelty of the approach 
can be seen in the treatment of non-epistemic possibility and necessity. The major split within 
non-epistemic modality occurs between two domains described as participant-internal and 
participant-external. Witness that these terms have a special compatibility with the force 
dynamic view of modality. Thus, there are four types of non-epistemic modality:
a. participant-internal possibility (henceforth PI possibility) is taken here to involve an 
agent whose physical, mental and psychological characteristics act as the Antagonist 
while some part of the agent’s self is the Agonist. The Antagonist generates a force of 
‘positive enablement’ (Sweetser 1990: 53) which makes it possible for the agent to 
proceed in a given situation. The decision whether to proceed or not depends on the 
Agonist.
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b. participant-external possibility (henceforth PE possibility) casts two different entities 
in the roles of the Antagonist and Agonist. When the Antagonist is circumstantial, we 
have to do with non-deontic possibility or general PE possibility. In the case of the 
Antagonist being a person or some other institutional or doctrinal body, we speak 
about deontic possibility. Deontic possibility is logically equated with permission. The 
force of possibility, seen as a barrier withheld by the Antagonist, prototypically 
coincides with the Agonist’s desires and is viewed as favorable.
c. participant-internal necessity (henceforth PI necessity) covers the contexts of the self 
divided. One part of the Agent’s self considers an action necessary and is determined 
to impose its inclination upon the other part of the self. In other words, PI necessity is 
concerned with an agent’s internal needs.
d participant-external necessity (henceforth PE necessity) again has the Antagonist and 
Agonist incarnated as two different participants. As with possibility, depending on 
whether the Antagonist is to be linked with objective external reality or a particular 
person, including the speaker, a code of law, etc., two types of necessity come into 
play: general PE (non-deontic) and deontic. Since the transition from PE necessity to 
deontic necessity rests on the specification of the Antagonist, deontic necessity is 
subsumed under PE necessity. With both kinds of necessity, the force exerted by the 
Antagonist stands in strong opposition to that of the Agonist.
When set against the background of the continuum of deontic modality shown in Figure 2.2., 
the notion of permission gravitates toward the weak end as it contains a rather non-intensive 
non-restrictive force generated by the Antagonist. The middle and upper stretches of the 
continuum are taken up by the necessity-based types of modality. General PE necessity and 
weak deontic necessity, as typically indicative of less restrictive forces, take up the middle 
area of the continuum. Strongly subjective, performative contexts of deontic necessity which 
contain highly restrictive forces indicate the strong end. Needless to say, the idea of the 
continuum allows a whole range of intermediate cases. To explore the verbal means of 
expressing the necessity part of the continuum in Old English is a primary objective of this 
research. I seek to identify the location of OE verbs of necessity and permission on the 
continuum of deontic modality.
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2.4. Semantic change in the English modal system
It has been commonly recognized that the particular members of the PDE modal system, i.e. 
the modal verbs, can be employed for the expression of different types of modality (cf., for 
example, Coates 1983, Palmer 1986). Moreover, as shown by Bybee and Pagliuca (1985), 
Palmer (1986), Bybee et al. (1994) and others, there is a cross-linguistic tendency for 
grammaticalized markers of modality to convey more than just one modal meaning. Also 
encountered are contrastive studies independently indicating that such multifunctional uses 
are available to the equivalents of the English modals in French (cf. Salkie 1996), Greek (cf. 
Tsangalidis 2004) or the Slavic languages (cf. Hansen 2004). Crucially, different modals vary 
in the range of modal meanings expressed. Nuyts (1994: 100), who focuses on English and 
Dutch, says that:
In fact, while the category of the modals in general allows expression of these three types of modality 
mentioned above [i.e. participant-internal, participant-external and epistemic in the nomenclature adopted 
here], this is not true for each single modal auxiliary in those languages. Most individual modals can only 
express two (and in some cases even just one) of these qualificational categories, and in general, only a 
limited number of them allows the expression of epistemic modality. Also, in many cases the epistemic 
usage turns out to be only the secondary or less frequent one, which means that this qualification is 
certainly not the most prominent of all semantic categories expressed by the modals (...) (Nuyts 1994: 
100)
Traugott and Dasher (2005: 107) add that cognates of a modal in related languages frequently 
differ in the variety of meanings that they can be used with.
Prompted by the fact that possibility and necessity are intertwined in terms of logic, 
scholars tend to regard the various meaning of a given modal as a case of polysemy (cf. 
Hermeren 1978, Palmer 1986, Traugott and Dasher 2005, Nykiel 2006). A somewhat 
different, that is, monosemantic, stance, is offered by Perkins (1983), Wierzbicka (1987) and 
Klinge (1993). The former two argue in favor a modal expression having an identifiable core 
meaning and, accordingly, seek to isolate it. Working with the Relevance theory, Klinge 
(1993) goes one step further in that proposes that the PDE modals should be seen to cover one 
semantic field of POTENTIALITY. Depending on the modal, POTENTIALITY can have 
different shades yet, in essence, all of them serve to furnish the hearer with the speaker’s 
assessment of the viability o f the relation between the propositional content of a sentence and
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its being verified in practice. A common thread binding all the monosemantic approaches 
mentioned above is the assumption that the meaning of the modal is stable. It is the semantic 
and pragmatic context of the utterance that brings out the difference between, say, an 
epistemic and non-epistemic use of a modal. In this study I adhere to the polysemic view of 
the meaning of modal verbs, which finds further support in diachronic research.
Literature abounds in accounts of the English modals which are shown to originate in 
verbs of non-modal or pre-modal semantics and only subsequently do they acquire non- 
epistemic meanings first and epistemic meanings later. There emerges a deep-seated tendency 
for participant-internal and participant-external uses of the modals to precede epistemic 
applications, which has induced linguists to consider non-epistemic modality as somewhat 
basic (cf. Shepherd 1982). In English the tendency has been attested and/or acknowledged by 
Goossens (1982), Shepherd (1982), Plank (1984), Traugott (1989), Sweetser (1990), Kytö 
(1991), Denison (1993), Warner (1993), Jacobsson (1994), Traugott and Dasher (2005) and 
others. Gamon (1994) observes a similar diachronic propensity in the case of the German 
modals mögen and müssen while Shepherd (1982) detects largely the same scenario in the 
history of the modals in Antiguan Creole. That the notion of such unidirectionality is indeed 
sound reasoning is additionally borne out by the process of language acquisition by children. 
As noted by Shields (1974), Shepherd (1982), and Perkins (1983), side by side with the 
child’s cognitive development, the non-epistemic uses of the modals and other expressions of 
modality, being less abstract, come before the epistemic notions. Persistent as the deontic-to- 
epistemic tendency is, rare instances of an against-the-stream development from epistemic to 
non-epistemic have also been documented. Livnat (2002), for example, looks into the history 
of the Hebrew modal adverb Dulay ‘perhaps’ which goes a long way from signaling epistemic 
possibility only in Biblical Hebrew to functioning also as a deontic in directive speech acts in 
Modem Hebrew.
Two studies devoted to the examination of the evolution o f modal polysemy need to 
be singled out here, those of Bybee et al. (1994) and van der Auwera and Plungian (1998). It 
is a central postulate o f both that it is possible to sketch universal paths of the development of 
modal meanings traveled by the members of a modal system. Working on a sample of a large 
number of the world’s languages, Bybee et al. (1994) arrive at three paths of modality which 
take into account the pre-modal meaning of a form, its modal evolution as well as its post- 
modal function. Van der Auwera and Plungian (1998) manage to integrate the single paths 
into a map which explicitly marks the developments attested by means of the arrows, as 
shown in Figure 2.4. The central part of the map, enclosed by the square, encompasses the
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developments within modality. It is important to notice the preeminent trend for the tokens of 
participant-internal modality to turn into markers of participant-external modality and then 
into those of epistemic modality. To the left off the square the major groups of the lexical 
sources of modal markers and their most likely destinations within modality are indicated. It 
can also be seen that the arrows extend beyond the square on the right hand side, an index to 
erstwhile modal markers having a post-modal life. Van der Auwera and Plungian (1998: 104) 
refer to this process as demodalization and it also resembles desemanticization a la Greenberg 
(1991). It takes only a moment’s look at the post-modal uses of modals to recognize that the 
labels ‘future,’ ‘condition,’ ‘complementation’ and ‘imperative’ (cf. Bybee et al. 1994: 212- 
236) have more to do with syntax than with semantics. This stands to show that the semantic 
development of a modal expression is paralleled by its syntactic evolution frequently captured 
under the heading of grammaticalization. The correspondence between modal markers and 
grammaticalization is discussed in section 2.6.
participant“ in tem. 
. possibility
participant-external
possibility
<deonne possibility)
future
conditionepistemic possibility
'epistemic necessity
partiel pani-internal 
necessity
^be strong, ‘know’4 
I "amve at . finish***■ 
suffice* J
. be permitted** 
i dare’
j ‘be*, ‘become'.
' happen , "befair, 
‘stand*,
‘I don't know ’,
i ‘like*
desire, movement 
V  toward __.
it becomes 
^ perfect )
( ‘owe*, duty, 
‘belong*,
I; be good/proper
(  ‘have*.
‘^be supposed
''need
future
imperative
Figure 2.4. Van der Auwera and Plungian’s (1998: 98) map of modality
2.5. Mechanisms of the semantic change in the modals
Having established the most frequent meanderings of the semantic change attested in the case 
of the English modal system and modal systems cross-linguistically, it is time to account for 
the apparatus of the change. The processes that receive attention in the following sections are 
subjectifiaction, inferencing, metaphor and metonymy.
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2.5.1. Subjectification
The term subjectification as used in this study is intended to imply that the change of the 
meanings of the English modals is driven by increasing subjectivity. It is concluded in 2.1. 
that the particular areas of modality differ in the load of subjectivity inherent to each of them. 
Using the terminology adopted, it can be said that the subjectivity markedly grows in the 
direction presented in Figure 2.5.:
participant-internal modality < participant-external modality < epistemic modality 
Figure 2.5. Increasing subjectivity and types of modality
It has also been remarked that within the epistemic and participant-external domains we can 
speak about clines extending from weakly to strongly subjective instances.
Obviously, that the semantic change of the modals and the growth of subjectivity 
proceed along the same lines is nowhere near a coincidence. The research of Traugott (1989, 
1995, 1997, 1999) and Traugott and Dasher (2005) testifies to the meanings of lexical forms, 
including the modals and other modal expressions, being sucked into the vortex of growing 
subjectivity. In Traugott’s (1989: 31) own words, ‘meanings tend to become increasingly 
situated in the speaker’s subjective belief, state or attitude toward the proposition.’ The far- 
reaching operation of subjectificatiom makes Traugott (1995: 46) speak about ‘the ubiquity of 
subjectification [which] presumably lies in the speaker’s attempts to communicate the 
relevance of what is said to the communicative event, which includes hearers as well as 
speakers, but which ultimately depends for its occurrence on the speaker. ’
Remarkably, subjectification is extended in time. Traugott (1982, 1989) draws three 
tendencies which reflect three stages of subjectification. By Tendency I meanings lose 
objective aspects and become part of the speaker’s internal set of values, by Tendency II, 
meanings gain textual and metalinguistic functions and, finally, by Tendency III meanings 
become more and more submerged by the speaker’s attitude toward the proposition. It is 
further argued that the English modals come to realize the three tendencies one by one by, 
respectively, giving up objective and descriptive meanings, acquiring participant-external 
meanings and eventually developing epistemic extensions to their meanings. This argument is 
paired with the research in which Traugott (1989) finds that the modals, once attuned to the 
expression of participant-external modality, occur in weakly subjective contexts significantly
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before they do in strongly subjective ones. Likewise, with epistemic meanings, strongly 
subjective instances are preceded by the appearance of weakly subjective instances. The last 
point is fine-tuned by Hanson (1987) who, while concentrating on PDE epistemic adverbs 
borrowed from French in Middle English, shows that initially their meanings ranged from 
concrete to abstract, yet, they were nowhere near the epistemic meaning that the adverbs have 
nowadays. Also, with the exception of certainly, they could not serve as sentence adverbs. As 
yet another example of subjectification, Traugott and Dasher (2005. 114-115) invoke the 
study of Myhill (1996, 1997) in which an increase in the popularity of should, got to, gonna at 
the expense of ought to, must in the twentieth century American English is ascribed to 
speakers’ preference for modals whose meanings imply an individualized Antagonist rather 
than modals which assign the role of the Antagonist to a group of people.
For Langacker (1990, 1999), subjectification of the English modals consists in the 
shift of the source of potency. In participant-internal cases, the activator of potency is the 
subject, hence they are objective. Participant-external modality locates the source of potency 
subject-extemally up to the point when in a performative deontic use it is the speaker who is 
the source. Epistemic modality provides an ultimate case with the potency being dependent on 
the speaker’s reasoning processes. A concomitant of this shift is ‘attenuation in regard to 
domain’ (Langacker 1999: 163). What it means is that the transition from non-modal 
meanings through non-epistemic through epistemic involves change of the domain where the 
meaning is played out -  from the physical sphere through the social sphere through the 
speaker’s mental activity, respectively.
In this study, subjectification and subjectivity, mostly as construed by Traugott (1989), 
will be taken as the other factor, besides the strength of the Antagonist’s force, that helps 
determine the location of the verb on the deontic continuum.
2.5.2. Inferencing
In her highly influential article, Traugott (1989: 50) conjectures that some semantic change is 
triggered by ‘the conventionalizing of conversational implicatures. ’ In other words, the use of 
an utterance in a context can give rise to an inference which does not constitute part of the 
meaning of any constituent o f the utterance. Still, if pragmatically strengthened, the inference 
may in time be accepted by speakers as inseparable from the meaning of an expression. The 
theme is picked up by Traugott and Konig (1991) who, inspired by Geis and Zwicky’s (1971) 
work on invited inferences, examine a number of expressions in English, for example, the
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subordinating conjunctions like after and since and markers of concession. Their conclusion is 
that the meanings of causation and concession in these expressions develop in the course of 
invited inferences being strengthened. The importance imputed to the role of invited 
inferences in semantic change reaches its climax in Traugott and Dasher (2005) who arrive at 
The Invited Inferencing Theory of Semantic Change. In accordance with this theory, the 
coded meaning of a lexeme may undergo modification once speakers start initiating a 
contextual inference or flirting with an already-existing inference. Traugott and Dasher (ibid.) 
caution, however, that not every single inference is guaranteed to cling to the coded meaning. 
Therefore, there is a need to distinguish between invited inferences and generalized invited 
inferences. The former category covers ‘fresh’ inferences before they evolve into an accepted 
part of the semantic content. Within this group some inferences fail to affect the meaning in 
the long run and disappear. The remaining invited inferences, once established as a significant 
component of the coded meaning, turn into generalized invited inferences. A generalized 
invited inference contributes to the polysemy of the meaning of a form as the original pre- 
inferential meaning also remains in use. The final result is, as noted by Traugott and Dasher 
(ibid.), layering, i.e. the coexistence of an earlier and later meanings (cf. Hopper 1991).
2 5.3. Metaphorization and metonymization
A lot of literature recently has been devoted to the role of metaphor and metonymy in the 
change of the meanings of the modals in English. Importantly both mataphorization and 
metonymization are types of infemcing (cf. Tarugott and Konig 1991). As regards the 
difference between metaphor and metonymy, let me invoke the words of Barcelona (2000: 3-
4):
Metaphor is the cognitive mechanism whereby one experiential domain is partially ‘mapped’, i.e. 
projected onto a different experiential domain, so that the second domain is partially understood in terms 
of the first one. The domain that is mapped is called the source or donor domain, and the domain onto 
which the source is mapped is called the target or recipient domain. Both domains have to belong to 
different superordinate domains. (...) Metonymy is a conceptual projection whereby one experiential 
domain (the target) is partially understood in terms of another experiential domain (the source) included in 
ihe same common experiential domain.
It might be said that the inferential link in metaphor consists in conceiving of one meaning in 
terms of another, the two meanings not being related to each other, and what is more, as
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Traugott and Konig (1991: 212) note, it is only the target domain that occurs in the context. In 
the case of metonymy, both meanings are part of a larger conceptual domain, the source 
domain being ‘present, even if only covertly, in the context’ (Traugott and Konig 1991: 212).
Among linguists who implicate metaphor in the change of modal meanings are Bybee 
and Pagliuca (1985), Sweetser (1990) and Pelyvas (2000). In Bybee and Pagliuca’s (1985) 
view, metaphorical leaps account for the shift of the meaning of ha\>e to, first from possession 
to obligation and then from obligation to epistemicity. Sweetser (1990), as noted in 2.3., 
assumes that epistemic modality becomes a plane onto which the socio-physical forces 
operative in non-epistemic modality are metaphorically mapped Intent on introducing some 
improvements to the metaphorical analysis offered by Sweetser (ibid.), Pelyvas (2000) claims 
that, among other things, it cannot be divorced from subjectification. Overall, however, 
Pelyvas (ibid.) concludes that metaphor as the key to the understanding of the shift from non- 
epistemic to epistemic modality can be upheld. A problem attributed to metaphor is that it 
makes one perceive semantic change as abrupt and modal meanings as discrete categories 
Metaphor often follows from a sudden realization that the structure of an abstract meaning 
resembles the structure of a more concrete meaning. As a result, proponents of metaphorical 
change tend to look ‘at lexical entries in their “before” and “after” stages and out of context’ 
(Traugott and Dasher 2005: 80) and overlook data that indicate that semantic change in the 
meanings of modal markers is gradual. Hopper and Traugott (1993), on the other hand, 
without denying the part played by metaphor altogether, maintain that grammaticalization, 
which encompasses the evolution of the modals is suggestive of metonymy. In this view, the 
attested appearance of instances intermediate between the source meaning and target meaning 
is illustrative of the conceptual relatedness of the two meanings, hence the shift can be 
gradual rather than abrupt.
Reconciliatory attitudes come to the fore in Bybee et al. (1994) and Goossens (2000). 
Also, when it comes to grammaticalization in general, Heine et al.’s (1991b) conclusion is 
that neither metaphoric nor metonymic explanation is sufficient when applied single- 
handedly. Both exaplanations are complementary and converge to account for the discrete and 
continuous aspects of grammaticalization. Specifically in the field of modality, Bybee et al. 
(1994 . 197) acknowledge the role of both metaphor and metonymy, the latter being 
subsumed under inferencing, and conclude that ‘the only way to determine the mechanism of 
change in any particular case is to find evidence for the way the new meaning arose.’ A far- 
reaching ramification of Goossens’s (2000) study is a realization that metaphor can be, in fact, 
motivated by metonymy. The ultimate metaphorical leap, say, from deontic necessity to
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epistemic necessity in the case of a modal, is made possible due to recurring metonymic 
extensions1. Still, an analysis of the actual data, rather than pointing to what he calls 
‘metaphor from metonymy’ (Goossens 2000: 150) as the only mechanism of change, hints at 
a variety of points at which a modal change can be initiated. In a number of contexts the 
already established meaning can ‘partially sanction’ a use which is a foray into some other 
meaning. The foray follows from the vagueness of the context and contributes to broadening 
the original meaning. If such partially sanctioned instances of a modal are multiplied by a 
large number of speakers over a period of time, the meaning to which these instances point 
becomes part of the semantics of the modal. The idea of partial sanction being borrowed from 
Langacker (1987/1991), Traugott and Dasher (2005: 130) equate the partially sanctioned uses 
with situations which are hospitable to invited inferences.
2.6. Grammaticalization
Although only few explicit references to grammaticalization have been made in the 
paragraphs above, the idea of gramamticalization has been copiously present between the 
lines. In 2.2. a mention is made of a modal system, as construed by Palmer (2003), whose 
members are grammaticalized forms. It would be downright fallacy to presume that while the 
grammaticalized elements exist all along, it is the semantic change that, in time, renders them 
members of the modal system. That semantic and syntactic developments in the case of modal 
forms go hand in hand can be gathered from the work of Traugott (1982, 1989), Plank (1984), 
Bybee et al. (1994), van der Auwera and Plungian (1998), Krug (2000), Traugott and Dasher 
(2005) Fischer (2007) and others galore. Since I side with the view that a diachronic study of 
modality lacks a sense of completeness with only the semantic aspects being highlighted, 
below I present the basic conturs of grammaticalization theory and its relation to modal 
markers and subjectification2.
Wide-ranging studies of grammaticalization, e.g. Hopper and Traugott (1993), Krug 
(2000), Fischer (2007), are replete with acknowledgments of the eighteenth and nineteenth 
century roots of the research on grammaticalization. Łęcki (in preparation) divides those early
1 A similar idea in the context of grammaticalization occurs in Brinton and Traugott (2005: 28) in that it is 
argued that ‘while the result of grammaticalization is often synchronically metaphorical, textual evidence for the 
development of many grammatical formatives out of lexical and constructional material is metonymic in the 
sense that it is highly context-bound arises out of the implicatures in the speaker-hearer communicative 
situation. ‘
2 Full accounts of grammaticaliztion theory, its history and case studies can be found, for example, in Lehmann 
(1982) [1995], Heine and Reh (1982). Heine et al. (1991a), Hopper and Traugott (1993), Harris and Campbell 
(1995). Campbell and Janda (2001) and Łęcki (in preparation).
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studies into the first phase and second phase. The names invoked in connection with the 
former include those of such eighteenth century philosophers as de Condillac, Rousseau and 
Horne Tooke. The second phase coincides with the contribution of the neogrammarians such 
von Humboldt, von der Gabelentz or von Schlegel. Concurrently, the most prominent figure 
of the second phase, although not associated with the neogrammarian circles, is the twentieth 
century linguist Antoine Meillet. On top of the fact that it is him who takes credit for coming 
up with the very term grammaticalization, his much quoted definition of the process, i.e. 
l ’attribution du caractère grammatical à un mot jadis autonome’ [the attribution of a 
grammatical function to a formerly autonomous word] (Meillet 1912: 385) remains still valid, 
with a proviso, however, that, as observed by Krug (2000: 13), the focus on a word has been 
displaced by the focus on more complex units. It is these units, initially composed of 
autonomous lexical forms and gradually fossilized as grammatical forms, that nowadays 
constitute the object of grammaticalization studies.
In this day and age researchers make use of the above notion while trying to define 
grammaticalization anew. For Traugott and Brinton (2005: 99), for example,
‘grammaticalization is the change whereby in certain linguistic contexts speakers use parts of 
a construction with a grammatical finction. Over time the resulting grammatical item may 
become more grammatical by acquiring more grammatical functions and expanding its host- 
classes.’ Note that the definition, by emphasizing the conversational and contextual 
background of the change, hints at the affinity of the mechanism of grammaticalization and 
inferencing. For the sake of clarity, it bears mentioning that the recent interests in 
grammaticalization gather momentum in the 1980’s with the contribution of Lehmann (1982) 
[1995] and Heine and Reh (1982), yet, date back to Givôn (1971, 1979). Lehmann (1982) 
[1995] explores the concept of cyclic developments of grammaticalized forms, the concept 
clearly articulated in Meillet (1912) and Givôn (1979). According to Givôn (1979), the use of 
a lexical construction in pragmatic discourse may push the construction onto the path of 
grammaticalization until it eventually disappears. The stages intermediate between the lexical 
status and the disappearance are depicted in Figure 2.6.:
discourse > syntax > morphology > morphophonemics > zero
Figure 2.6. Stages of grammaticalization according to Givôn (1979: 209)
Needless to say, the elimination of the grammaticalized item generates the necessity to recruit 
other lexical items so that they could fill the resultant vacuum. What is more,
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grammaticalization is viewed as a gradual process and Lehmann (1982) [1995], in an attempt 
to provide ‘a measurement of relatively stronger and weaker grammaticalization’ (McMahon 
1994: 167), goes on to specify six parameters that converge to help gauge the degree of the 
grammaticalization of an item. In later work on this increasingly popular topic 
grammaticalization is associated with and detected through a number of concomitant 
properties, which are most loudly voiced in Hopper (1991:22):
a) Layering. “Within a broad functional domain, new layers are continually emerging. As this happens, the 
older layers are not necessarily discarded, but may remain to coexist with and interact with the newer 
layers.“
b) Divergence. “When a lexical form undergoes grammaticization to a clitic or affix, the original lexical 
form may remain as an autonomous element and undergo the same changes as ordinary lexical items.”
c) Specialization. “Within a functional domain, at one stage a variety of forms with different semantic 
nuances may be possible; as grammaticization takes place, this variety of formal choices narrows and 
the smaller number of forms selected assume more general grammatical meanings.”
d) Persistence. “When a form undergoes grammaticization from a lexical to a grammatical function, so 
long as it is grammatically viable some traces of its original lexical meanings tend to adhere to it, and 
details of its lexical history may be reflected in constraints on its grammatical distribution.”
e) De-categorialization. “Forms undergoing grammaticization tend to lose or neutralize the morphological 
markers and sy ntactic privileges characteristic of the full categories Noun and Verb, and to assume 
attributes characteristic of secondary categories such as Adjective. Participle, Preposition, etc.”
The grammaticalization theory has proved attractive for studies of modality. Its appeal 
lies in the fact that the process goes beyond mere syntax or semantics and is concerned with 
variegated developments responsible for picking up a lexical element and assigning a 
functional value to it over time. As Haspelmath (2002: 26) notes, ‘grammaticalization is a 
particularly interesting concept (...) because we observe strong correlations between 
phonological, syntactic and semantic-pragmatic changes’ (cf. Heine and Kuteva 2002 and 
Heine 2003 [2005] for similar comments). The status of grammaticalization as an overarching 
principle in language change lies at the heart of the developments shown in van der Auwera 
and Plungian’s (1998: 98) map of modality. Although, as resorted to in 2.4., the map 
primarily serves to illustrate the semantic paths of modal meanings, we cannot escape from 
the fact that it is suggestive of some morphosyntactic changes as well. The lexical sources of 
subsequent modal exponents do not make up any grammatical system, unlike modals which 
are frequently members of a modals system (cf. Palmer 2003). Within the field of modality 
itself, Bybee et al. (1994: 242) demonstrate that cross-linguistically the ratio of free forms in
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relation to affixes among exponents of non-epistemic modality is remarkably lower than 
among those of epistemic modality. The final stage of the cycle of a modal form is frequently 
beset by the loss of a modal meaning with a grammatical function remaining as the only 
application of the form. Optionally, some modal forms, e.g. Chinese dei ‘need’ or English 
need, have been attested to backslide into lexical items via degrammaticalization (cf. van der 
Auwera and Plungian 1998, Taeymans 2002, Ziegeler 2002). It must then be concluded that 
the evolution of modality goes hand in hand with parallel morphosyntactic change, both 
developments being conveniently captured under the heading of grammaticalization. Brinton 
(1988), Heine et al. (1991a), Hopper (1991), Bybee et al. (1994) and Ziegeler (2002) stress 
that it is the semantic change that provides the spark for the mechanism of grammaticalization 
to take off. In Ziegeler’s (2002: 117) own words, ‘grammaticalization begins with conceptual 
changes, and (...) these are prior to other changes taking place.’ At the same time, I side with 
Fischer (2007: 183) who advances the need ‘to tie formal change to meaning change on an 
equal footing,’ as only then do we get a proper idea of how grammaticalization in general and 
gramamticalization of modality works.
In order to elucidate the details o f the grammaticalization of modality, Fischer (2007: 
182) adumbrates three clines: semantic, formal and discourse-pragmatic. The semantic cline, 
as it runs parallel to and is a recasting of the notion of the semantic changes presented in 2.4., 
will not be repeated here. The other two clines are depicted in Figure 2.7.:
CLINE OF MODALITY (FORMAL)
lexical verb > vector verb > auxiliary > clitic > zero
CLINE OF MODALITY (DISCOURSE-PRAGMATIC)
prepositional >(textual) > expressive/attitudinal/interpersonal
socio-physical world > world of reasoning/ > subjective attitude towards the
of speech event world
non-subjective > subjective > intersubjective
Figure 2.7. Clines of modality (taken from Fischer (2007: 182))
A coherent reflection of Givon’s (1979: 209) cycle, shown in Figure 2.6. above, the formal 
cline displays the morphosyntactic stages that modal forms have been attested to go through 
over time until their demise. If it is tacitly assumed that a modal form is simultaneously 
visited by the semantic and morphosyntactic developments, at least some correspondence 
between the stages can be expected. The increase in bound forms that accompanies the shift
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from non-epistemic to epistemic modality (cf. Bybee et al. 1994: 242) is then justified. Apart 
from the semantic and morphosyntactic clines, Fischer (2007: 182) explicitly points to the 
discourse-pragmatic domain as another dimension along which grammaticalization of 
modality takes place. The cline, based primarily on the research of Traugott (1982, 1989), 
Sweetser (1990) and Traugott and Dasher (2005), comprises three paths. All of them have 
been already touched upon. In 2.5.1. subjectification is described in detail since I follow 
Traugott and Dasher (2005: 89-90) in conceiving of subjectification as a trait of semantic 
change in general, or, in the body of this dissertation, of modal shifts rather than strictly that 
of grammaticalization. The first and last paths of the discourse-pragmatic cline cohere with 
the growing subjectivity of the respective modal meanings on the semantic cline and with the 
three tendencies detected by Traugott (1989). The second path is an extended version of the 
trajectory described by Sweetser (1990) which I highlight in 2.3. In compliance with this 
analysis, the evolution of the meaning of a modal in English typically involves the following 
consecutive phases: non-epistemic modality with a socio-physical background, epistemic 
modality played out in the world of reasoning, speech-act modality involving a conversational 
background. With each stage respectively, the conceptual background, or Langacker’s (1990, 
1999) domain, of modality changes, each stage being indicative of more subjectivity.
The three clines assembled by Fischer (2007) are also emblematic of two widely 
discussed features of grammaticalization: gradualness (or graduality) and unidirectionality. 
Gradualness describes the stages on the clines as non-discrete, hence a large amount of 
indeterminacy between them is warranted. Brinton and Traugott (2005: 26) explain the nature 
of gradualness in the following way: ‘this notion refers to the fact that most changes occur in 
very small structural steps with innovative uses coexisting along older ones.’ (cf. Givon 1975, 
also Lichtenberk 1991 on the gradual diffusion of syntactic categories). Enjoying very wide 
currency in grammaticalization studies, the issue of unidirectionality has raised some 
controversy. Integrated into the theory of grammaticalization by Lehmann (1982) [1995], 
unidirectionality implies that the stages of the clines proceed in the order shown rather than in 
any other order. As Hopper and Traugott (1993: 95) put it, ‘the basic assumption is that there 
is a relationship between two stages A and B, such that A occurs before B, but not vice versa. ’ 
A lot of emphasis is put on the fact that ‘there is nothing deterministic about 
grammaticalizaion and unidirectionality. Changes do not have to occur. They do not have to 
go to completion, in other words, they do not have to move all the way along the cline 
(Hopper and Traugott 1993: 95). Nevertheless, on top of fervent supporters of 
unidirectionality like Heine and Reh (1984), Traugott (1982, 1989), Heine et al. (1991a),
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Bybee et al. (1994), van der Auwera and Plungian (1998), Haspelmath (1999, 2002), 
Tsangalidis (2002), Traugott and Dasher (2005), the notion has attracted a remarkable number 
of opponents, e.g. Roberts (1993), Newmayer (1998), Lightfoot (1999, 2002), Fischer et al. 
(2000), Lass (2000), Campbell (2001), Janda (2001), Norde (2001) and Ziegeler (2002) 
among others. Arguments that make inroads into or, simply, challenge unidirectionality 
include:
a. there are a number of exceptions to unidirectionality identified cross-linguistically, (cf., for 
example, Burridge 1998, Newmeyer 1998, Janda 2001, Ziegeler 2002)
b. unidirectionality renders viable the notion that all languages were initially isolating (cf. 
Lass 2000)
c. unidirectionality is at odds with the fact that language change is driven by parameter setting 
(cf. Lightfoot 1999, 2002)
Having addressed these criticisms, Haspelmath (2000, 2002), nevertheless, comes out 
convinced that unidirectionality holds its own ‘as an important prerequisite for understanding 
language change’ (Haspelmath 2002: 35). I endorse his view that the exceptions to 
unidirectionality, rare when compared with the tokens of unidirectionality, fail to invalidate 
the theory as a whole.
2.7. The verb in Old English
The aim of this section is to introduce the focal exponent of modality in this study, that is the 
OE verb. It is a long standing tradition to divide OE verbs into four groups of verbs: weak, 
strong , preterite-present and anomalous. The former two groups comprise the majority of all 
the verbs at that time. What underpins the division into strong and weak verbs is the mode of 
preterite form creation: strong verbs make use of root vowel variation (also known as ‘vowel 
gradation’ or ‘ablaut’) in their preterites while weak verbs resort to a dental suffix to this end 
(cf. Prokosch 1939: 159, Mitchell 1985: §600, Hogg 1992b: 146, Lass 1994: 153, 164). 
Depending on the vowel variation, there are seven classes of strong verbs in Old English. 
Proto-Germanic weak verbs are assigned to four classes, the criterion being the modification 
to the stem in the preterite before the suffix. Class IV of weak verbs, although still relevant for 
Gothic, has no morphological impact on Old English where there are only three classes of 
weak verbs (cf. Lass 1994: 169). It is generally conceded that ablaut is older than the dental
3 According to Prokosch (1939: 159), the nomenclature strong’ and ’weak’ with reference to Germanic verbs 
goes back to Jacob Grimm (1819).
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suffix as a preterite marker. Lass (1990: 153) speculates that proto-Germanic inherits the 
ablaut series from PIE aspectual forms, and, having eliminated the PIE aorist and perfect, 
‘recycles’ the inherited ablaut in new preterites. As for the dental suffix, the motivation for the 
form has never been successfully pinned down. A typically Germanic innovation, the dental 
suffix is likely to have arisen out of the periphrasis of a verb stem and auxiliary *dhe-dhd, ‘to 
do,’ a cognate of OE don and PDE do, later grammaticalized into an inflection (cf. Prokosch 
1939: 196, Lass 1994: 164). Interestingly enough, ablaut is, generally speaking, no longer 
productive in Old English (for exceptions in Old English and later, see Wełna 1997). This is 
connected with the process of the disintegration of the strong verb system which starts as 
early as in late proto-Germanic (cf. Newfield 1983, Krygier 1994). The disintegration stands 
for a tendency for original strong verbs to develop preterites in the weak verb fashion, i.e. 
with the aid of the dental suffix as well as for a tendency for borrowed verbs to join the ranks 
of weak verbs, which culminates in the demise of the weak/strong verb distinction in Early 
Modem English.
The conjugation of the strong verb dńfan  (Class 1) and a weak verb lufian (Class 2) in 
Figure 2.8. wraps up this brief section:
PRESENT INDICATIVE SUBJUNCTIVE INDICATIVE SUBJUNCTIVE
Singular 1.drife drlfe lufie lufie
2. drifsl drife lufast lufie
3. drJfd drife lufad lufie
Plural 1-3. drifad drifen lufiad lufien
PRETERITE
Singular 1. drâf drife lufode lufode
2. drife drife lufodest lufode
3. drâf drife lufode lufode
Plural 1-3. drifon drifen lufodon lufoden
Figure 2.8. The conjugation of dr i f  an and lufian in tle West Saxon dialect of Old English
2.7.1. The pre-modals and the preterite-present verbs
The list of the predecessors o f the PDE modals comprises seven preterite-present verbs agan, 
cunnan, *durran, magan, *motan, *sculctn, *purfan and one anomalous verb willan. The
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asterisk next to the form of the verb indicates that the infinitive form of the verb is not attested 
in OE texts. I will hereupon adhere to the practice of using the l sl/3rd person singular present 
forms of the verbs with unattested infinitives. In literature there has been little agreement as to 
how to refer to this group of verbs. As the relevant verbs are not morphologically 
homogenous, their modal semantics is not fully established and their syntactic position as 
auxiliaries has been questioned, the term ‘modal auxiliaries’ is felt to be rather awkward. 
Mitchell (1985: 415) puts the term ‘modal’ in inverted commas and says that ‘I call these 
[predecessors of the PDE modals] ‘“modal” auxiliaries’ for want of a better name.’ In order to 
avoid possible terminological caveats, in the following part of this dissertation I follow 
Lightfoot (1979) and Traugott (1992) in applying the term ‘pre-modals.’ Considering that 
seven out of the eight pre-modals are preterite-presents, this morphological class calls for 
some attention.
As is well known, the seven pre-modals mentioned above are not the only preterite- 
present verbs in Old English. Following Prokosch (1939) and Campbell (1959), below I list 
all the OE preterite-presents assigned to the classes that correspond to those of strong verbs:
Class I: witan ‘know,’ agan ‘possess, ought’
Class II. deag ‘avail’
Class III: unnan ‘grant.’ cunnan ‘can, know,’ jiearf ‘need,’ dearr ‘dare’
Class IV: sceal ‘shall.’ gemunnan ‘remember,’ be-, geneah ‘be enough’
Class VI: mot ‘must’
Uncertain class: mceg ‘may’
Warner (1993: 140) adds uton to this list although he admits that the verb ‘is of 
debated origin.’ This classification is taken from Campbell (1959: 342-346). It should not be 
overlooked, however, that there are minor discrepancies between the details of Prokosch’s 
(1939) and Campbell’s (1959) taxonomy. Thus, in Prokosch’s (1939. 192) view, geneah falls 
under Class V although he admits that a certain variety of interpretation comes into play in 
this case. Another controversial issue is mceg which does not sit comfortably in any class, as 
Campbell (1959: 346) notes: ‘This verb cannot be classified under any of Classes I-V, for the 
root appears to have had I-E a (not o), nor under Classes VI and VII, as these have past tenses 
in 6, e and eo.1 Prokosch (1939: 193) overcomes this difficulty saying that ‘we may assume 
that the [Gothic] pi. magnm was the starting point for this preterite present and that the 
singular, theoretically *mdg, was replaced by mag under the influence of kann, skal, etc.’
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Conversely, Colman (1992) believes that this traditional taxonomy is no longer valid for the 
preterite-presents in Old English. What he postulates is that the preterite-presents, in the 
course of what he calls ‘realignment,’ come to constitute a sub-class of verbs internally 
divisible into sub-groups defined by a different set of morphological features.
The origins of the class of the preterite-presents have been alluded to on numerous 
occasions. Undoubtedly, the verbs are part of the Indo-European inheritance. Prokosch (1939: 
187-188) speaks of two types of perfect in proto-Indo-European, i.e. reduplicated and non­
reduplicated, the latter used to talk about states occurring as a consequence of past actions. It 
is the non-reduplicated perfect that continues on a large scale in the IE family. ‘The Gmc 
languages have preserved this perfect type to a much greater extent than any other IE 
language. In fact, they doubtless added to this group in prehistoric times’ (Prokosch 1939: 
188). As further noted by Prokosch (1939), Campbell (1959) and Lass (1994), the past time 
reference in the perfect forms is dropped in favor of present meaning. As a result, the 
Germanic branch comes to have a class of verbs of present meaning which have a past of 
erstwhile perfects. The shift in the time reference takes substantial credit for the label 
‘preterite-presents’ attached to these verbs. The subsequent morphological consequences of 
the shift are explicated by Lass (1994: 169-170): ‘since the past sense was lost in these 
historical perfects, new pasts had to be constructed; and since the weak conjugation even in 
early times was the only productive one, this is the natural source. (...) the fact that the 
present is ‘really’ (historically) a strong preterite accounts for one major structural anomaly, 
the lack of 3 sg inflection (. . .).’ The conjugation of a preterite-present in Old English is be 
exemplified by mot and sceal in Figure 2.9.:
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PRESENT INDICATIVE SUBJUNCTIVE INDICATIVE SUBJUNCTIVE
Singular 1. mot mote sceal scyle, seule
2. most mote scealt scyle, seule
3. mot mote sceal scyle, seule
Plural 1-3. moton moten sculon scylen, sculen
PRETERITE
Singular 1. moste moste sceolde sceolde
2. mostest moste scoldest sceolde
3. moste moste sceolde sceolde
Plural 1-3. mosten mosten scoldon sceolden
Figure 2.9. The conjugation o 'mot and sceal in the West Saxon dialect of Old English
In a nutshell, Warner (1993: 140) points out that the conjugation of a preterite-present 
in the present indicative resembles that of a preterite o f a strong verb (compare Figure 2.8.). 
The past forms are composed of a preterite stem and a dental suffix which is indicative of the 
operation of the weak conjugation formulas. Also, the indicative forms in the present ‘often 
displayed remnants of Indo-European vowel gradation (specifically, zero-grade) persisting in 
strong verb preterites’ (Nagle 1989: 57), which can be observed in singular sceal vs. plural 
sen Ion.
The class of the preterite-presents per se fails to survive till Present-Day English. All 
¡the preterite-presents, besides those which yield modal auxiliaries in Early Modem English, 
i.e. agan>ought, cunnan>can, dearrdare, sceal>shall, mot>must, mceg may, become 
obsolete in standard English by late Middle English or Early Modem English (cf. 3.2. on the 
demise of pearf). Plank (1984: 312) maintains that the class ‘gradually shrank’ as a result of 
its members either switching to the other classes, e.g. deag and wilan end up as weak verbs, or 
simply falling into disuse. As Nagle (1989) sees it, eventual obsolescence affects those 
preterite-presents which fail to be abductively categorized as auxiliaries. Deduction causes 
speakers to perceive them as not fitting in with the other preterite-presents which have been 
covered by the auxiliary-bound change. Consequently, speakers eliminate the verbs which 
seem out of place.
With the morphological characteristics of the pre-modals established, in what follows I 
focus on the syntax of the verbs. In particular, I seek to handle the use of the pre-modals in
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mpersonal constructions first and then review the complementation options relevant for the
/erbs.
As regards impersonal constructions, it needs emphasizing that the OE pre-modals 
efuse to be categorized as impersonal verbs themselves yet they are attested with impersonal 
characteristics when the following infinitive, a potentially impersonal verb, is used in this 
vay What is meant by the impersonal characteristics is absence of any nominative subject, 
he arguments being expressed by means of oblique NPs, as in (2.9):
'2.9) hine sceal on domes daeg gesceamian beforan Gode
him [lit.: him (acc)]  shall at Doomsday be-ashamed before God 
‘He will be ashamed before God at Doomsday’
Wulfstan 238.12 (example and translation taken from Warner 1993: 123)
Notice that in (2.9) the only argument of the verb gesceamian, i.e. hine takes an accusative 
form, which leaves the sentence subjectless. Having made a foray into such impersonal uses 
af the pre-modals, Warner (1993) offers some insightful comments. Importantly, within the 
»roup, it is mceg, mot, sceal, pearf and wile that are conducive to impersonal occurrences, 
there being no corresponding attestations of dearr, caiman or agan. As the nature of the
impersonal use of a pre-modal consists in it giving up its syntactic identity in order to assume
the syntactic profile of the subordinate impersonal verb, Warner (1993: 128) is led to treat the 
pre-modals thus used, which he terms ‘intervening verbs,’ on a par with raising verbs, e.g. 
byncan. In other words, with both intervening and raising verbs, the syntactic and semantic 
structure of the sentence is determined by the impersonal character of the following infinitive. 
At the same time, since impersonal syntax itself is not a central issue for the OE pre-modals, I 
Jo not consider it necessary to invoke the burgeoning literature on impersonal constructions in 
English here (for a detailed diachronic examination of impersonals in English, see Denison 
1993, for a thorough survey of linguistic approaches to impersonals in the history of English, 
see Denison 1993 and Loureiro-Porto 2005).
When it comes to the complementation type, the pre-modals have four options 
available, that is to say, a pre-modal may be either used intransitively or make use of one of 
the following complements: an infinitive, which with the notable exception of agan is a bare 
infinitive without to, an NP or a /^/-clause. Availing myself of examples given in Traugott 
¡^ 1992: 194) and Denison (1993: 305, 308), I will illustrate all the patterns respectively:
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p. 10) f)eos seolf maeg wi5 aslces cynnes untrumnysse 6e eagan eigliaS 
this salve may against each kind (GEN) illness(es) which eyes afflict 
‘This salve is good for all manner of infirmities that affect eyes’
(Med3 37 114. 20)
(2.11)7 he naefre hine ofersui&an meahte 
and he never him overcome might 
‘and he was never able to overcome him’
(Mart 3 178.41)
(2.12) .. .Joaet he geornor wolde sibbe wiQ hiene j)onne gewinn 
... that they rather wanted peace with him than conflict
‘... that they wanted peace with him rather than conflict’
(Or 3 1 96.17)
(2.13) Ac (m't hie magon fiaet hie (>as tida leahtrien
hut that they have-power that they those times hlame(SUBJ)
‘but all thay can do is blame the times’
(Or 74.25)
Furthermore, as regards the distribution of the complementation types, the members of the 
pre-modal group differ markedly from one another in the frequency of acceptance of the 
individual patterns, or may even disallow certain patterns altogether. For instance, Traugott 
(1992. 194) and Denison (1993: 308) note that the pcet-c\mse complement is compatible only 
with mceg and wile. Goossens (1987a), having investigated the language of ¿Elfric and 
Wulfstan, demonstrates that cann shows a much stronger preference for NP objects than 
sceal. Another important observation concerns the infinitival complements of the pre-modals. 
If we juxtapose two facts: high frequency of infinitives as the complements of the pre-modals 
and attestations of the pre-modals themselves in the infinitive form, there should be no 
obstacle to a pre-modal being followed by an infinitive of another pre-modal. Indeed, this
proves to be the case. From his quest for the so called double modals in the Toronto
Microfische Concordance to Old English, Nagle (1993, 1994) comes out assured that such 
combinations of the pre-modal do exist in that period, the most common being sceal agan, 
sceal cunnan and mot agan. What is remarkable is that while the syntactically first pre-modal 
in the sequence is finite, the second pre-modal, each time occurring as a bare infinitive, 
invariably chooses an NP object, which amounts to one of the reasons why Nagle (ibid.)
36
dismisses the OE double modals as the possible predecessors of the double modals in present- 
day Scottish English (cf. Brown 1990) and of the multiple modal constructions utilized in the 
speech of the southern US (cf. Di Paolo 1989, Battistella 1991, Montgomery and Nagle 1993, 
Mishoe and Montgomery 1994, Nagle 1994, 2003 and Nagle and Holmes 2000). Consider 
example (2.14) as an illustration of the OE double modal construction, where, it is 
noteworthy, the infinitive can be seen to be used with the meaning of possession rather than 
any modal semantics:
(2 14) Joat hie healfre geweald wi3 Eotena beam agan moston 
that they half share (ACC) with Geats ’ sons own might 
‘that they might own an equal share with the sons of the Geats’
(Beowulf 1085) (example and translation from Nagle 1993: 366)
Once the typical sentence patterns with the pre-modals have been looked into, I will 
now proceed to lay out the views of linguists on the syntactic status of the pre-modals in Old 
English. In many cases, e.g. Lightfoot (1979), the syntactic whereabouts of the pre-modals are 
looked into as a prelude to the discussion of syntactic change. Considering that failing to 
include some of the central issues in the post-OE evolution of the pre-modals would distort 
the overall picture, I incorporate these ideas into the content of the following paragraphs. It 
should be borne in mind, however, that syntactic change as such does not constitute a focal 
point of attention in this dissertation and will not be thoroughly examined until it has a 
bearing upon a given researcher’s perception of the pre-modals in Old English.
Generative linguists in the 1970s usually consider the pre-modals syntactic main 
verbs. Allen (1978), before embarking on an analysis of OE word order, starts with a tenet 
that the pre-modals (she uses the term ‘modals’) have to be treated as main verbs until it is 
possible to prove otherwise. She says that ‘the burden of the proof seems to be on those who 
would add a new category to the grammar. There is no justification for including the category 
‘modal’ in the grammar of Old English unless it can be demonstrated that modal verbs behave 
differently from other verbs’ (Allen 1978: 92). Subsequently, Allen’s (ibid.) critique is leveled 
at Traugott (1972) who, having defined the syntactic criteria that PDE auxiliaries meet, 
refrains from showing that they also apply to the OE pre-modals, which does not, however, 
stop her from regarding the pre-modals as auxiliaries. All in all, in Allen’s (1978) view, a pre- 
modal is generated under the V node in the VP, the infinitival complements being treated as 
non-fmite clausal complements dominated by S.
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In his highly influential work. Principles o f Diachronic Syntax, which pivots on the 
rules of The Extended Standard Theory, Lightfoot (1979) is set within the same line of 
thought as Allen (1978) in his approach to the OE pre-modals. Despite the areas in which the 
pre-modals diverge syntactically from main verbs, e.g. their strong leaning toward bare 
infinitives as complements rather than inflected infinitives, the pre-modals fall into the 
category of main verbs. Thus, a tree-diagrammed representation of (2.11) would be:
VP
AdvP NP v! I
S meahte
naefre / \
COMP S
A
NP VP 
PRO NP V
PRO ofcrsuiSan
Figure 2.10. A tree diagram of sentence (2.11)
It will be clear from Figure 2.10. that the pre-modal is still the head of the VP which is
complemented by the clausal constituent. In the underlying structure the clausal complement 
is assigned the NP specification.
The appeal of the classification of the pre-modals as main verbs echoes in later studies 
such as Kossuth (1982) or Roberts (1985). It must be said, however, that this trend perseveres 
to some extent as a side effect of the Lightfootian stance on syntactic change and the 
notorious Transparency Principle. Lightfoot (1979) is of the opinion that within the next 
centuries, up till about the year 1500, the pre-modals are visited by a host of mutually 
unrelated changes that he calls the Predisposing Changes. They are the following:
NP
PRQ
1
■1
He
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a the pre-modal are the only surviving members of the morphological class of the 
preterite-presents
b. the pre-modals show consistency in taking a bare infinitive
c. the past forms of the pre-modals acquire uses not connected with the expression of 
past time
d. the pre-modals cease to combine with NP complements
The operation of these changes leaves the pre-modals in a position where they are 
syntactically marked off the rest of verbs. What happens next is a sudden reanalysis of the 
pre-modals into modal auxiliaries due to the Transparency Principle, an independent formula 
which enters once complexity and exceptionality accumulate beyond tolerable limits in a 
grammar and a category refinement seems to be in order. As Fischer and van der Leek (1981: 
310) put it ‘the conclusion to be drawn, Lfightfoot (1979)] argues, is that the number of 
: exception features due to the earlier changes had exceeded the limits of derivational 
complexity set by the Transparency Principle. Forced to reduce the intolerable opacity, the 
new generation [of speakers] abducted the separate category ‘modal.” The emergence of the 
modal auxiliaries comes about side by side with another round of changes affecting them, that 
is to say, the modals lose non-fmite forms (infinitives, gerunds, participles), they no longer 
enter perfective or double modal constructions, at least in standard British English.
Obviously, the reanalysis changes a tree diagram representation of any sentence 
containing a modal. A modal verb is no longer part of the VP, it is inserted under the AUX 
node dominated directly by S, instead. McMahon (1994: 118) sums up the consequences of 
the reanalysis visible in the Phrase Structure Rules in the following way:
a. before the reanalysis: S ► NP VP 
(modal=V, part of VP)
b. after the reanalysis: S >. NP Aux VP
Aux-^ Tense (Modal)
(modal=separate category, not part of VP)
As is well known, Lightfoot’s (1979) theory of change has been an object of harsh 
criticism, e.g. Fischer and van der Leek (1981), Romaine (1981), Plank (1984), Nagle (1989). 
Intent on pinpointing numerous drawbacks in Lightfoot’s (1979) data, Plank (1984) tries to 
show that a radical reanalysis never really takes place. Rather, most of the developments that
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Lightfoot (1979) classifies as the Predisposing Changes and the post-reanalysis changes, are 
shown by Plank (1984) to be gradual processes, some of them originating in Old English. The 
very sixteenth century, the alleged seat of the reanalysis, is not treated as a period of any 
crucial significance. The processes that lead the pre-modals to auxiliarihood, although 
admittedly somewhat intensified in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, continue before 
and after this time Plank (1984), in fact, does not take any firm stand on the issue of the 
syntactic status of the OE pre-modals, his main contribution being the notion of graduality 
that underlies the overall syntactic evolution of the English modals. The same notion of 
graduality bears on Nagle’s (1989) account of the (pre)-modals in which he strongly opposes 
the independence of what Lightfoot (1979) terms the Predisposing Changes. The key to 
understanding these changes lies in the fact that in late Old English the pre-modals slowly 
take over the function of periphrastic subjunctive markers in dependent clauses. The 
adaptation of the pre-modals to the subjunctive purposes follows from the meanings of the 
pre-modals and the subjunctive closely overlapping. Increasingly frequent use of the pre- 
modals in periphrastic structures, it is argued, leads speakers to perceive the pre-modals as 
auxiliary-like. ‘I wish here to propose that as a result speakers abduced special 
subcategorization of both the modals and the whole preterit-present paradigm beginning in 
early ME as [+V, +Aux, +Mod], a development which spread as the conditions favoring it 
heightened, namely, the expansion of the use of the modals as auxiliaries’ (Nagle 1989: 71). 
The developments assembled under the Predisposing Changes occur as a gradual surface 
corollary of the special marking of the pre-modals. Interestingly enough, Nagle (1989) does 
not turn down the concept of a reanalysis of the pre-modals in Early Modem English. For him 
it is a second quicker stage in the evolution of the pre-modals.
Another study which marries both opposition to Lightfoot (1979) and the reanalysis of 
the pre-modals is Harris and Campbell (1995). Their contention is that the reanalysis takes 
place by early Middle English in the course of the morphological subjunctive being ousted by 
the periphrastic subjunctive containing the pre-modals. In this view, the pre-modals 
experience parallel homophonous development as lexical verbs on the one hand and 
auxiliaries on the other hand. The Predisposing Changes described by Lightfoot (1979) as 
eading to the reanalysis are to be seen as the gradual actualization of the reanalysis. As the 
auxiliaries gradually account for most of the occurrences of the pre-modals, the corresponding 
exical verbs die out in Early Modem English (cf. also Fischer 2003 for support of these 
/iews).
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It is, however, Warner (1982, 1993) who answers Allen’s (1975) call and ultimately 
provides evidence that the OE pre-modals and the other verbs are not syntactically on equal 
footing. As noted by Denison (1993), the novelty of this account rests on the essentially 
cognitive theoretical approach to auxiliaries rather than on the data presented. Inspired by 
Rosch’s (1978, 1988) theory of human categorization, Warner (1993) reasons that the 
membership of a word category, say, the category of verbs, does not imply that all the 
members of this category conform in the same degree to all the properties that define this 
membership. In other words, we can talk about ‘better’ and ‘worse’ members of a word 
category, its more central and more peripheral elements. A consequence of such a construal of 
a word category is that categories are not discrete but there is an amount of overlapping 
between them. At the same time, the categories are arranged on different planes as basic, 
superordinate and subordinate. ‘Because it has most distinctive properties and is most 
internally coherent’ (Denison 1993: 335), a basic category is the most easily accessible to a 
language user. A working hypothesis that Warner (1993) assumes is that auxiliaries in early 
English start off as a not well-defined category subordinate to the basic category ‘verb.’ With 
his mind set on verifying this hypothesis, Warner (1993) sets out to check whether there is a 
set of correlated properties that might define the class of auxiliaries in, inter alia, Old English 
and whether it is possible to point to a set of verbs that merit inclusion in this category. 
Obviously, a central question is whether the pre-modals belong to the class of auxiliaries.
Accordingly, Warner (1993) probes into the availability of potential OE auxiliaries, 
including the pre-modals, for the following syntactic properties:
a. occurrence before contexts of ellipsis, 
a’. occurrence in pseudogapping contexts.
b. transparency to impersonal constructions, [which is indicative of lack of subject 
selection and the status of a verb as a sentence modifier], (Warner 1993: 152)
.he subsequent research, in which other morphological and semantic features are also taken 
into account, allows for the following generalizations: the pre-modals together with beon, 
habban and a few other verbs square with the above properties beyond the point of 
randomness. By means of these properties it is possible to delineate a class of the OE 
auxiliaries with some precision. In this group, mceg, sceal, wile, mot and pearf qualify as more 
central auxiliaries whereas can, dear and ah are more peripheral members of the class, with a 
proviso, of course, that we focus only on the pre-modals.
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It seems that Warner’s (1982, 1990, 1993) research provides scholars with an 
incentive not to treat the OE pre-modals as a homogenous group. They are verbs that behave 
auxiliary-like in some uses and main-verb-like in other uses and the amount of the auxiliary­
like conduct varies from one pre-modal to another. This line of reasoning resonates in the 
work of later generativists. One can see it in Molencki (1991), who is mainly set within the 
Extended Standard Theory, where the pre-modals are shown as either main verbs (when 
followed by NP complements) or auxiliaries (when followed by infinitives). In the latter case 
a pre-modal is still generated within VP but under the AUX node, the infinitive being inserted 
under V. Molencki (1991: 139) supports such treatment of the pre-modals even though it 
produces ripples in the lexicon: ‘the analysis will complicate the lexical component, because 
we have to introduce two lexical entries [e.g.] cunnan into it. One would be cunnan\ followed 
by pure NPs and the other cumian2 taking infinitival complements. ’ Although van Kemenade 
(1992a, 1992b) continues largely in the same non-unitary spirit, she delves deeper into the 
syntactic analysis of the pre-modals. One thing that changes is the theoretical framework 
which in this case is the Government-Binding theory. Van Kemenade (1992a, 1992b) offers a 
tripartite division of the pre-modals. In accordance with the division, a pre-modal can be:
a. a main verb when it selects its own subject, is followed by an NP or clausal 
complement, has non-modal or deontic semantics. An example of such an occurrence 
of mceg is sentence (2.15) and its tree-diagrammed representation ensues in Figure 
2.11. (both the example and tree diagram are taken from van Kemenade 1992a: 151):
(2.15)butan tweo, gif hie [>a blotan mehten (subj) 
except two, i f  they them sacrifice might 
‘except two, if they could (be able to) sacrifice them’
(Oros. 115,14)
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S p e c C ’ C T
C  I”
gif / Xs p e d ’ F  
hie / \  
V ”  I
m e ^ te r i
s p e c ' s / ’V ’
P R O  / \
N P  V
f>a bio tan
Figure 2.11. A tree diagram of sentence (2.15)
As a main verb, the pre-modal is generated under V in V” (former VP). V” itself is 
dominated by I’ (former INFL or AUX), ‘a universal category which in highly inflected 
languages contains tense and agreement morphology and in [Present-Day] English (...) at 
least the modal auxiliaries’ (Nagle 1992: 272). has the subject under sped’ which
is understood as repeated under specV’. Notice that in the diagram above, the I node is empty 
in absence of any auxiliary.
b. a main verb when it is followed by an infinitival complement yet it does not select its 
own subject. Pre-modals used with epistemic semantics or in impersonal constructions 
usually fall into this category, e.g.:
(2.16) ealle hie Jtaet anmodlice wilnodan Jjaet hie his word gehyran moston 
all they that unanimously desired that they his words hear must 
‘they all unanimously desired that they might hear his words’
(Bl. Horn., 219. 34) (example and translation from van Kemenade 1992a: 152)
The deep structure of (2.16) differs from that of (2.15) in that the surface subject of (2.16) is 
generated in the lowest VP as the subject of his word gehyran. Later it is raised to sped’ 
immediately dominated by I” . The status of the pre-modal as a main verb under V stays intact.
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c. an auxiliary when it takes an infinitival complement. This category embraces the 
application of wile and scecil as markers of futurity, e.g.:
(2.17) wenen and wilnian Sast ge lange libban scylan her onworulde 
think and want that you long live shall here on world 
‘think and wish that you will live long in this world’
(Boethius. 46. 31)
V
Figure 2.12. A tree diagram of sentence (2.17) (the example and tree diagram taken from van
Kemenade 1992a: 156-157)
According to van Kemenade (1992a, 1992b), only in such cases is there enough justification
inserted under I in I’.
In a recent study, however, Romero (2005) once again denies the pre-modals the 
auxiliary specification. She also brings back the focus to the NP/infinitive complement
happens when they take an NP or PP complement, or as semi-lexical verbs when they choose 
an infinitival complement. Accordingly, two different syntactic positions are available to the
\;n
V
for regarding the pre-modal as auxiliaries. Witness that scylan in Figure 2.12. is generated
dichotomy. It is argued that the pre-modals can function as either lexical verbs, which
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pre-modals: V in VP to a pre-modal which is lexical verb and vModal in vModalP to a semi- 
lexical pre-modal. If the former position is hardly remarkable as it is a continuation of the 
previous studies, the latter means that another phrase termed vModalP is introduced to the tree 
diagram. The phrase is reserved for the pre-modal -  infinitive construction. Thus, a 
representation of sentence (2.18) is presented in Figure 2.13. (the sentence and tree diagram 
ire taken from Romero 2005: 116, the PDE translation mine):
[2.18) scealt oncnawan jjone gesettan dom
thou shall understand the made judgement 
‘you must understand the judgment made’
(ApT: 5.5. 71; 1050)
TP
T
In Figure 2.13., which is a reflection of Chomsky’s (1995) minimalist program, the new 
phrase, vModalP, can be seen to contain the head vModal which governs VP. The T position 
is originally empty as the clause is devoid of any auxiliary. Only later is it filled by the pre- 
modal, a consequence of the V-2 movement after the subject was moved from Spec in VP to 
Spec in TP.
In parallel with the above mentioned endeavors, Goossens (1987a) proposes an 
alternative Functional Grammar-inspired scheme that encompasses a syntactic treatment of 
the pre-modals. In his earlier publications Goossens (1985a, 1985b) develops the scheme for 
the PDE modals and applies it to the OE pre-modals partly as a reaction to Lightfoot’s (1979)
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notion of the sudden reanalysis of the pre-modals into auxiliaries. As such, Goossens’s 
(1987a) proposal diverges from Lightfoot’s (1979) in two respects: 1) it is out of place to 
consider the pre-modals in terms of syntax only, especially from diachronic point of view. 
The syntactic status of the pre-modals, as well as later modals, is at every point of their 
development intertwined with their semantics. 2) his view of the pre-modals is necessarily 
gradualist and inseparable from the idea of grammaticalization. Goossens (1987a: 118) draws 
a grammaticalization scale for the (pre)-modals, a slightly modified version of which from 
Goossens (1996: 45) is presented in Figure 2.14.:
full predicate > complex predicate formation > operator 
Figure 2.14. A grammaticaliztion scale of the (pre)-modals
Without going into the details of the Functional Grammar theorizing, one can say that the 
labels on the scale stand for the particular stages of the syntactic and semantic evolution of the 
pre-modals:
a a full predicate is a pre-modal used as a lexical verb with a non-modal (facultative) 
meaning. A full predicate typically selects its arguments (the subject, the direct object
NP).
b. complex predicate formation involves the use of a pre-modal with a deontic or 
epistemic meaning followed by a predicate which ‘imposes its argument structure 
upon the whole combination’ (Goossens 1996: 46).
c. an operator describes a pre-modal in the most grammaticalized use when it serves to 
convey futurity or appears in conditional or subjunctive clauses without any 
discernible modal meaning.
As the grammaticalization proceeds, a full predicate shows a propensity to develop an 
application in complex predicate formation which in turn may evolve into a use as an 
operator. Inevitably then, the model presented is dynamic in that the pre-modals are all the 
time in the process of change. As a consequence, a given occurrence of a pre-modal may 
represent an area of overlap between two stages. At a given point in time, an investigation 
into the pre-modals should evidence which stage on the scale a particular member of the class 
has reached. An attempt at such an analysis is made in Goossens (1987a) where two extremes 
of the grammaticalization scale are found, that is conn and sceal. The former, still primarily a
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full predicate, only flirts with complex predicate formation uses in /Elfric homilies while the 
latter, a fully fledged part o f complex predicate formation, is also attested functioning as an 
operator. It is also noteworthy that Warner's (1993) assessment of sceal and carm as 
respectively a central and peripheral members of the category of the OE auxiliaries is in tune 
with Goossens’s (1987a) findings concerning the extremes of the grammaticalization scale.
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Chapter 3 
The pre-modal verbs
3.0. Introduction
The chapter offers a comprehensive and detailed investigation of non-epistemic necessity 
expressible by means of the OE pre-modals. Quite matter-of-factly, it is also, by itself, an 
investigation of those pre-modals whose semantics falls within the range of non-epistemic 
necessity. If pre-modals irrelevant for the notion of necessity are sifted out, one is left to 
direct their attention to the following five verbs: agan (to) infinitive, pearf, sceal, mot and 
mceg. In order to amplify the case for the idiosyncrasy of the necessity conveyed by each pre- 
modal, I analyze the verbs in separate sections. The order of the sections is a reflection of the 
order in which the pre-modals are arranged above. So is it a reflection of the assumption that 
it is essential to start with those pre-modals that center on deontic necessity and arrive at a 
complete picture by highlighting permission-related pre-modals, i.e. mot and mceg.
A convenient starting point will, however, be made by placing the five pre-modals in a 
broader context o f their text frequency. Table 3.1. compares the normalized frequencies of the 
five verbs per 100,000 words in the DOE and Helsinki corpora. It is of no secondary 
importance to realize that within the group we have to do with enormously popular tokens like 
sceal and mceg on the one hand, and hardly noticeable verbs like agan (to) infinitive on the 
other hand. With respect to the frequency of the particular verbs, the methodology of 
compiling samples of examples to be looked into varies from verb to verb. With low 
frequency pre-modals agan (to) infinitive and pearf I have collected all the occurrences of the 
verbs in the 5,291,236 word DOE corpus while in the case of sceal, mot and mceg I have 
obtained a number of examples from texts selected from the OE part of the Helsinki corpus. 
The exacts details of sample size and text selection for each of the three pre-modals are given
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n sections 3.3., 3.4. and 3.5. Consequently, depending on whether an example comes from 
he DOE or the Helsinki corpus, the codification differs. If an example comes from the DOE 
:orpus, the codification indicates the segment of the corpus to which the text has been 
issigned, the short title of the text, as specified by Mitchell et al. (1975, 1979), and the 
;orresponding Cameron number (cf. Cameron 1973). In the case of an example retrieved from 
the Helsinki corpus, I include the code of the text, e.g. COBENRUL for the Benedictine Rule 
[cf Kyto 1993), followed by the number of the line which indicates the location of the 
sxample in the text in the corpus.4 Each example is followed by a gloss in which I adhere to 
the convention of the literal translation of a given pre-modal. Thus, mot, for instance, is each 
time glossed as must irrespective of whether is it is used with the meaning of permission or 
PE necessity.
Verb N. F.
sceal 340.3
mceg 221.5
mot 74.4
pearf 5.0
agan (to) infinitive 1.2
fable 3.1. Normalized frequencies of the necessity-related pre-modals
¡J.I. agan
Far from coming across as a major conveyer of obligative modality in Old English, agan does 
take its modal roots in that period. Remarkably, some accounts of the semantics of the OE 
pre-modals choose to overlook this late OE aspect of the meaning of agan. Thus, for instance, 
B&T focuses only on the widespread application of agan as a verb of possession, Tellier 
(1962) notes the advent of the sense of necessity with agan in the twelfth century, yet does 
hot fully acknowledge it until the thirteenth century. Nor can one find agan among the OE 
pre-modals of necessity in Warner (1993). A totally different perspective is adopted by OED 
which, rather than dismiss the OE obligative uses of agan, accommodates them by showing 
that they gradually lead to the PDE status of ought as a marker of deontic necessity (cf. Harris 
1986, Myhill 1997 for issues connected with the dwindling frequency of ought in Present-Day
4 For ease of reference, on page 205 I enclose a full list of the Helsinki Corpus texts which I have used along 
with their codes.
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English). An in-depth treatment of the semantic and syntactic development of OE agan and its 
subsequent incarnation ought is provided by Nordlinger and Traugott (1997) and fine-tuned 
by Traugott and Dasher (2005). They convincingly outline the possible channels through 
which the original possessive semantics of agan may have been pushed toward deontic
necessity.
As observed by B&T and Prokosch (1939), agan has cognates in other Germanic 
languages, namely Gothic aigan, Old Norse eiga, Old Saxon egan and Old High German 
eigan, the semantics of which revolves around the notion of possession. Watkins (2000: 1-2) 
adduces *aik- ‘to be master of, possess’ as the PIE root of all these Germanic forms with an 
intermediate proto-Germanic form being *aigan. It can be added that the same root spawns 
two other semantically related verbs in English: own, which is derived from the past participle 
of agan, namely agen, and owe. This twofold development of agan in English is brought up 
by Harris and Campbell (1995: 178) who consider own and owe the lexical reflexes of agan 
which remain true to the verbal origin of the form after agan in some contexts is swept up by 
the processes of grammaticalization. Without invalidating Harris and Campbell’s (1995) 
hypothesis, the same development can be seen as an actualization of Hopper’s (1991) 
principle of divergence (cf. 2.6.) A story of a frequently used verb of possession gradually 
becoming a verb of deontic necessity is, quite understandably, nothing uncommon. Denning 
¡(1987) and Bybee et al. (1994) give a cross-linguistic overview of the possible sources of 
deontic necessity expressions, erstwhile verbs of possession being commonly attested. 
Notable examples could include Latin habere or Polish mieć. In English a similar distance, 
yet at a different pace, is traveled by the verb have whose grammaticalization and PDE status 
as a quasi-modal of deontic necessity have been scrutinized by, among others, Bybee and 
Pagliuca (1985) and Fischer (1994). As van der Auwera and Plungian (1998: 95) see it, verbs 
meaning ‘have’ are inclined to make a direct leap to PE necessity, with the PI necessity stage 
being omitted.
3.11. agan with the sense of possession
Invariably, the possessive semantics of agan is to be linked with the syntactic pattern of 
aganNP. The corpus pinpoints a variety of contexts in which such a construction occurs 
with a plethora of the different shades of meanings referring to having, owing and belonging. 
The cline of possession meanings extends from those which embrace most concrete objects, 
e g. domestic animals.
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(3.1.1) se hyra se })e nis hyrde 7 se f>e nah J?a sceap,
the hired-servant this that not-is shepherd and this that not-own the sheep 
‘The hired servant who is not a shepherd and who does not own the sheep’
(SEG25AJn (WSCp) B8.4.3.4)
through those which take more abstract objects hardly imaginable in terms of literal 
possession, e.g. agangeleafe ‘to have faith’:
(3.1.2) J>e heo ahte trumne geleafan a to Sam aelmightigan 
fo r  she had strong faith in the almighty 
‘for she had strong faith in the Almighty.’
(SEG03.\Jud A4.2)
Fischer (1994: 151) avails herself of the concept of semantic bleaching, first noted by Heine 
and Reh (1982) and Lehmann (1982), while accounting for similar extensions in the meaning 
; of have, another verb of possession. This verb ‘from the very beginning (at least from historic 
} Old English onwards) had a range of meanings centered around the notion of possession. At 
I one end of the scale have could express pure possession interchangeable with verbs meaning 
‘to own’ etc.; at the other end, it would, much more vaguely, imply a relation between its 
subject and object, wherein it comes very close to the existential verb be’ (Fischer 1994. 151- 
152). The corpus data, through pointing to the aforementioned cline, indicate that agan 
develops a web of meanings in accordance with a parallel formula. Semantic bleaching may 
constitute the first step to the grammaticalization of a verb of possession into an auxiliary, as 
Fischer (1994: 152) further notes. Even more significantly, Bybee and Pagliuca (1985), after 
surveying their fifty language sample, observe recurrent cross-linguistic co-existence of the 
generalization of a meaning of a lexical item and the process of its grammaticalization. In the 
case of agan, the bleaching does induce grammaticalization which goes hand in hand with the 
verb slowly encroaching upon the semantic area of deontic necessity.
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.1.2. agan (to) infinitive
ls noted above, the weakening of the sense of possession triggers the development of lexical 
gan into a modal auxiliary, hence the late OE spate of the agan (to) infinitive construction, 
vhich eventually comes to be a firmly established marker of deontic necessity in later 
inglish. The DOE corpus uncovers 63 cases of agan followed by an infinitival complement 
nd agan is the only pre-modal which shows consistent attachment to the inflected infinitive. I 
nd only one example to the contrary. It is shown in (3.1.3) and has agan complemented by 
le bare infinitive folian
3.1.3) gif hit ani de5, hu ah Jaarfore ftolian ]aa regullice wrecae.
i f  it any does, he ought therefore undergo the canonical punishment 
‘if anyone does that, he should undergo the canonical punishment.’
(SEG34./BenR BIO.3.1.1)
>n account of this one-off deviation from the routine practice of agan to take the inflected 
lfinitive, I follow the convention of putting to in agan (to) infinitive in brackets.
to
geldanne
to
syllanne
to
habenne
to donne other total
agan 11 6 6 5 35 63
Table 3.1.1. Co-occurrence of agan with infinitives
.1.3. agan to geldanne
he frequency of different nonfinite complements of agan is presented in Table 3.1.1. 
risibly, there is a remarkable preponderance of the occurrences of to geldanne as a 
amplement of agan, which is of interest in view of Nordlinger and Traugott’s (1997) 
amment on this collocation. They emphasize the use of agan to geldanne as a gloss for Latin 
ebere (meaning ‘to owe’), which finds confirmation in five out of the eleven occurrences. It 
roves futile to seek any necessity meaning in those eleven instances of the construction, 
lough. Even more so, if we acknowledge Mitchell’s (1988) slamming the door on admitting 
aything beyond the sense of possession before the end of the eleventh century in the 
întences of the following type:
52
.1.4) egressus autem seruus ille inuenit unum de conseruis suis qui debebat ei centum 
denarios et tenens suffocabat eum dicens redde quod debes
gefoerde soSlice 5egn Se gefand vel gemitte enne of efnedegnum his sede ahte 
went indeed servant who found vel met one o f coservants his this-that had 
to geldenna hundrad scillinga 7 geheald hine cuoedende geld £>ast 9u aht to seldanne 
to pay hundred shillings and held him saying pay that thou hcn>e to pay
‘The servant was walking when he met one of his co-servants who owed him a 
hundred shillings, he grabbed him saying, ‘Give me back what you owe me.” 
(SEG61.\MtGl (Li) C8.1.1)
¡.1.5) TElc mon eomestlice ah to geldene sum |?ing, and haefd odeme mon Joe him sceal 
each man therefore ought to pay some thing, and has another man that him shall 
sum ding; forjjon de nan mon nis de naebbe sume synne, 
some thing; because no man not-is who not-has some sin,
‘Indeed, each man owes someone something and there is someone who owes him 
something. It is because no man is without guilt,’
(SEG12.VLHomM 7 Bl.5.7.)
js a matter of fact, one cannot but side with Mitchell (1988) when he argues that the agan to 
jeIdanne constructions such as in (3.1.4) and (3.1.5) do not lend ‘any support to the notion 
hat agan alone means ‘to be obliged to’; the sense of the Old English is ‘You have something 
b pay. Pay it.’ In other words, agan means ‘to possess’ and the inflected infinitive qualifies 
he object. The comparison is with MnE ‘I have my house to let’, not with ‘I have to let my 
touse” (Mitchell 1988: 77). Indisputable as the point made by Mitchell (ibid.) is, a 
¡omparison of agan in (3 .1.4) and (3 .1.5) reveals quite remarkable differences. In the former, 
igan to geldanne appears twice, each time as a gloss for Latin debere and each time with 
■eference to the most prototypical type of a debt, namely a financial one. By no means, on the 
Dther hand, does the debt in (3.1.5) concern financial matters, it has some moral overtones 
nstead. What is owed and/or paid for is a guilt or sin committed. Considering that (3.1.5) is 
not a line translated from Latin, it testifies to the fact that semantic bleaching of the 
possession meaning in the case of agan continues.
Also, I believe the significance of agan to geldanne lies elsewhere. This juxtaposition, 
quite likely merely a convenient way of translating debere at first, may be the first incentive 
to follow agan with an infinitive. If the textual popularity of this practice is any indication of
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its frequency in the spoken language, then the expression can be said to have acquired an 
aspect of idiomaticity. A mechanism that yet more enhances the fostering of agan to geldatme 
in Old English is that connected with a speaker’s mental lexicon being affected by the traces 
left by frequently used words. Theorized by Bybee (1985), the mechanism is credited by Krug 
(1988, 2000) with much explanatory force behind the establishment of word sequences and 
grammatical structures. The pivotal assumption this theory revolves around is that a lexical 
item which is repeatedly swept into the consciousness of the speaker is very likely to leave a 
mark and, thereby, to stay there. Subsequently, a point is reached when a speaker’s familiarity 
with the item boosts its frequency, which in turn creates an environment favorable for 
grammaticalization.
Furthermore, an interesting observation that forces itself after an investigation of the 
corpus is a relatively high rate of recurrence of agan with different verbs of social 
transactions. Table 3.1.1. shows that to syllaime (‘to give’) collocates with agan six times 
whereas a host of verbs such as to gifanne (‘to give’), to dcelanne (‘to give, distribute’), to 
bebycganne (‘to sell’), etc. make numerous one-off appearances. My conjecture is that only 
after both a sufficient amount of the semantic bleaching of agan to gyldanne and a number of 
traces left on speakers’ lexicon by this construction is the extension to the verbs of social 
transactions possible. Undoubtedly, a facilitating factor in the genesis of this extension is a 
significant semantic overlap between verbs like to geldanne and the likes of to syllanne. Once 
the novelty of agan (to) infinitive wears off, speakers are ready to experiment with applying 
the structure to new albeit related contexts and substituting semantically related infinitives for 
the one firmly established. The meaning of agan followed by a verb of social transactions, is 
still mostly possessive:
(3 .1.6) 7 heo cwsed to Osulfe 5aet heo hit ahte him wel to syllanne forSon hit waes hire 
and she said to Osulfe that she it ought him well to give because it was her 
morgengifu 
morning-gift
‘She told Osulf that she had it to offer him/was supposed to give it to him as it was her 
morning gift’
(SEG38.\Ch 1445 (HarmD 18) B15.5.7)
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(3.1.7) And landcop 7 hlafordes gifu, pe he on riht age to gifanne.
and tax-for-purchase-of-land and lord's gift that he properly ought to give
‘The tax at the purchase of land and the lord’s gift that he legally has to give’ 
(SEG37.\LawIIIAtr B 14.22)
At the same time, however, Nordlinger and Traugott (1997) and Traugott and Dasher (2005) 
in their in-depth discussion of the OE development of agan emphasize the advent of an 
invited inference of a deontic necessity to pay once the object possessed is no longer 
referential. The focal point of their argument is, in fact, the context wherein agan to geldanne 
occurs, as illustrated in (3.1.4) above.
In [such] cases (...) the debt is referential, but the pennies to pay it off are not (yet). Where the object may 
not yet exist (like the pennies) and especially where it does not yet exist (...) the semantics of possession 
is bleached, and the pragmatic inference of obligation strengthened. Semanticization of the obligation has 
clearly occurred when the object is no longer physical, only cognitive or experiential (...) (Traugott and 
Dasher 2005:139).
Indeed, there seems to be no good reason why this line of reasoning should not also cover the 
;ases like (3 .1.6) and (3 .1.7) where agan is coupled with a verb of social transactions. The 
‘eferential function of the debt in (3 .1.4) or (3.1.5) is now taken over by the deal imposed or 
(greed upon. What is not referential, however, is the thing to be given which is yet to be 
paterialized. Particular contexts may vary to a lesser or greater degree but what is of crucial 
mportance is that an inference of a deontic necessity to give, sell, buy, etc., sneaks into many 
)f those contexts, an inference which is bound to stay.
Obviously, because of the way inference-based semantic change proceeds it is 
mpossible to point a finger to a precise moment when the consummation of the sense of 
leontic necessity in agan (to) infinitive takes place. As noted by Faltz (1989) and Bybee et al. 
¡1994) it takes a transition period before a meaning brought along by an inference can be 
aken to be prevalent in a given item. Beforehand, sentences are encountered where both 
¡enses, the initial one and the inferential one, strive for dominance, undoubtedly, this stage 
teing preceded by the unquestioned presence of the initial meaning and a slight implication of 
he second. In Traugott and Dasher’s (2005) view it is the time needed for an invited inference 
o evolve into a generalized invited inference. That being so, linguists venture converse 
ypotheses as to the location in time of the arrival of the obligative sense of agan. Tellier 
1962), while providing the first instance of ahte to habanne from 1085, opts for the end of
55
;he twelfth century as a relevant date whereas aforementioned Mitchell (1988) moves this date 
tack by a century.
possesssion agan to 
geldanne
possession/ 
deontic necessity
deontic necessity total
agan (to) 10 11 8 34 63
infinitive (15.9%) (17.4%) (12.7%) (54%) (100%)
Table 3 .1.2. Distribution of meanings of agan (to) infinitive
3.1.4. Possession vs. deontic necessity in agan (to) infinitive
A semantic analysis of the tokens of agan (to) infinitive in the corpus, which is shown in 
Table 3.1.2., reveals that despite the overall small number of the occurrences of the 
construction, it seems to be in broad strokes reserved for the obligative meaning. The figures 
presented in Table 3 .1.2. testify to the sense of possession being recessive when agan takes an 
infinitival complement (10 out of the 63 occurrences exhibit a dominating meaning of 
tossession rather than deontic necessity). A likely explanation is that possession clings to the 
older construction agan+NP, an inference of deontic necessity constituting an inherent part of 
almost every use of the novel structure agan (to) infinitive. The possession meanings are 
illustrated in (3.1.8) and (3.1.9).
(3.1.8) 7 se cyning cwasó pa pet he nahte nan land ut to syllanne. 
and that king said then that he not-ought no land out to give 
‘And the king then said that he had no land out there to give.’
(SEG38.\Ch 1242 (Harm 108) B15.2.23)
(3 .1 9) paet se deofol eow nage naht on to bestelenne on pam vtemestan daege 
that that devil you not-ought nothing upon to steal on the last day
eowres lifes ungeandettes 
of-your life unconfessed
‘So that the devil would have nothing of yours to steal upon on the last day of your 
unconfessed life’
(SEG21.\HomU 26 (Nap 29) B3.4.26)
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Two points require some comment. First of all, both contexts make an inference of deontic 
necessity conceivable. Take example (3.1.9) where a primary possessive interpretation ‘so 
that the devil would have nothing to break into’ implies another interpretation somewhere 
along the lines of ‘so that the devil couldn’t/was not permitted to break into anything.’ 
Secondly, among the ten possessive instances of agan (to) infinitive there is none to be found 
which would move the object NP to the position following the infinitive, an index to the NP 
being still totally dependant on the finite verb.
3 .1.5. agon (to) infinitive with the meaning of deontic necessity
On the opposite pole there are 34 cases of agan (to) infinitive which unequivocally take 
deontic necessity as a dominant semantic area. The earliest example that I have identified 
comes from the second half of the ninth century, see (3.1.10) below, which should not, 
however, obscure the fact that the bulk of such occurrences spread over the subsequent three 
centuries.
(3.1.10) Deah hwa gebycgge his dohtor on freowenne. ... nage he hie ut on 
though who sell his daughters into slavery, not-ought he them out on
eldeodig folc to bebvcgganne. 
alien people to sell
‘nevertheless, who would like to sell his daughters into slavery, he cannot sell them to 
alien people’
(SEG3 7 .YLawAfEl B14.4.3)
Both Traugott and Dasher (2005) and the DOE make sure to clearly distinguish 
between the instances where agan makes use of an infinitive of habban as a complement, as 
in:
(3.1.11) o65e hwilce gerihtae he ahte to habbanne to xii monjDum of 6®re scire. 
or what dues he ought to have to XII months o f that scire
‘or what dues he ought to have by the year from that scire’
(SEG43.\ChronE (Plummer) B17.9)
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id those with all the other infinitival complements. The rationale behind this division rests 
n an argument that ‘in [such a] construction the subject is defined in the DOE as ‘the person 
> whom the obligation is due.’ i.e. the subject is in the semantic recipient role’ (Traugott and 
lasher 2005: 139-140). Indeed, the peculiarity of (3.1.11) consists in the lack of any explicit 
gent in the last clause, habban being a non-agentive verb. At the same time, as Traugott and 
lasher (2005: 140) further argue, the subject can assume the role of a beneficiary only as a 
»suit of an action. The identity of the agent and the time of the action are left unsaid, which is 
f no consequence as the action is clearly implied to take place anyway, the subject being 
ntitled or ‘obliged’ to benefit from it. Traugott and Dasher (2005 140) paraphrase agan to 
abenne as ‘to have/get the right to’ and believe the construction to enjoy the status of an 
liom, the six occurrences of this construction in the DOE corpus providing a corroborative, if 
ot conclusive, piece of evidence that their assessment is correct. The right of the subject of 
gem to haberme to receive profits is derived from various external, usually legal, norms, like 
he position of a king in (3.1.11). Needless to say, the subject is each time a person whose 
ugh social status provokes certain expectations in the speaker.
All in all, agan to haberme emerges as an exponent of deontic necessity which is 
hown implicitly. Nordlinger and Traugott (1997: 9) are very cautious about advancing a far- 
eaching obligative sense of the idiom in favor of possessive meaning still holding its own. In 
his scenario the meaning of agan is said to read ‘get, come to have.’ I am of the opinion that 
he possession of agan as employed in agan to haberme is significantly bleached, otherwise 
i juxtaposition of two possession verbs would be out of place. Agan, as evidenced by the 
;orpus data, more often than not carries deontic necessity when followed by an infinitive.
As Table 3 .1.2. makes clear, the most numerous group of the obligative uses of agan 
(to) infinitive is made up by those instances where the subject is a person who is confronted 
tvith deontic necessity. All the twenty-eight cases manage to conform to this formula, as in
[3.1.10) for instance. For our analysis to be coherent, it should, however, be still borne in 
mind that probably none of the twenty-eight examples is totally devoid of at least a taint of 
Reached possession meaning. Using Coates’s (1983) terminology of fuzzy sets it could be 
¡aid that the merger area between deontic necessity and possession is remarkably significant. 
:t appears that, for the reasons of the specificity of the access we have to Old English, or to 
my dead language, linguists, including the author of this dissertation, tend to see the 
meanings they need to see in some sentences in order to prove their theses. A plausible 
llustration could be Van der Gaaf (1931), Visser (1963-73), Mitchell (1985) and others who 
lim to prove that have comes to express necessity as early as in Old English, an argument
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¡sting on a semantic analysis only, and Fischer’s (1994) diatribe against advancing any 
sontic modality and full grammaticalization in the case of have before the respective word 
rder change in late Middle EnglishYEarly Modern English. In other words, only after have 
;ases to admit NP objects before the following infinitive does it become an eligible marker 
f deontic necessity and a fully-fledged auxiliary. A similar battle could rage over agan, 
onsider sentence (3.1.12):
3.1.12) And (>u ahst to fyllene jrine seofen tidsangas under daeg and niht, 
and thou ought to fill  your seven services under day and night 
‘and you ought to/have to fulfill your seven services every day and night’
(SEG21.\HomU 45 (Nap 56) B3.4.45)
)n the one hand, considering the homiletic context, the authority of the speaker, the second 
terson singular subject and an activity main verb, a sense of deontic necessity rarely gets any 
iirther in Old English. Nor does it in Present-Day English. Even the word order with the 
)bject following to fyllene subscribes to the claim of the auxiliarization of agan. A PDE 
ranslation along the lines of ‘You ought to fulfill your seven services...’ might be felt too 
veak, a stronger verb like have to serving the purpose more effectively. On the other hand, 
proponents of the possession reading of agan in Old English could easily justify their 
Assessment through interpreting (3.1.12) as ‘You have your seven services to fulfill...’ Thus, 
ft follows that, even though far from being prototypically possessive, a sentence like (3.1.12) 
barely implies deontic necessity. The argument of the word order could also be invalidated on 
the frequency grounds since the object-main verb pattern prevails in 24 out of the 34 
instances.
In my survey I follow the likes of Van der Gaaf (1931), Visser (1963-73) and Mitchell 
(1985) and adopt the semantic approach. Basing on evidence from other pre-modals it seems 
that modal semantics does not necessariliy go together with the appearance of the contraint on 
object NPs to follow main verbs. Consider mot, for example, to which the meanings of 
permission and deontic necessity are ascribed regardless of whether the object NP precedes or 
follows the main verb complement (compare examples (3.4.12) and (3.4.13) below).
With this proviso in mind, I set out to analyze the focal group of the agan (to) 
infinitive occurrences, namely the twenty-eight instances with the dominant sense of deontic
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ecessity. My inspection of the obligative agan (to) infinitive occurrences in the DOE corpus 
as led me to enumerate the most frequent parameters those occurrences observe:
(a) animate third person subject
(b) generic reference of subject
(c) paraphrasable by ‘it is important that’
(adopted from Coates 1983: 36)
n the group of the twenty-eight examples, as many as seventeen converge to embrace all 
hose features, a number significant enough to warrant a prototypical use or in Coates’s (1983: 
3) words, ‘the native speaker’s psychological stereotype.’ Remarkably, negative contexts 
lutnumber positive ones by 9 to 8, an index of negated agan being considered more natural 
dth a sense of deontic necessity. While I shall return to the question of negation with agan in 
.1.6., two sentences illustrate the prototypical use, namely (3.1.10) above and (3.1.13):
3.1.13) Daet is, Joaet man ah to forganne ealle fulnyssa, f)e gode laóe syndon, 
that is, that man ought to refrain-from all foulness, that to-God loath is 
‘That is, man should refrain from any foulness that is loath to God.’
(SEG21.\HomU 46 (Nap 57) B3.4.46)
for a sentence to aim for prototypicality, it should be elicited from an instructive piece of 
witing. The majority come from homilies and codes of law.
The obligative occurrences of agan (to) infinitive display a feature of gradiance, as 
itroduced to the study of modal meanings by Leech and Coates (1980). What gradience 
mplies is that different degrees of necessity and subjectivity can be expected in the particular 
ises of the construction. With a view to illustrating the gradience of deontic necessity, I 
onsider it plausible to perceive the instances of agan (to) infinitive as arranged along a cline, 
luch in the vein of Coates’s (1983) scrutiny of the meanings of modals in British English and 
'ollins’s (1991) discussion of the semantics of modals in Australian English. Such an 
pproach in the case of a modal of deontic necessity has the advantage of revealing ‘the 
emantic continuum from strong, subjective, almost performative uses (it is 
nperative/compulsory) to weak requirement (it is important/necessary’) ’ (Collins 1991: 154). 
'oates (1983: 34) predates Collins (1991) with a remark that ‘the value of the concept lies in 
le fact that it allows the linguist to describe a continuum of meaning, with a core and a
60
riphery which can be identified (...). Between those two extremes, there is considerable 
zziness. ’ The cline of the deontic necessity of agan (to) infinitive in Old English has its 
jstration below:
.1.14) We habbad gesett (last preostas nagon to wunigenne ne to masssigenne ne to 
we have decreed that priests not-onght to dwell nor to say-mass nor to 
fulligenne an nanre cyrcan Jae to oQre burge gebyrige 
baptize on no church that to other city belongs
‘we have decreed that priests are not to dwell or say mass or baptize in any church that 
is subject to another town’
(SEG35.\ChrodR 1. B10.4.1)
1.1.15) Nah nader to farenne ne Wilisc man on ^Englisc land ne ¿Englisc on Wylisc 
not-onght neither to go no Welsh man on English land no English on Welsh 
de ma,
the more
‘Neither a Welshman may trespass on the English land nor may an Englishman 
trespass on the Welsh land any more’
(SEG37.\LawDuns B14.31)
3.1.16) Donne agan weofoddenas to smeagenne symble, Joaet hi hurudinga heora lif 
then ought altar-servants to consider always, that they at-any-rate their lives 
fadian, swa swa to cyrcan gebyrige mid rihte.
arrange as as to church be-of-concern with right
‘Altar servants should always take care to arrange their lives so as to make the church 
be rightly of concern to them’
(SEG36.\WPol 2.1.1. (Jost)B13.2.1.1)
(3.1.17) j)a forsoc he. 7 saede j^ aet he hit nahte to donne.
then refused he and said that he it ought-not to do
‘Then he refused; and said, that he ought not to do it’
(SEG42.\ChronA (Plummer) B17.1)
Sentence (3.1.12), while coming closest to the upper extreme of the cline, stands out like a 
beacon of attention. It is the only instance of agan with a non-third-person subject and one of
the two instances, the other being (3.1.17), whose subject has a specific reference. Due to the
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second person singular pronoun in the subject position, (3.1.12) is marked off from the rest of 
the examples as the single strongest exponent of deontic necessity. In Palmer’s (1979: 62) 
view, deontic necessity is at its strongest when the subject of a modal is you and when ‘the 
speaker is in a position to lay the obligation, and is thus in a position of some authority.’ The 
context of (3.1.12) stands as a clear indication that the speaker’s position is that of superiority 
as he is a master who addresses a youth. What debilitates the strength of the modal expression 
is, however, the source of the necessity. The speaker merely allows himself to be a conveyer 
of religious norms. As I have noted above, the necessity imposed strikes one as quite 
vehement in that it might take a verb have to to do justice to its strength in a PDE translation. 
To use Sweetser’s (1990) nomenclature, the strength of the necessity encoded in the situation 
would call for a considerable amount of resistance on the part of the Agonist were he or she to 
oppose it.
In example (3.1.14) the speakers explicitly mark their involvement, which renders this 
instance the most subjective of all in the corpus, the remaining twenty-seven occurrences 
subscribing to the pattern of weak subjectivity as elaborated on by Lyons (1982) and Traugott 
(1989). Furthermore, (3 .1.14) is exceptional insofar as the speakers present themselves as the 
source of the necessity. At the same time, however, the subject is third person plural with a 
generic reference, which has a weakening effect. The authority of the speakers as law-givers 
cannot be questioned, nor can the resultant pervasive nature of the necessity. Example
(3.1.15) falls within the prototype I have sketched above as emerging from my corpus. It is 
representative of an external source of deontic necessity in the shape of legal regulations. The 
subject is third person singular yet still generic. As with other codes of law, the sense of 
necessity can be strongly felt due to the imminent prospect of the penalty enforcement rather 
than the actual authority of the speaker.
Not infrequently, as in example (3.1.16), the necessity expressed by agan merges into 
a weaker force, evoking the cumulative effect of a piece of advice. Sentences of this type are 
traceable to handbooks and manuals where the moral good or the well-being of the subject 
receives priority. The instructions are rather universal than specific, hence the generic 
reference of the subject. As with most examples, it is hard to identify the speaker as the source 
of the necessity. Add to that the fact that the verb following agan is that of a mental state 
rather than an activity verb and it takes only a moment’s thought to realize that (3.1.16) goes 
lower down the cline. Due to its non-generic subject reference and a past time reference, the 
last of the examples, that is (3.1.17), is a solitary representative of this type in the whole
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;orpus. The example, a true deontic statement, is hardly subjective whatsoever as the speaker 
nerely reports rather weak deontic necessity in the past.
In an attempt to provide a gauge of the strength of deontic necessity pertaining to a 
particular example containing a PDE modal verb must, Coates (1983: 36) assembles a matrix 
in which a set of the occurrences of must are cast against eight features. The features are 
presented below:
(a) second person subject,
(b) speaker involvement,
(c) speaker has authority over subject,
(d) verb is agentive,
(e) paraphrasable by ‘it is obligatory/absolutely essential that’,
(f) animate subject
(g) paraphrasable by ‘it is important that’,
(h) inanimate subject.
(adaopted from Coates 1989:36)
An advantage that such a matrix has is that it fits the corpus examples of must into a coherent 
pattern. On no account is the order of those features random. Rather, it is understood to reflect 
(he cline of deontic necessity and subjectivity, the upper features being indicative of stronger 
necessity and subjectivity and the lower features gradually pointing to weak necessity, weak 
subjectivity or lack thereof. Thus, for example, an occurrence interpreted as (a), (b), (c) and
(d) positive will be more modal than one which exhibits features (f) and (g). As a result, 
Coates (1983) manages to arrive at a detailed illustration of the gradience of the deontic 
necessity of must in Present-Day English. Agan being a verb of deontic necessity in Old 
English, I believe it is worth an effort to confront the examples given above with Coates’s 
(1983) parameters with a view to obtaining a picture showing the gradience of the necessity of 
agan as well as comparing the strength of the necessity encoded in PDE must and OE agan.
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Parameter a b c d e f g h
(3.1.12) + ? + + + + _
(3.1.14) + + -/+ + + -
(3.1.15) - + + + + -
(3.1.13) - + + - + +
(3.1.10) - ? + - + +
(3.1.16) - ? - - + +
(3.1.17) - - + - + +
. w
strong necessity/subjectivity weak necessity/subjectivity
(core) (periphery)
Table 3.1.3. Matrix to show the gradience of the deontic necessity of agan
Drawing upon Table 3.1.3., one cannot fail to notice the gravitation of the occurrences of 
agan toward the skirt and periphery of the cline with the strong extreme to a large extent left 
unoccupied. Considering that (3.1.12) is a sole representative of the core, it is a safe bet to 
state that agan steers clear of strong necessity and strongly subjective contexts. Otherwise, the 
examples split up into three groups. Examples (3.1.14) and (3.1.15) display warranted 
inclinations toward stronger necessity, (3.1.13) and (3.1.10) hesitate between the center of the 
cline and a visible periphery-bound orientation whereas examples (3.1.16) and (3.1.17) are 
typical of very weak necessity and weakly subjective contexts. If we recall that 17 out of 28 
examples available are compatible with a weaker force of necessity, i.e. feature g , then the 
answer to the question of which area of the cline is most heavily exploited must be that it is 
the center and periphery. This finding is consonant with what Coates (1983: 13) elicits from 
her research into the clines of root modality, namely a conclusion that ‘[t]he majority of 
examples are found in the skirt and at the periphery.’ A difference worthy of note between the 
cline of the meaning of a well established modal must and that of the meaning of a developing 
modal agan is that in the former it proves relatively easy to pin down a number of strongly 
subjective examples carrying a high degree of deontic necessity (cf. Coates 1983). Virtually 
empty is the core of the agan cline, a concomitant of the verb’s budding modality.
The total absence of feature h needs some accounting for at this point. All of the agan 
(to) infinitive instances in Old English take animate subjects as this construction does not 
occur with inanimate subjects until well into Middle English. Nordlinger and Traugott (1997)
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te the first such examples at the beginning of the fourteenth century. Two points require 
centuation in connection with this development. Traugott and Dasher (2005. 108-109) shed 
me light the first of them through stressing that in a prototypical deontically modalized 
iglish sentence an agent is construed as the subject. Any other variants with non-agentive 
:rbs or foreshadowed agents in favor of inanimate subjects are possible yet they enjoy a 
jripheral status. Hence, their delayed appearance is justified. The second point centers on the 
Dtion of scope which is traditionally taken to split into two types: narrow and wide, the 
)rmer found in non-epistemic modality and the latter traceable to epistemic modality (cf. 
.yons 1977, Bybee 1988). Nordlinger and Traugott (1997) clarify the issue of scope and 
mphasize the need to distinguish between narrow and wide scope with reference to deontic 
íodality as well. In their article it is convincingly argued that when an agent appears as a 
ubject of a sentence, as in (3.1.18):
3 .118) mycel is and masre, f>aet sacerd ah. to donne folce to j)earfe, gif he
great is and splendid, that priest ought to do people according-io need if  he 
his drihtne gecwemó mid rihte. 
his lord pleases with right
‘it is great and splendid that a priest ought to deal with people according to their needs, 
if he is to please the Lord rightfully’
(SEG36.\WPol 2 11 (Jost) B13.2.1.1)
then the deontic modal, in this case a verb of deontic necessity, links the subject to the 
proposition by means of the necessity. Such a situation epitomizes narrow scope, also referred 
to as prepositional scope, of a modal verb. Wide scope with deontics is attested diachronically 
later and less frequently than narrow scope. Wide scope requires a scenario where the agent is 
relegated to the background, or, in Talmy’s (2000) force dynamic framework, the Agonist is 
demoted, and the function of the subject is taken over by an inanimate NP which belongs to 
the proposition. As can be easily deduced, the earliest example of wide scope of deontic agan 
coincides with pinning down the first instance of an inanimate subject o f this verb:
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.1.19) before fte noun Whan goddys seruyse owyf) to be doun. 
before the noon-time when G od’s service ought to be done 
‘before noon, when God’s work should be done’
(1303 Rob. Of Brunne. Handl. Svnne 1024 [Visser 1969: 1815]) (example and translation from 
Nordlinger and Traugott 1997: 11)
hus, for scope of a deontic to be wide, a non-agentive inanimate subject of this deontic is 
jquired, a condition not met by any of the twenty-eight obligative occurrences of agan in the 
orpus. The two theses, the one dealing with the prototypicality of agents as the subjects of
eontic modals and the other pertaining to narrow/wide scope are complementary. They result
l the construal of narrow scope with deontic modals as a prototype which develops 
iachronically earlier than peripheral wide scope. This ties in with the observations made by 
roossens (1987a) who, while trying to show different degrees of the semantic and syntactic 
volution of the pre-modals in Old English, attests no inanimate subjects with cunnan and a 
andful of inanimate subjects with sculan. The choice of these two verbs is, of course, not 
ccidental, cunnan being a notorious ‘hesitant companion to the other modals’ (Nagle 1989. 
¡4) and sculan being one of the most advanced on the way to grammaticalization and 
bsorption of modal meanings (cf. Plank 1984, Nagle 1989).
.1.6. agan (to) infinitive with negation
Vhen Hermeren (1979: 161) acknowledges that ‘modals in relation to negation are an 
mportant aspect of modal meaning,’ it comes as no surprise that the question of the co­
ncurrence of negation with modality has been looked into from various angles. Lyons (1977. 
168-769) advances the need to distinguish between the negation of modality and the negation 
)f the proposition, or the event5 as proposed by Joos (1964), Jakobson (1971) and Bouma 
1975), which follows a modal marker. This topic has become a recurrent one as picked up, 
or example, by Jacobsson (1979) who, while analyzing the contemporary trends in the usage 
jf the necessity modals, discusses modal negation and main verb negation. Also Palmer 
1979: 26) speaks correspondingly of ‘the negation of the modality and the negation of the 
;vent’ as in:
’ I use the term proposition’ in the following part of the stud)
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[3.1.20) You mustn’t take him too seriously.
[3.1.21) You needn’t take him too seriously. (sentences from Palmer 1979: 26)
Even though both (3.1.20) and (3.1.21) center on necessity and negation, in (3.1.20) it is the 
bvent that is under negation whereas in (3 .1.21) it is the modality of necessity that falls within
the scope of negation. Thus, the appropriate paraphrases of (3 .1.20) and (3 .1.21) respectively
are the following:
(3.1.22) It is necessary for you not to take him seriously.
(3.1.23) It is not necessary for you to take him seriously.
(For more considerations of the irregularities and gaps in the system of modal markers in 
¡relation to negation cross-linguistically, see Palmer 1995, 1997, de Haan 1997 and van der 
Auwera 2001).
affirmative negative interrogative total
possession 6
(9.5%)
4
(6.3%)
0 10
(15.9%)
agan to 
geldanne
9
(14.3%)
0 2
(3.1%)
11
(17.4%)
possession/
deontic
necessity
7
(11.1%)
1
(1.6%)
0 8
(12.7%)
deontic
necessity
16
(25.4%)
17
(27%)
1
(1.6%)
34
(54%)
total 38 
(60, 4%)
22 
(34, 9%)
3
(4, 7%)
63
(100%)
Table 3 .1.4. Distribution of clause types with agan (to) infinitive
¡As regards the negative examples of agan (to) infinitive, I have assembled the corpus data in 
Table 3.1.4. The negative forms, while in the minority when it comes to the total number of 
the occurrences of the construction, i.e. 34,9 per cent, appear in half of the examples of agan 
(to) infinitive when the meaning at issue is deontic necessity. Note that negation does not find 
its way to agan to geldanne. Nor does it to the agan to habenne instances which are included 
among the deontic necessity examples in Table 3 .1.4. Among the six instances of agan to 
habenne, five are engendered in affirmative clauses, one occurs in an interrogative clause.
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Once we set aside agan to habenne, as Traugott and Dasher (2005) suggest that it be done, we 
are left with the 28 deontic necessity examples out of which 17 are negative. It follows then 
that agan with the meaning of deontic necessity sees a significant increase in the number of 
negative clauses. I have checked whether there is any correlation between the 
positive/negative type of a clause and the force of the necessity of agan. In Table 3.1.5. the 
cases of strong and weak deontic necessity have been cast against the sentence types. It turns 
out that in the case of both positive and negative clauses, the strong necessity instances 
constitute slightly less than half of all the examples. There is no justification for the statement 
that stronger necessity of agan (to) infinitive is to be linked with the increase in the number of 
negative sentences. Possibly, no such correlation can be established due to insufficient data in 
Old English. Further investigation into agan in Middle English could shed some more light on 
the issue. That an overall inclination of the negative contexts to exhibit stronger modality can 
be expected finds support in Nagle’s (1989: 96) interesting cross-linguistic observation which 
posits that
we might speculate that the meanings of the marginal modals [namely dare and need in Present-Day 
English] in negatives and questions are somehow ‘more’ modal than in affirmatives (...). Evidence for the 
(...) notion, at least as regards negatives, is found in many Indo-European languages that have 
morphological subjunctive verb tenses. In both modem French and Old English, for example, the 
morphological subjunctive appears in complement clauses whose higher sentence contains a semantically 
negative verb such as doubt or negated verbs of thinking, believing, etc., or w here the meaning contained 
in the complement clause is negative as in OE sentences (...) from Traugott 1972: 101:
[3.1.24] ic wene dartte noht monige begiodan Humber tuurcn (subj.).
‘I think that not many beyond the Humber not were’. CP. 3. 16 (complement negative)
[3.1.25] deh ne geortriewe ic na Gode diet he us ne ruicgc (subj.) gescildan.
although I shall not distrust God (so much as to think) he can not shield us’, (higher sentence 
negative) (Nagle 1989: 96-97)
strong necessity weak necessity total
negative clauses 7 10 17
affirmative
clauses
3 8 11
total 10 18 28
Table 3 .1.5. Distribution of strong/weak necessity with agan (to) infinitive
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I have included some of those negative instances while illustrating the cline of the 
deontic necessity of agan as a holistic attitude seems most feasible in this case. It is a fair 
generalization which makes it clear that both affirmative and negative constructions serve to 
express different degrees of deontic necessity and subjectivity. Nevertheless, the fact that the 
negative examples vary in the degree of necessity makes it no mean task to analyze these 
examples in terms of the scope of negation. Consider (3 .1.14) and (3 .1.15) again, where the 
intensity of the necessity makes the meanings of those examples approximate to the sense of 
lack of permission, (for the meanings of strong necessity-not-to and prohibition being closely 
intertwined in the case of PDE mustn 7, see Coates 1983. 39). These cases, it seems to me, are 
best treated as ones where it is the proposition that is negated. Thus, in (3.1.14) it is a deontic 
necessity not to stay or say mass, etc. that is imposed on the priests and, analogically, in
(3.1.15) we find out about a necessity for a Welshman not to go England. Logically, strong 
necessity-not-to is equal to prohibition, which accounts for the availability of a prohibition 
reading in the case of both (3.1.14) and (3.1.15) (see also 3.4.3. for the equivalence of the
notions of necessary-not and not-possible in the sense of Lyons (1977) and 3.4.4. for the
inference of necessity-not-to from prohibition in the case o f mot). Conversely, the negative 
instances of weaker necessity like (3.1.17) require an different interpretation. The force of 
necessity of agan in (3 .1.17) brings the meaning of the verb close to that of PDE should or 
ought to. The peculiarity of these two PDE modals, when they are used with root meanings is 
that they accept both kinds of negation, which leaves the meaning, broadly speaking, intact. In 
Coates’s (1983: 239) assessment, the special compatibility of should and ought with negation 
of both modality and proposition, has to do with the merger-like character of the root and 
epistemic meanings of the respective verbs. Opinions of other linguists, with the notable 
exception of Halliday (1970) who acknowledges only proposition negation with should, 
converge in this respect in that the following sentence:
(3.1.26) They [beggars] shouldn’t be allowed to go about like that, (sentence from Coates 
1983: 63)
can be paraphrased as either (3.1.27) or (3.1.28) (cf. Ehrman 1966, Hermerén 1979):
(3.1.27) It is not advisable/appropriate that they be allowed...
(3.1.28) It is advisable/appropriate that they not be allowed...
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In an attempt to account for this phenomenon, Horn (1989. 342) constructs a metascale of 
deontic necessity which indicates the increasing force of necessity6. The bottom of the scale is 
occupied by a weak force of permission, say, that of PDE can or may, the center of the scale 
is associated with the necessity o f should and ought and the strong necessity of must, have to 
and need belongs in the top of the scale. If negation of modality is applied to these modals, a 
reverse scale is arrived at. Negation of permission yields a strong force of prohibition, strong 
necessity, when negated, results in a weak force of no-necessity-to while negation of the 
necessity of should/ought leaves the necessity unaffected so it remains the intermediate point 
on the negative metascale as well. The force of weaker necessity, that o f should and ought, 
stays constant regardless of whether the necessity is negated or not, and, what is more, it also 
remains the same if the proposition following the necessity is under negation rather than the 
necessity itself. It then seems plausible to argue that the necessity of agati in (3.1.17) 
approaches the middle point on the metascale thereby making agon responsive to either 
modality negation or proposition negation without impinging on the meaning of the verb. It 
might also be added that the position of the negative particle is no clue that might hint at the 
type of negation agan takes in a particular example. Invariably, the negative particle rre is 
attached to agan, cumulatively yielding forms like nah, naht, nage, etc. (cf. Warner 1993: 
150-151). The same trend perseveres in Present-Day English in that not is contracted with or 
follows the modals irrespective of what type of negation is at issue (cf., for instance, Palmer 
2003).
3 .1.7. Indeterminacy of possession and deontic necessity
As shown in Table 3.1.2., alongside the possessive and obligative instances of agan (to) 
infinitive, there is a group of eight examples which reconcile both of these semantic areas. It 
should be reemphasized that these examples are to be seen as a forming part of the verb’s 
semantic evolution from possession to deontic necessity. On the time axis, they emerge once 
the inference of deontic necessity acquires such frequency and strength that it is 
acknowledged as a component of the meaning of agan on a par with the sense of possession. 
The compatibility of the meanings of possession and weak necessity is, however, so high that 
an application of either interpretation does not induce any tension or misunderstanding. In
° De Haan's (1997) continuum of deontic modality, which is presented in 2.3., is a recasting of Horn’s (1989) 
notion of the metascale.
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other words, these eight sentences are a realization of a merger which is illustrated in the 
following:
(3 1.29) And we symle geornlice his })a halgan and j?a godcundan bebodu agan
and we always eagerly his the holy and the sacred commandments ought 
to gefvllanne and to gehealdenne on us sylfum. 
to fulfill and to keep on us selves
(possession) ‘And we always have his holy and sacred commandments to fulfill and 
keep on us in earnest’
(deontic necessity) ‘And we should always earnestly fulfill his holy and sacred 
cammandments and keep them on ourselves’
(SEG17AHomS 37B3.2.37)
(3.1.30) Iosep hasfde mycele gyuu to his hlaforde 7 jjenode him 7 betaehte him
Joseph had great gift to his Lord and stretched-out him and handed-over him 
eall }>set he ahte to bewitanne. 
all that he ought to entrust
(possession) ‘Joseph had great gifts for his Lord and handed over to him all that he had
to give’
(deontic necessity) ‘Joseph had great gifts for his Lord and handed over to him all he 
was supposed to give’
(SEG23.\Gen (Ker) B8.1.2)
Both (3.1.29) and (3.2.30) are followed by two different translation lines, the first stemming 
from the possessive meaning of agan (to) infinitive and the other stemming from the 
obligative meaning of the construction. Example (3 .1.29) engenders the only appearance of a 
first person plural subject among all the occurrences of the construction in the corpus. On the 
obligative interpretation, it is a pseudo-exhortative, a rhetorical device whereby the speaker 
lumps himself together with the hearer(s) and thus puts up a pretence, not necessarily a false 
one, of rendering himself subject to the deontic necessity he reports. Overall, the sentence 
falls short of conveying any remarkably strong necessity, rather it should be understood as a 
form of encouragement. An obligative reading of (3.1.30) brings it close to (3.1.17) in that a 
case of deontic necessity in the past is objectively reported. Equally possible is an 
implementation of a possession reading in both (3.1.29) and (3.1.30). Witness that in (3.1.29) 
the meaning of possession has undergone significant bleaching as the object possessed is an 
intangible order.
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3 18. Summary of agan
It will be readily realized that agan comes a long way in Old English to spark a modal 
extension in its semantics, which goes hand in hand with the beginning of the verb’s 
grammaticalization into an auxiliary. I have tried to illustrate the particular steps of this 
semantic travel, its motivations and the ultimate OE destination. That agan comes to be 
associated with weak necessity and weakly subjective contexts in Old English testifies to an 
early stage of its evolution. A determining factor in the whole life-span of modal agan and 
later ought to is the origin of the obligative meaning of the verb in the collocation with to 
geldanne, a sequence often translated as ‘to owe.’ This situation brings agan close to verbs of 
owing, duty, belonging and being good/proper which on van der Auwera and Plungian’s 
(1998) semantic map, are shown to aim at deontic necessity as a subsequent phase of their 
evolution. Importantly, the link which facilitates the transition from owing to deontic 
necessity is that in the former the focus is shifted to the person to whom something is owed. 
The creditor could be visualized as a source of the obligation to pay the debt, a source which 
is external to the subject. In Old English this information is crucial; as agan gradually 
increases its frequency in obligative environments due to the strengthening of inferences, the 
necessity rigidly comes from the outside. It comes to be associated with legal, religious and 
social rules. Without ever filtering through to really subjective settings in Old English, the 
deontic necessity of agan flourishes mostly in negative sentences.
3.2. ¡)earf
Among the OE preterite-present verbs of necessity discussed in this dissertation, pearf figures 
prominently as the only one which has not been passed over to Present-Day English in any 
capacity whatsoever. According to Prokosch (1939: 191) and Molencki (2002: 3), pearf goes 
back to the Indo-European form * t e r p Molencki (2002: 3) invokes the data provided by 
‘Rejzek (2001: 679) and Snoj (1997: 880) [who] believe that the Indo-European root *terp- 
‘to satisfy need’ had the variant *terb(h)- ‘to need,’ whose descendant forms developed in 
Slavonic and Germanic.’ The Germanic cognates of pearf are Gothic parf Old Norse parf 
Old Saxon tharf and Old High German darf. It should be also pointed out here that in Old 
English, side by side with pearf there is another pre-modal verb of necessity derived from it, 
namely bepurfan. Since the verb is a morphologically complex form and is not a pre-modal, I 
have chosen to handle bepurfan alongside the weak and strong verbs of necessity in sections
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4.1 and 4.1.3. Visser (1963-1973: 1423) pays attention to the amalgamation of pearf with 
another preterite-present verb dearr in Middle English brought about by a frequent omission 
of final /  in the forms of the former. The resultant similarity of the stems is yet enhanced by 
common misguided substitution of the alveolar plosive for the initial dental fricative in pearf 
bringing it even closer to dearr. A thorough account of the confusion caused by the two verbs 
and their eventual ME fusion is given by Molencki (2005), who, apart from the morphological 
and phonetic reasons for the fusion, stresses the areas of semantic affinity shared by pearf and 
dearr, which cumulatively results in pearf or tharf as the action takes place in Middle 
English, totally losing its separate identity in favor of dare. OED (1989) and Molencki (2002) 
caution that, far from being an isolated phenomenon, confusion between the cognates of pearf 
and dearr has similar consequences in other Germanic languages.
Before those turbulent events take their toll, the distinct presence of pearf leaves its 
indelible mark on the DOE corpus. Instances of pearf found in this corpus are assembled in 
Table 3 .2.1.. If any comparison between agan and pearf seems plausible at this stage, what 
strikes one forcibly is that, complement-wise, the verbs are mirror images of each other. 
Whereas the modal use of agan stands in the shadow of the non-modal use of the verb in 
terms of frequency, pearf relies mainly on its modal potential since the instances of infinitival 
complements of pearf outnumber those of NP complements by 227 to 34. In what follows, 
section 3 .2.1. will be devoted to the occurrences of the pearf+NP structure and the remaining 
sections contain a close look at the use o f pearf coupled with the infinitive.
+infinitive +NP total
pearf 227 34 261
Table 3 .2.1. Comp ementation o? pearf
3.2.1. pearf with NP complements
Jndoubtedly, the thirty-four examples of pearf taking an NP complement in the DOE corpus 
ire a trace of the non-modal past of the verb. That the NP complements are older than the 
nfinitival complements can be gathered from the fact that that most of them come from the 
¡ighth and ninth centuries (including one example from Beowulf and seventeen examples 
rom the Alfredian prose). In the following centuries they are still attested yet a downward 
rend in frequency can be observed. To be sure, the main verb morpho-syntax of tharf persists 
ill the very end of the verb’s presence in Middle English (cf. Molencki 2005, Loureiro-Porto
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2005). The situation of the co-existence of an older and younger structure gamers support for 
Heine’s (1993) Overlap Model in the process of grammaticalization of main verbs into 
auxiliaries whereby source items are used side by side with target items.
Typically, when followed by an NP, pearf means ‘to have a need,’ the subject is 
human, singular, often with a generic reference. The need can denote something down-to- 
earth and physical, e.g.
(3.2.1) ne 5earf he nanra domboca o{terra 
not needs he none book-of-law other 
‘He does not need any other code of law’
(SEG37.\LavvAfEl B14.4.3.)
yet, more often than not, the object of pearf stands for something more abstract or very 
general or even unspecified, e.g.
(3.2.2) {tonne ne Sorfte he no maran fultomes {tonne his selfes. 
then not needed he no more help than his self 
‘then he needed no more help than his own’
(SEG29ABO B9.3.2)
(3 .2.3) Ac Saet nis nan man {tastte sumes eacan ne 5vrfe. buton Gode anum; he hasfQ on 
but that not-is no man that some addition not need, but God one, he has on 
his agenum genog, ne 5earf he nanes {tinges buton 5a; s {te he on him selfum hatf9. 
his own enough, not need he no thing but that which he on him self has. 
‘There is not a man who needs something more besides God alone; he has enough on 
his own, he does not need anything besides what he has on his own’
(SEG29.\Bo B9.3.2)
There is one interesting case where the subject is inanimate. The mechanism involved here is 
metonymy of the type PART FOR THE WHOLE as the need of a human is ascribed to the 
mouth:
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(3 2.4) Mu5a gehwylc mete ^earfL mael sceolon tidum gongan. 
mouth each fo o d  needs, meals should on-time go 
‘Each mouth needs food, meals should be on time.’
(SEG02.VMax I A3.13)
Marginally, as noted by Molencki (2002: 13), pearf expands its semantic potential and 
‘corresponds to sceal in the sense of modern ‘to owe” :
(3.2.5) On lifiendes Godes naman, ne dearfic N sceatt ne scylling, ne penig ne peniges 
on living G od’s name, not need I  sceatt nor schilling, nor penny nor penny's
weorS,
worth
‘In the name of the living God, I owe no sceat or shilling or penny or a penny’s worth 
to anyone’
(SEG37.\LawSwer B 14.39)
At the same time, (3.2.5) emerges as the only case of pearf with the meaning of ‘to owe’ I
find in the corpus. I reserve some more space for the comments on the approximation of pearf
and sceal in the section on pearf with infinitival complements.
Very rarely - twice to be exact - does pearf+NP become involved in an interrogative 
context, which is not to say that pearf v infinitive does significantly more often, one of the two 
possible illustrations being (3.2.6) below:
(3.2.6) Hu frearf mannes sunu maran treowe?
how needs m an’s son more assurance
‘What need does a man’s son have of a better assurance?’
(SEG01.\Ex A1.2)
Needless to say, an interrogative structure falls short of influencing the meaning of the verb 
which retains the focus on the subject’s needs.
On the whole, the pearf + NP structure can be said to serve to express the subject’s 
needs motivated by her or his everyday existence. Importantly, rather than to convey a 
speaker’s needs, the verb finds itself at the service of the expression of somebody else’s
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esires. In other words, in all but two cases, and these two cases include (3.2.5), the subject is 
ther than first person. The shift from the contexts with the salient focus on a speaker’s own 
eeds to those in which someone else’s needs are acknowledged, matters to the degree that 
the key to the development of an obligative (. . .) may involve the assertion of a desire on the 
Dart of the speaker (cf. the use with the third person subject in She must have her way)’ 
(Denning 1987: 50).
Also, it is worth noting that, much like pearf infinitive, pearf+NP tends to be nestled 
in negative contexts. Although the discrepancy between the number of negative and 
affirmative contexts does not reach any striking proportions, namely twenty and twelve 
respectively, it is still remarkable. I refer the reader to section 3.2.5. for a detailed discussion 
of the non-assertive occurrences of pearf + infinitive.
3 .2 .2 pearf with the infinitive
Not so frequently attested cross-linguistically, the pathway of the development of pearf from 
a main verb meaning ‘to need’ to a grammaticalized token of deontic necessity, has some 
parallels in other languages. Bybee et al. (1994) spot a similar evolutionary formula in Basque 
and Denning (1987:48) points to Chinese verb yung, which, on the one hand, is an auxiliary 
functioning as a conduit for medium necessity but, on the other hand, retains main verb 
characteristics and the meaning ‘to need’ in other contexts. The semantic readjustment of 
pearf propelling its grammaticalization seems less complex than in the case of agon. Denning 
(1987: 51) explains that ‘sometimes the semantic change is relatively minor, being rooted in 
some component of compulsion already inherent in the semantics of the source verb, as is the 
case of those with such original senses as ‘need’ ( ...) .’ Further, van der Auwera and Plungian 
(1998: 95) put forth a claim that ‘need [as a source item] feeds into a participant-internal 
necessity,’ a line of development not at all at odds with what could be expected given the 
corollaries of the meaning of pearf discussed in 3.2.1. Relevant here is the fact that in both the 
expression of one’s needs and the expression of PI necessity, the common denominator is the 
subject’s desire which is spotlighted. Also in keeping with van der Auwera and Plungian’s 
(1998) map of modality, PI necessity is coterminous with PE necessity, the latter being 
another semantic area visited by pearf. Thus, in the following sections my attention is 
commanded by the two major obligative senses of pearf PI necessity and PE/deontic 
necessity. Other, quite marginal, semantic extensions of the meaning of pearf receive due 
consideration in 3.2.6. as well.
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3.2.3. Syntactic considerations
Before the semantic reflections take over, the type of the infinitival complementation of pearf 
deserves to be dealt with. Unlike agan, pearf follows other preterite-presents in that it is, to
use Warner’s (1993: 136) terms, ‘subcategorized for the plain infinitive.’ Rather than be
complemented by the inflected infinitive, the verb exhibits considerable consistency in taking 
the bare infinitive. The only example that runs afoul of this formula is (3 .2 .7),
(3 .2.7) Gif hit sie winter ne frearft j)u j^one wermod to don. 
i f  it be winter, not need thou the absinthe to do 
‘if it is winter, you need not use absinthe’
(SEG47ALCh II (2) B21.2.1.2.2)
of which Molencki (2002: 7) says ‘in the Book o f Leechdom there is an interesting example of 
a complex (inflected) infinitive, whose ending appears to have been reduced (to don for to 
donne).’
Among the 227 occurrences of pearf + infinitive there are twelve instances which 
¡formally lack any overt infinitive following pearf. Two possible interpretations of such a state 
¡of affairs come into play: we have to do either with an intransitive (absolute) use of the verb 
¡or with ellipsis of the infinitive. B&T and Loureiro-Porto (2005: 157) choose to set absolute 
uses of pearf apart from elliptical ones. Warner (1993. 133) is less absolute in that he 
conjectures that it is not, in fact, always possible to determine which of the two options is the 
case. The solution he offers is to mark all such instances as potentially elliptical without, 
¡however, jettisoning the possibility of them containing intransitive pearf altogether. It seems 
¡reasonable to follow Warner (1993) as in my twelve examples the context preceeding the 
¡occurrence of pearf each time engenders the potential antecedent of the verb ellipted, as 
drince in (3.2.8):
¡(3.2.8) Wijs j)eore, ... do on wilisc ealu, bewyl o)) jtriddan dael 7 drince \>a hwile }ta
against ulcer, do on Welsh ale, boil- away to third part and drink while
he {jurfe. 
he need
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‘With ulcer, ... add to the Welsh ale, boil it away to the third part and let him drink it 
while he needs’
(SEG46.\LCh II (1) B21.2.1.1.2)
Warner (1993: 113) refers to such ellipsis, which is encountered with the premodals 
and beonwesan in Old English, as ‘postverbal ellipsis.’ Postverbal ellipsis in Old English 
works largely along the same lines as post-auxiliary ellipsis in PDE (cf. Hankamer and Sag 
1976, Sag 1979), the different nomenclature stemming from the problem of whether the OE 
pre-modals are auxiliaries or not (cf. 2.7.1.).
Another syntactic point worth making is the distribution of pearf infinitive with 
respect to clause types presented in Table 3.2.2. The table is to serve as a crucial reference 
point that I intend to use while investigating the semantics of pearf henceforth. At this stage I 
confine myself to stressing a striking asymmetry between the number of negative and 
affirmative clauses containing the verb, a mechanism we could observe work in the case of 
the occurrences of agan (to) infinitive as well.
negative interrogative affirmative total
p e a r f infinitive 186 4 37 227
Table 3 .2 .2. Distribution of clause types with pearf + infinitive
3.2.4. pearf with the meaning of necessity
As regards the signification of pearf, Tellier (1962: 103) observes that ‘le sens est 
généralement celui de “avoir besoin”,’ [generally it has the meaning ‘to need’] and Warner 
(1993 : 160) adds that ‘it is centrally dynamic, but also expresses deontic modality.’ While 
Tellier’s (1962) assessment cannot be denied a degree of accuracy, especially with respect to 
pearf+NP, it still remains exactly what it aspires to be, namely a very general statement. It is 
Warner’s (1993) observation that is more difficult to be upheld. My investigation of the data 
from the DOE corpus have led me to conclude that pearf in Old English is a token of 
predominately external obligation, that is to say, deontic necessity if the terminology adopted 
in this dissertation is to be applied.
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3.2.4.1. PI necessity o fpearf
As hinted at in 3.2.2., the semantic leap from the expression of one’s need to PI necessity, 
which pearf makes at one point of its evolution, fails to qualify as any revolutionary change. 
In both of these semantic areas, the subject’s desire is in the center of the speaker’s message. 
Initially, as shown in 3 .2.1., when pearf takes NP complements, the subject is one with the 
speaker, later more and more contexts emerge where the unity of the speaker and subject is 
severed, thereby causing pearf to become more subjective. After all, it is hardly possible to 
expect objectivity from someone who is talking about someone else’s needs. Once this stage 
is accomplished, it seems that the verb is ready to accept infinitival complements. What may 
provide a spark for this advancement is the fact that OE infinitives are by some linguists 
believed to be on a par with nouns. Consider that ‘since infinitives were nouns, the relation 
between them and the verbs shall, can, etc., to which they were joined must originally have 
been the same as that between a direct object and a full verb, so that there was structurally no 
difference in this respect between ‘he can manigfealdan sprsece’ (= “he knows many 
languages” -  IGR) and ‘he can sprecan’ (= “he can speak” -  IGR)’ (Visser 1963-1973. 548, 
quoted in Roberts 1985: 22), (for a similar stance on OE infinitives, see Lightfoot 1979; also 
see Fischer and van der Leek 1981 for criticism and van Kemenade 1992a who argues that 
OE bare infinitives are, in fact, propositional VP complements). Notwithstanding such formal 
disagreements, the idea that bare infinitives replace nominal complements of pearf cannot be 
questioned. While coping with a similar development, namely the emergence of the infinitival 
complements in the case o f ‘to want’, Krug (2000: 144) maintains that
A feasible and rather elegant explanation is syntactic in nature, which reveals that (. . .) it is impossible to 
isolate semantic from syntactic development. It is an account in terms of extension and would simply 
posit generalization of transitive WANT along the following lines: if a noun phrase can denote a desired 
entity, so too can an infinitive. This type of generalization is exemplified by the bracketing of the two 
examples below:
1 want [a car]
I want [to go]
(Krug 2000: 144)
The moment pearf+infinitive comes into being, the need of pearf becomes PI necessity, a 
corollary of a necessity of an action, state or some other verbal concept to be achieved, being
79
iubstituted for an object required. Note that simultaneously the subjectivity of pearf is yet 
mhanced, necessity being a modal concept, and the verb is pushed onto the road to 
jrammaticalization into an auxiliary (cf. Bolinger 1980).
In spite of the fact that all the accounts of the semantics of the OE pre-modals I have 
:onsulted ascribe PI necessity to pearf (cf. OED, Mitchell 1985, Warner 1993, Molencki 2002 
among others), it proves not an easy task to identify a really uncontroversial example with this 
meaning. By an uncontroversial example of PI necessity I mean a sentence in which the 
speaker who is at the same time the subject comments on his or her needs or optionally, the 
speaker shows impartiality with respect to the subject’s need. In the set of 227 occurrences in 
the DOE corpus, a minority meet those criteria, a few of the best illustrations following:
(3.2.9) he is (purh his mihte aeighwaer andweard: and ne Qearf na faran fram stowe to stowe; 
he is throtigh his might anywhere present: and not need not go from place to place 
‘He has the ability to be present anywhere: he need not walk from place to place’ 
(SEG05.y£CHom 1 10 B l. 1.11)
(3.2.10) Da ongaet se waeliga, (past he ne (porfte na oferjpast wenan him selfum 
then realized the rich-man, that he not needed not over that consider him self 
(3£ere ecan haele hihtes.
of-the eternal salvation hope
‘Then the rich man realized that there was no need for him to think about the hope of 
eternal salvation’
(SEG31 AGDPref and 4 (C) B9.5.6)
(3.2.11) Drihten is min onlyhtend, and min Haslend, hwaet (pearf ic ondraedan?
Lord is my light, and my Savior; what need I  fear
‘the Lord is my light and my Savior; what need I fear?
(SEG24APPs B8.2.1)
Representative of the most typical use of PI necessity with pearf (3 .2.9) through (3 .2.11), as 
well as (3.2.8), all contain animate subjects and in each ‘the subject is actor with respect to the 
modality as well as with respect to the process’ (Halliday 1970: 339). In other words, it is the 
subject’s volition or need that is recognized as a focal point and the subject is assigned the 
function of the agent (in (3.2.8) and (3.2.9)) or the experiencer (in (3.2.10) and (3.2.11)) of the 
action specified in the proposition. As for the former point, that of the animacy of the subject,
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Hermerén (1979: 99) argues that ‘it is a common characteristic of the surface subject of (...) 
[PI] modalities.’7
A closer look at the nuances of the PI necessity of pearf seems appropriate. Culled 
from a medical manual, (3 .2.8) focuses on a bodily need of the subject. The subjunctive form 
indicates a hypothetical situation that might take place. It is uncommon that pearf is 
engendered in an affirmative clause (see Table 3.2.2 ). Interestingly enough, but for Bald's
Leechbook, the number of the affirmative clauses containing pearf would significantly
dwindle away. The other three examples conform to the predominant type of a clause, namely 
a negative. In (3.2.9), the PI necessity, or rather lack thereof, to be exact, derives from the 
subjects property of omnipresence. The time reference is general present, it can thereby be 
taken to include the future as well. Unlike (3.2.8) and (3.2.9), examples (3.2.10) and (3.2.11) 
contain non-agentive main verbs, a verb of mental activity (wenan) and a verb of feelings 
(ondrcedan) respectively. In (3.2.10) the speaker quite objectively reports the lack of necessity 
in the past on the part of the subject whereas (3 .2.11) takes on an aspect of uniqueness in that 
it is one of the four interrogative examples with pearf + infinitive in the whole corpus (see 
Table 3 .2.2 ). Witness, however, that despite the interrogative form of the sentence, (3 .2.11) is 
nowhere near a bonafide question. Rather, it approaches a rhetorical question, the speaker 
apparently not expecting any answer, and a paraphrase of (3.2.11) could be:
(3.2.12) I don’t need to\have to fear anything.\I have got nothing to be afraid of.
As a result, (3.2.11) is to be thought of as a logically negative sentence, which only goes to
prove that OE speakers have a strong association of pearf with a context of lack of
need/necessity.
Interestingly, it should be noted that the fact that the subject does not need to be afraid 
in (3.2.11) is not wholly internally motivated. More than by the psychological disposition of 
the subject, the lack of necessity is determined by the presence of God, an external factor, 
which brings us to the question of the indeterminacy of the meaning of pearf. (3.2.11) turns 
out to combine PI necessity, PE/deontic necessity and is even compatible with yet another 
reading, viz. that o f ‘to have a reason.’ By no means is (3.2.11) a solitary example of such a 
blend, on the contrary similar cases could be multiplied. A practical difficulty that this state of
Hermerén (1979) introduces an alternative division of modality into internal, external and neutral which 
roughly correspond to the dynamic, deontic and epistemic types respectively. With necessity subsumed under 
external modality, the point that seems to be missed in this scheme is that necessity can also be internal. The 
quotation used above refers to internal modality as this is what. I assume. PI necessity is part of
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affairs brings about is that the numbers presented Table 3.2.3., which reflect the results of my 
analysis of the semantics of pearf + infinitive, should be understood as tentative only. As 
evidenced by example (3.2.11), there are no clear swaths cut between PI and PE necessity of 
pearf an indication of PI necessity and PE necessity being susceptible to merger. Under my 
very subjective interpretation of the relevant contexts there are at least 33 cases of merger 
which I understand as occurrences of pearf+ infinitive where both PI necessity and PE/deontic 
necessity (optionally some other meaning too) are involved but neither clearly prevails. It, 
however, bears reemphasizing that rather than sound absolute, I would like Table 3.2.3. to 
give a rough idea about the frequency of usage of pearf with different meanings in the DOE 
corpus. Counter to Warner’s (1993) appraisal, PE/deontic-necessity-dominant contexts occur 
twice as often as Pi-necessity-dominant contexts, which suggests that it is PE/deontic 
necessity that occupies the center of the semantics of pearf + infinitive.
PE/deontic necessity PI necessity indeterminate other total
pearf+ infinitive 118 66 33 10 227
(52%) (29.1%) (14.5%) (4.4%) (100%)
Table 3.2.3. Distribution of meanings of pearf infinitive
3 .2.4.2. From PI necessity to PE/deontic necessity
Obvious as it is that pearf after flirtation with PI necessity becomes available to PE necessity, 
the very shift needs to be accounted for. I conjecture that the key to the understanding of this 
development lies in the verb’s adherence to negative environments. In order to shed some 
light upon what is meant here I must refer to Present-Day English. In Present-Day English 
there are two verbs which are considered beneficiaries of the semantics of pearf modal need 
and main verb to need to (cf. Taeymans 2004 and Nykiel 2005 for a history of need and to 
need to). Both verbs are commonly associated with necessity inherent to the subject, hence PI 
necessity, much like pearf in Old English (cf. Sweetser 1990 and Smith 2003). On the other 
hand, deontic necessity is tightly knit with the core of the meaning of to have to (cf. among 
others Coates 1983, Sweetser 1990, Smith 2003). Thus, there emerges a finely drawn, albeit a 
little idealized perhaps, symmetry:
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PI necessity 
need to need to
deontic necessity 
to have to
Curiously, the contrast between PI necessity and deontic necessity with respect to these verbs 
is neutralized in negative contexts. In other words, forms needn 7, don 7 need to and don 7 
have to converge to denote no-necessity-to-do. Palmer (1979: 104) holds that ‘NEED often 
seems to supply the forms for negating necessity modality and for questioning it,’ Coates 
(1983: 51), having surveyed the Lancaster and Survey of English Usage corpora, garners 
evidence in support of needn't and don’t have to being lumped together and Taeymans 
(2003:105) comments on the possibility of replacing have to with needn 7 or don 7 need to. It 
could be concluded then that when there is no necessity to perform an act, the source of the 
negation of the modality is relegated to the far reaches of the background. The neutralization 
of PI and deontic necessity in negative contexts could also be viewed through the perspective 
of Talmy’s (2000) force dynamics. In this scenario a given modal context, e.g.:
(3.2.13)1 needn’t work today.
(3.2.14) I don’t have to work today.
pnvolves two participants: the Agonist, who is associated with the subject, and the Antagonist, 
(one with the source of the necessity. Ideally, in (3.2.13) the Antagonist would be a part of the 
(subject’s self and in (3.2.14) the Antagonist is to be identified as some external authority. In a 
prototypical situation there is a clash of the Agonist and Antagonist as they exhibit opposite 
inclinations. The peculiarity of needn’t and don’t have to, as in (3.2.13) and (3.2.14), consists 
in the fact that in both cases the Antagonist chooses to withdraw. To say "you needn 7 d o ' or 
"you don 7 have to do’ amounts to leaving much freedom to the Agonist, who is free to realize 
his or her tendency whatever it may be. If the Agonist’s tendency is satisfied, the nature of the 
Antagonist plays second fiddle. As a result, a situation when the role of the source of 
necessity, i.e. the Antagonist, is played down or when the Antagonist is not clearly stated may 
invite an inference in the sense of Traugott and Dasher (2005) that the source is different than 
it really is. Hence, (3.2.13) may be taken to imply that the source of necessity is other than 
subject-internal, thereby bringing the meaning of needn 7 to close to that of don 7 have to.
The same premises, I believe, underlie the development of pearf. If the speaker of
(3.2.15) means PI necessity in that ‘we have got no internal need to doubt:’
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(3 2.15) Ne jjearf nanne man tweogian: asfter his deaj)e oQrum Jftssa he onfehS,
not need no man doubt: after his death other this he receives,
‘No man need have doubts about this: after his death he will receive something else’ 
(SEG20\HomU 9 (Ver 4) B3.4.10)
yet ends up being interpreted otherwise, an inference appears that ‘we should not doubt’ 
because of some external circumstances. All in all, if a verb of PI necessity is commonly used 
in negative contexts, as is the case with pearf it stands a good chance of being inferentially 
reanalyzed as a verb of PE\deontic necessity. The former signification is, of course, still 
preserved in appropriate contexts, so the older and later meanings work in parallel with each 
other (cf. Traugott 1989 and Heine 1993 for other examples of such co-existence).
3.2.4.3. PE and deontic necessity of pearf
When pearf is employed as a token of PE necessity, it is primarily the case that the source of 
the necessity can be determined with better or worse precision. In other words, general PE 
necessity does not play any crucial role in the occurrences of the verb in the DOE corpus. 
With the exception of nine examples where the source of necessity is nebulous and 
circumstantial, necessity emerging from the remaining occurrences of the verb in the sample 
is deontic. As the weakest instances of deontic necessity of pearf border on general PE 
necessity, the circumstantial nature of the source of necessity will be touched upon in the 
following discussion.
pearf with the sense of deontic necessity embraces various degrees of the force of 
necessity and a diversified extent of subjectivity and speaker involvement. For this reason, a 
cline showing the gradience of deontic necessity proves the best means of doing justice to this 
meaning of pearf Without too much distortion, the range of deontic necessity is illustrated by 
the following examples:
(3.2.16) ic eow secgan mseg |)oncwyrde J)ing, Joaet ge ne fryrfen leng muman on mode.
I  you say may pleasing thing, that you not need longer mourn inspirit 
‘I can tell you a pleasing thing, you need no longer mourn in your spirits’
(SEG03.\Jud A4.2)
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(3.2.17) Da cwaef) he Crist to me, Ne frearft j)u t>e ondraedon, for^on J?e ic eom mid j?e,
then said he Christ to me, not need thou thee fear because I  am with thee
‘then Christ said to me, ‘You need not fear because I am with you,’
(SEG19ALS 32 B3.3.32)
(3.2.18) him f)inc6 on his ge{?ance, }?aet he j3am abbode ne fryrfe hyran, 
him seems on his mind, that he to-the abbot not need hear
‘it seems to him in his mind that he is not obliged to obey the abbott’
(SEG34.\BenR BIO.3.1.1)
(3.2.19) Ne us ne frearf na twynian, |oaet we gebyrian ne sceolon o55e heofonwarena
not us not need not hcn>e-doubts, that we belong not shall either heaven-inhabitants 
cyninge o55e hellewites deoflum 
king or hell-torment devil
‘we need not doubt that we will belong either to the king of the inhabitants of heaven 
or to the devil of hell’
(SEG21.\HomU 27 (Nap 30) B3.4.27)
(3.2.20) se Jjegen (...) moste his hlaford aspelian 7 his onspaece geraecan mid rihte, swa 
the servant must his master substitute-for and his law-suit obtain with right, so 
hwar swa he foorfte.
where so he needed
‘The servant was allowed to substitute for his master and have his lawsuit wherever he 
needed to’
(SEG37A LawGepyncpo B14.46)
(3.2.21) Micele maran gyltas man masg gebetan her on |)isum life, and })one Haelend
many more guilts man may repair here on this life, and the Savior 
gegladian, jjaet he ne frurfe Jjrowian on Sam toweardan life. 
gladden that he not need suffer on the future life
‘A man may compensate for many more sins here in this life and thus gladden the 
Savior so that he would not have to suffer in the future life’
(SEGll.VAEHom 16 Bl.4.16)
(3.2.22) Petrus cwaeS: nis nu ofer jais naht, foaet frurfe beon andswared swa openre 
Peter said: not-is now over this nothing, that need be answered so open
gesceadwisnesse
sagacity
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‘Peter said, ‘There is nothing about it now that need be answered with such open
sagacity’
(SEG31 AGDPref and 4 (C) B9.5.6)
example (3.2.16) figures high on the scale of subjectivity as the speaker is shown to have 
iome involvement even though he is only reporting the lack of necessity which is dictated by 
i third party. The meaning of ge tie pyrfeti, paraphrasable as ‘you needn’t’ or ‘you don’t have 
;o’ could be labeled as prototypical among the negated examples of the deontic necessity of 
bearf. It is the same meaning that Tellier (1962. 103) classifies as a negative counterpart to 
positive mceg and suggests that its translation be tie pas avoir lieu de (‘to have no good reason 
to’), it seems to me that, when distilled to the bare essentials, both translations are adequate in 
that the gist of both is the same. The fact that there is no good reason to do something often 
amounts to saying that there is no necessity to do it and vice versa, a common result being that 
no one or nothing obliges the subject to perform an act. Nevertheless, I choose to adopt the 
‘you needn’t’ paraphrase as otherwise we would run the risk of losing the common thread in 
the semantic development of pearf which is the chain from need through PI necessity through 
deontic necessity. Secondly, to say that (3.2.16) means ‘you have no good reason to mourn’ 
somehow obscures the almost performative nature of the sentence. Note that given the 
authority and involvement of the speaker and despite the fact that the main verb is not a 
typical activity verb, the sentence verges on performativity in that the subject is positively 
urged to stop mourning.
Example (3.2.17) is representative o f quite a large group of 24 occurrences which 
contain the second person singular subject, hence they are expected to be the most subjective 
and to have the sense of necessity strongest. The reality only partly lives up to the 
expectations. (3 .2.17) has no overt marker of the involvement of the speaker who, however, 
undoubtedly speaks from a position of authority and generates the necessity himself. The 
status of such use of pearf is only marginal, though. This can be gathered from the fact that 
for the speaker to be interpreted as the source of necessity in a given instance of pearf an 
explicit indication must be provided by the context. Christ, designated as the speaker in
(3.2.17), is clearly in a position to lay obligations, which is yet enhanced by the clause forpon 
pe ic eom mid pe, which precisely elucidates the grounds of the lack of necessity and points 
back to the speaker as the source of the modality. What drags the necessity force down the 
scale is the non-agentivity of the main verb following pearft. As is clear from Table 3.2.4., 
otidrcedan is one of the three most frequent verbal complements of pearf in general and the
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most frequent complement of pearf with the meaning of PE/deontic necessity. A common 
denominator of those three verbs in Table 3.2.4. is that none of them is an activity verb, a 
trend which runs through the majority of the occurrences of pearf (in the group of the 118 
instances of pearf, an activity verb follows the pre-modal 39 times). The meaning of pearf in
(3.2.17) approximates to that in (3.2.16) to the extent that it could be paraphrased as ‘you 
needn’t/you don’t have to.’ It is also of significance that in this case the source of the 
necessity can be linked to the authority of the speaker.
^ wenan ondrœdan tweogan other verbs total
PE/deontic necessity 8 13 1 90 118
other meanings 17 11 6 75 109
Table 3.2.4. Frequency of verbal complements of pearf
Further, (3 .2.19) is of interest since it has a third person singular subject as well as the 
meaning that can be seen essentially along the same lines as those in (3.2.16) and (3.2.17). 
There is no speaker involvement and the necessity is conditioned by the official regulations, 
which renders this example more objective. It is noteworthy, however, that the main verb is at 
last an activity verb. (3 .2.19) goes further down the cline on the virtue of its being a pseudo­
exhortation of which Coates (1983: 35) says that ‘such examples seem weak in their 
imperative force (...) .’ Formally the sentence belongs to the class of ‘impersonal 
constructions which have oblique arguments, but which lack a nominative subject’ (Warner 
1993: 122), example (3 .2.19) being one of eighteen appearances of this construction that I 
find in the DOE corpus. The logical subject of (3 .2.19) is us, which indicates the speaker 
counts himself as a member of his audience with a view to implying that he is subject to the 
same external necessity. Purely a rhetorical device, it fails to carry any strong modality.
The only non-negative example among the ones that I have selected as the best 
illustrations of the cline, (3.2.20) has pearf with the meaning referred to by Tellier (1962: 
114) when he observes that ‘dans quelques contextes son sens apparaît comme étonnamment 
proche de celui qu’aurait SCULAN’ [in some contexts the sense of the verb appears 
surprisingly close to that of SCULAN]. This assessment tallies with Molencki’s (2002: 12) 
observation that ‘pearf often expressed the idea of compulsion, or where the inevitability of 
consequence is expressed, and is thus synonymous with sceal in the sense of modem ‘should, 
ought to’ ’ With the third person singular subject, a past reference and the necessity which is a
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concomitant of the legal regulations, (3.2.20) is located toward the periphery of the cline, 
though. Subsequently, there is (3.2.21), a member of quite a numerous set of occurrences with 
a clearly future reference. It implies the necessity to suffer from some unfavorable conditions 
in the future unless appropriate precautions are undertaken in the present. Note that the future 
necessity derives from the generally accepted system of religious rules which are not 
questioned. Obviously, with the necessity projected far upon the future, (3.2.21) is devoid of 
any performative value and subjectivity and hence figures very low on the cline. Finally, the 
bottom of the cline is occupied by examples like (3.2.22) which can be seen to contain an 
inanimate subject and a passive construction. With the addressee of the necessity being 
demoted, the obligative force of (3.2.22) turns out very weak. Moreover, (3.2.22) fails to 
unequivocally locate the source of the necessity. Given this, it seems most likely that the 
speaker reports a necessity arising out of the vague external circumstances. If this 
interpretation is accepted, we have to do an instance of pearf extending beyond mere deontic 
necessity to general PE necessity.
Once the occurrences of pearf of deontic necessity have been shown to vary in the 
amount of necessity and subjectivity, the next step is to balance these occurrences against the 
parameters set out by Coates (1983: 36) in a way no different than in the case of agan. The 
aim of this task is to make an attempt at determining the force of the modality of the particular 
instances of pearf by laying them out on a matrix. The parameters need to be rearranged 
slightly so that they would reflect the true nature of the semantics of pearf. The final order, 
after some necessary adjustment, is presented below:
(a) second person subject,
(b) speaker involvement,
(c) speaker has authority over subject,
(d) verb is agentive,
(e) paraphrasable by ‘it is obligatory/absolutely essential that’
(f) animate subject
(g) paraphrasable by ‘it is important that’,
(h) paraphrasable by ‘it is not necessary that’,
(i) inanimate subject.
(adopted from Coates 1983: 36)
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As can be seen, feature (h) has been added as it is implicated in the bulk of the negative 
occurrences of /»ear/8 Also, it will not go unnoticed that feature (e), an indicator of strong 
necessity, is virtually absent from the meaning of pearj\ yet it is preserved in the matrix as it 
makes comparisons with the matrix of agan more easily available.
Parameter
(3.2.16)
(3.2.17)
(3.2.18)
(3.2.19)
(3.2.20)
(3.2.21)
(3.2.22)
+
+
+
+
strong necessity/ 
subjectivity 
(core)
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
weak necessity/ 
subjectivity 
(periphery)
Table 3.2.5. Matrix to show gradience of deontic necessity ofpearf
Pm initial observation that can be made on the basis of Table 3.2.5. is that the examples of 
pearf spread over the matrix somewhat less consistently than those of agan and PDE must (for 
¡the former, see Table 3.1.3. for the latter, see Coates 1983: 37). Specifically, what is meant 
¡here is that the most subjective examples of pearf such as (3.2.16) and (3.2.17), can be 
ffesDonsive to the features typical of the low extreme of the cline, e.g. feature (h). Likewise, 
|he only feature-(i)-positive example, (3.2.22), is at the same time sensitive to feature (d) 
¡which is indicative of stronger necessity. It is worth emphasizing that such a trend is not 
moticeable in the case of agan and must. Further, it can be noticed that examples (3.2.16) and
(3.2.17) stand out by virtue of embracing the crucial features of the strong end of the cline. 
Considering that overall there are 31 cases of a second person pronoun used with a present 
indicative form of pearf with the sense of deontic necessity, I conclude that subjective 
contexts with pearf have quite a strong foothold in Old English. The remaining occurrences
8 Feature (h) is indicative of much weaker and less intensive modality than feature (e) even though the former is 
only a negative variant of the latter. As shown by Horn (1989) and de Haan (1997), however, negation of strong 
necessity results in weak modality equivalent to permission-not-to.
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fail to show any significant internal divisions and thus can be lumped together as the residents 
of the skirt and periphery of the cline. Importantly, they make up the majority of all the
instances of the verb.
Also, two points should be given some consideration in relation to Table 3.2.5. Firstly, 
it cannot escape anyone s attention that none of the examples of  pearf yields a paraphrase ‘it 
is obligatory/absolutely essential that. Instead, the nature of the deontic necessity of pearf is 
best described in terms o f  features (g ) paraphrasable by ‘ it is important that’ and (h) 
paraphrasable by ‘ it is not necessary that.’ The former applies to the affirmative instances 
whereas the latter is preferred by the negative ones. The deontic necessity which underlies the 
use o fpearf is then not to be taken as very forceful. Witness examples (3.2.20) and (3.2.22) 
where it is relatively easy to overcome the force of the necessity. In the explicitly negative 
examples, e.g. (3.2.16), the subject’s freedom of choice is not significantly constrained either 
in that they are given an option: to act or not to act (to mourn or not to mourn in (3.2.16)). The 
final decision rests with the subject, a natural consequence of there being no necessity for the 
subject to act The second point to be commented on centers on the inanimate subjects of 
pearf As can be seen in Table 3.2.5., pearf+ infinitive expands its use to the degree that it 
accepts inanimate subjects. Even if this innovation verges on negligibility in frequency terms 
(five times total, including four cases of deontic necessity and one case of indeterminacy 
between PE/deontic and PI necessity), in light of my discussion of wide and narrow scope 
with deontic modality in section 3.1.5., pearf proves a pre-modal mature enough to enter wide 
scope constructions. It should be remembered that, as shown by Nordlinger and Traugott 
(1997) and Traugott and Dasher (2005), such a development is implemented only after the use 
of a deontic modal in conjunction with narrow scope is firmly established. With the Agonist 
being unexpressed, example (3 .2.22) provides an illustration of wide scope with pearf.
3.2.5. pearf with negation
To all intents and purposes, it is negation that seems the proper locus for a discussion of the 
modality of pearf + infinitive. Table 3.2.6., which builds on Table 3.2.2., undisputedly 
demonstrates that the sense of necessity of pearf be it internal or external, relies mainly on 
the negation of this necessity. This statement is only weakened when some other meanings 
than necessity come to the fore in pearf (cf. 3.2.6 ). Otherwise, the quantitative summary of 
the clause types points to steady and prevalent incidence of negation whose average value, 
regardless of the verb’s meaning, is 81.9 per cent. This finding lends further support to my
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account of the role played by negative contexts in the PI necessity of pearf being extended to 
PE and deontic necessity, which I detailed in 3.2.4.2. It is crucial to note that the semantic 
change in pearf infinitive leaves the preference for negative contexts unaffected or even 
strengthened. This, in turn, suggests that negation might have a hand in this semantic change. 
Also, in order to arrive at a thorough picture of negation with pearf in Table 3 .2.6. I include 
the lowest row which, by virtue of presenting the distribution of pearf+NP with respect to the 
clause type, naturally belongs to section 3.2.1. Due to this inclusion, one can observe that the 
convergence of pearf and negation is a theme underlying all the various uses of pearf in Old 
English.
affirmative negative interrogative total
PE/deontic necessity 16
(13.6%)
101
(85.6%)
1
(0.8%)
118
(100%)
indeterminate 7
(21.2%)
25
(75.8%)
1
(3%) (100%)
PI necessity 9
(13.6%)
55
(83.4%)
2
(3%)
66
(100%)
other 4
(54.6%)
5
(45.4%)
0
(0%)
10
(100%)
pearf + infinitive 
total
37
(16.3%)
186
(81.9%)
4
(1.8%)
227
(100%)
pearf+NP 12
(35.3%)
20
(58.8%)
2
(5.9%)
34
(100%)
Table 3 .2 .6. Distribution of clause types with pearf
A word of caution seems proper in connection with Table 3.2.6., however. The 
division line between the affirmative and negative sentences is, predictably, the presence of 
the clitic ne in the same clause as pearf. Such an approach, even if necessary and helpful, 
might be felt to explain away some other facets of the negative contexts containing pearf to 
which there is much more than just explicit negation. A closer inspection of the 37 instances 
of pearf infinitive subsumed under the label AFFIRMATIVE in Table 3 .2.6. reveals that as 
many as 21 are traceable to assertive contexts whereas the remaining examples can be 
deivided into seven emphatic and nine non-assertive (cf. Table 3.2.7 ). As for the emphatic
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subgroup, it comprises complex sentences in which the clause with pearf is itself positive, yet, 
at the same time, it is an embedded clause whose matrix clause is negative, as in (3.2.22):
(3.2.22) se wilniajs dastte nan Sing ne sie Se he him ondrasdan Qyrfe, 
those desire that no thing not he that he him dread need
‘those wish that there was no thing that he need dread’
(SEG27ACP B9.1.3)
Importantly, besides a two clause paraphrase along the lines o f ‘that there was no thing that he 
should/need dread,’ a single clause paraphrase of (3.2.22) also comes into play: ‘He 
shouldn’t/needn’t dread anything.’ Note that both paraphrases cited are negative sentences. 
Overall, the structure of (3 .2.22) brings to mind negative raising in that out of two juxtaposed 
clauses, main and embedded, it is the former that is negated. The gist of negative raising is 
elucidated by Horn (1989: 308) when he says it is ‘the availability of a lower clause reading 
or understanding for a higher-clause negation.’ Earlier, Palmer (1979: 95) acknowledges 
negative raising in his consideration of the PDE modals’ interaction with negation and offers 
an exemplification:
[3.2.23] ‘I don’t think we need worry about that any more now. (...)
(...) [3.2.23] is a sentence with ‘negative raising,’ where it is THINK that is formally negated, although 
the negation clearly belongs semantically to the subordinate clause. I  don't think that... is to be interpreted
as] think that... not... ’ (Palmer 1979: 95).
On the other hand, the parallels between (3.2.22) and negative raising are not far-reaching. 
Without the transposition of not to the main clause, (3.2.22) would yield a paraphrase 
incongruent with its original meaning, viz. ‘There is a thing he shouldn’t/needn’t fear.’ 
Equally incongruent are the rationales behind the structure of (3.2.22) and negative raising. 
The former is validated on the grounds of emphasis, the resultant double clause structure of
(3.2.22) being conditioned by the speaker’s desire to shift the focus to nan ding, a procedure 
reminiscent of the motivation behind existential or cleft sentences in PDE (cf. Quirk et al. 
1985) Interestingly, the effect achieved by negative raising is that of turning the focus away 
from the negation since, as Horn (1989: 316) puts it, ‘negative force weakens with the 
distance of the negative element from the constituent with which it is logically associated.’ 
All in all, the seven negative-raising-like instances of pearf1 infinitive, albeit seemingly
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positive, when interpreted in their double clause entirety, cannot be disentangled from the 
negation in the first clause. I therefore suggest that they be treated as no less negative than 
those which take overt syntactic negation.
emphatic other non-assertive assertive total
pearf+ infinitive 7 9 21 37
Table 3 .2.7. pearf in assertive and non-assertive contexts
Furthermore, there are nine cases of pearf * infinitive without any overt syntactic 
negation yet occurring in what Quirk et al. (185: 54) call non-assertive contexts and what 
Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 834) label non-affirmative contexts. Molencki (2002) and 
Loureiro Porto (2005) pay attention to this inclination of the verb and, by way of illustration, 
it bears enumerating the types of the non-assertive contexts which employ pearf In seven out 
of the nine times it is a comparative clause.
(3 .2.24) 6a 5e ma swugia5 Sonne hie 5vrfen. 
those who more keep-silent than they need 
‘those who stay silent more than they should’
(SEG27ACP B9.1.3)
I also find one instance of a present counterfactual with pearf + infinitive whose non-assertive 
nature consists in the fact that a certain imaginary situation is talked about (cf. Molencki
1999):
(3 .2.25) ac ic wolde swiSor sweltan gif ic foorfte for minum agenum earde,
but I  would sooner die i f  I  needed fo r  my own native-land
‘but I would rather die if I needed for my native land’
(SEGIOA^ELS (Edmund) Bl.3.31)
On a similar note, Quirk et al. (1985: 747) stress the affinity between non-assertion and 
conditionals to the degree that ii f  clauses (especially those expressing open conditions ) are 
like questions in that they imply uncertainty about the actual existence of the circumstances 
referred to. Therefore they tend to contain non-assertive forms.’ Finally, there is a single 
instance of pearf + infinitive in an adverbial clause of purpose introduced by py Ices, a
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conjunction which is inherently negative yet does not require any other marker of clausal 
negation (cf. Mitchell and Robinson 1986: 94):
(3 2.26) Span {ju hine georne j)aet he J)ine lare lseste, j)y laes gyt laS gode, incrum 
urge thou him earnestly that he thy bidding do, lest you loath to-god, to-your 
waldende weordan frvrfen. 
lord become need
‘Urge him earnestly to do your bidding lest you should become loath to God, your 
lord’
(SEGOlAGenA.B A l.l)
The theme of non-assertive contexts should not be passed without a few word about 
the four interrogative clauses with pearf+infinitive. Infrequent as they are, they subscribe to 
the verb’s overwhelming preference for non-assertive environments. In 3.2.4.1. I exemplify a 
fine line between a rhetorical question and its interpretation in terms of negation (cf. example
(3.2.11) and the subsequent discussion), which finds further support in the fact that scholars, 
for example Quirk et al. (1985) or Huddlestone and Pullum (2002), assign a non-assertive 
function to interrogatives.
As noted in 3.2.4.1. and 3.2.4 3, in negative sentences pearf+infinitive has the 
meaning of ‘no necessity to do something,’ be it PI or PE/deontic necessity or both types at 
the same time in the case of merger. The saliency of this meaning is shown in Table 3 .2.5. 
where it materializes into feature h) paraphrasable by 'it is not necessary that, ’ and where 
one can see it work for five out of seven examples illustrating the cline of the meaning of 
pearf+infinitive. Given that, it goes without saying that out of the two options available, viz. 
negation of modality and negation of the proposition, it is modality that is under negation 
here. Loureiro Porto (2005: 135) describes this situation as ‘implying] that the antagonist 
releases the agonist from acting in a given way, that is, absence of obligation (.. .).’ 
Nevertheless, there appear counterexamples, consider the following sentence culled from the 
Benedictine Rule:
(3 .2.27) wite he j)onne, ofer |)aet j?aet him aslces infaeres forwymed bid and he nasfre eft
understand he then, over that that him any entrance denied be and he never again 
to |}am mynstre gecyrran ne frearf. 
to the monastery return not need
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‘Let him understand that then any entrance will be denied to him and he may never 
again return to the monastery’
(SEG34.\BenR BIO.3.1.1)
When (3.2.27) is cast against (3.2.18), another example taken from the Benedictine Rule 
which serves to illustrate the cline of the deontic necessity of pearf in 3 .2.4 3 ., it turns out 
they stand in sharp contrast. While (3.2.18) is a fairly uncontroversial embodiment of a no- 
necessity-to reading, that is, it negates the modality, the intensity of the modality in (3 .2.27) is 
such that rather than in terms of no-necessity, it should be interpreted as either having the 
meaning of ‘necessity not to return’ close to that of PDE mustn’t or a ‘no permission to 
return’ reading parallel to that of PDE can't. The former is a case of negation of the 
proposition, while in the latter, negation affects the modality. Loureiro Porto (2005. 135) also 
opts for viewing instances such as (3.2.27) in terms of necessity-not-to. At the same time, the 
question of the two types of negation in the case of modality arises. The question which is 
interesting in itself. If one assumes that the occurrences in the vain of (3.2.27) are a case of 
necessity-not-to, then it follows that pearf+ infinitive accepts both types on negation, modal 
and main verb negation, and depending on which type of negation is used in a given sentence, 
the verb can have two different meanings, namely no-necessity-to as in (3.2.18) or necessity- 
not-to as in (3 .2.27). That such a state of affairs is quite exceptional can be gathered from 
Jacobsson’s (1979: 298) discussion of must in Middle English. Initially in that period must 
develops the sense ‘not obliged to,’ indicative of modal negation, which is ensued by the 
emergence of the meaning ‘obliged not to’ which is based on main verb negation. ‘After 
mustn't in the sense ‘obliged not to’ had become firmly established in the language, it was no 
longer eligible for use with modal negation (‘not obliged to’). Absence of necessity or 
obligation had to be expressed in other ways, notably by negating need  (Jacobsson 1979:
; 298). It seems then that if two meanings of a modal differ solely in respect of the type of 
negation, one of them has to go in the long run. This is exactly what pertains to pearf, whose 
ME continuation, thurven, has no attestations of the meaning necessity-not-to (cf. Visser 
!. 1963-1973, MED, Loureiro Porto 2005).
3.2.6. pearf W\\k\ other than necessity-related meanings
¡In the present section I seek to provide an illustration of the fringe areas in the verb’s 
semantics. In Table 3.2.3. ten instances of pearf + infinitive are assembled under the heading
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OTHER, which is to imply that the meaning of the verb in these instances is only tangential to 
the prevalent meanings revolving around necessity. Two major trends in the semantics of 
these ten examples can be detected: some of the examples swerve in the direction of dearr ‘to 
make bold’ and some have potentially epistemic readings. Both trends receive proper 
exemplification in (3.2.28) and (3.2.29) respectively:
(3.2.28) ne nan man ne Searf him cweSan to, Hwi dest 5u swa? 
nor no man not need him tell to, why dost thou so?
‘and no man dare ask him, ‘Why do you do this?”
(SEG23.VEGenPref B8.1.7.1)
(3.2.29) 5a cwaeS he: Gif he nauht naefde jjaes Se he ondrede J^ aet he forleosan frorfte. 
then said he: I f  he nothing not-had this that he feared that he lose needed
‘then he said: ‘If he had nothing that he feared that he should/might lose”
(SEG29.\Bo B9.3.2)
In the preceding context of (3.2.28) we learn how God created man and what he endowed 
man with. The passage ends with the sentence cited. Considering that him and du both have 
God as the antecedent, it is rather unlikely that any necessity-related meaning is involved. 
Rather, the meaning intended should read ‘no man is bold enough to ask/has a good enough 
reason to ask him.’ Tellier (1962), Molencki (2002) and Loureiro-Porto (2005) all consider 
such uses of pearf + infinitive worthy of note. Molencki (2002: 13) speculates that the semantic 
affinity of pearf and dearr ‘might be treated as a harbringer of the confusion between the two 
verbs in Middle English’ and is thereby the beginning of the end of pearf in English. When it 
comes to the epistemic potential of pearf it seems to emerge when the verb is found in a 
subordinate clause. In (3.2.29) porfte follows in a clause that complements ondrede and in 
(3 .2.26) the clause containing pyrfen is introduced by py Ices. In both cases the meaning of 
pearf+ infinitive is future-oriented, which makes an inference of the possibility of the action 
taking place viable. This shows that pearf + infinitive is receptive to epistemic possibility 
although, on the other hand, it is a moot question whether the allegedly epistemic uses of the 
verb do not, in fact, actualize periphrastic subjunctive (see also 3.3.5.)
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3.2 7. Summary ofpearf
In the preceding sections I have tried to elaborate on the sequence of steps that pearf takes 
while advancing on its way to deontic necessity and gradually increasing subjectivity. As 
might be expected, the line of the development is determined by the meaning of the lexical 
source (cf. Aijmer 1996), and pearf initially a verb expressing need, enters the area of PI 
necessity and subsequently PE and deontic necessity. All the stages of this development are 
represented in the sample of 261 instances of pearf obtained from the DOE corpus. It is 
surprising to find that pearf + infinitive, despite the suggestions of Warner (1993) pointing 
otherwise, primarily functions as a token of deontic necessity. Still, the deontic necessity 
associated with the verb turns out fairly weak. Two factors can be blamed for the majority of 
the occurrences of pearf+infinitive residing at the skirt and periphery of the cline indicating 
the modal strength and subjectivity of the verb: 1) a strong attachment of the verb toward non­
activity verbs selected as infinitival complements, which alienates pearf + infinitive from 
performative contexts, 2) inability of pearf to establish itself as a carrier of the speaker­
generated necessity without the aid of the context. Interestingly, a similar circumstantial 
frame is noted by Perkins (1983: 62-63) with reference to PDE need, i.e. a semantic 
:ontinuation of pearf in Present-Day English, in that ‘the core meaning of NEED TO denies 
the speaker’s involvement, although it may sometimes be used in an utterance which has the 
Dverall illocutionary force of a directive, in which case the directive element, which is 
ultimately due to the speaker’s wishes, must always be supplied by the cotext of NEED TO or 
by the context of utterance. ’
13.3. sceal
linguistic literature abounds in pages dedicated to the intricacies of the semantics of sceal (cf 
|B&T, OED, Tellier 1962,Visser 1963-1973, Mitchell 1985). Goossens (1987a) looks into a 
¡sample of 200 instances of sceal taken from /Elfric and Wulfstain with a view to examining 
¡the degree of auxiliarization of sceal from the perspective of Functional Grammar. Even if 
¡the account of the meanings of sceal is more a tool than an end in itself for Goossens (1987a), 
this account will provide a relevant landmark for the present investigation. Traugott (1989) 
extensively uses the semantic development of sceal as an illustration of the semantic progress 
¡from non-modal meanings through deonticity and even as far as epistemicity. Importantly, all 
those stages can be observed in the case of sceal without going beyond Old English, which
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renders the case of st eal a point of crucial importance for Traugott (1989) in her pursuit of the 
increasing subjectivity of meanings. Interestingly enough, scea1 is often cited as a major 
counterexample to Lightfoot’s (1979) theory of rapid auxiliary-bound change in the status of 
English modals in the sixteenth century in that the verb is in the vanguard when it comes to 
approaching auxiliaryhood as early as in Old English (cf. Plank 1984, Harris 1987, Nagle 
1989).
Turning to the semantic road traveled by sceal, it epitomizes a verb originally 
associated with the sense of owing that becomes a verb of deontic necessity. Conradie (1987: 
177) cites the words of Pokomy (1959) and says that ‘[t]he Indo-European stem (sjkel 
probably meant: ‘to owe, be guilty, be indebt ed/obliged to.’ In OED we find that ‘[t]he 
Teutonic root (*skel-) *skal-, *skul~, to owe (...) is represented by Goth, skula.’ Related to 
this root, as also noted by OED is the OE noun scyld which is assigned two meanings by 
B&T: guilt, sin on the one hand and debt on the other. The noun then preserves the traces of 
the earliest signification of the root. As for the verb, by the OE times it evolves into an 
exponent of deontic necessity and throughout Old English continues to be what might be 
conceived of as the most important and the most popular tool that deontic necessity has at its 
disposal. At the same time, sceal rather than jettison its non-modal past altogether, can still be 
attested with the meaning ‘to owe’. As might be expected, much in the same mode as agon 
and pearf, the older meaning goes together with a less grammaticalized form, viz. sceal+NP 
whereas deontic necessity is to be searched for among the more grammaticalized occurrences 
of sceal complemented by an infinitive. Needless to say, such coexistence of older and 
younger forms and meanings provides a paragon of layering as discussed by Hopper (1991) 
and Hopper and Traugott (1993) as well as of Heine’s (1993) Overlap Model.
The sample of 394 instances of sceal to be looked into in the following sections has 
been obtained from the following works included in the OE part of the Helsinki Corpus: 
Alfred’s Cura Pastoralis, Laws (Alfred’s Introduction to Laws; Alfred; Ine), Chronicle MS 
A, Genesis, West-Saxon Gospels, TElfric’s Catholic Homilies, A Homily fo r  the Sixth (...) 
Sunday, The Blickling Homilies, The Benedictine Rule, Laws (Late; William), Wulfstan’s 
Homilies (03/4) and Chronicle MS E (03/4) (cf. Kyto 1993 for the full list of texts within the 
Helsinki corpus). All these works, when combined, constitute a 115, 769 word corpus. In 
Table 3.3.1., the occurrences of sceal in the sample are confronted with the two 
complementation types. It becomes obvious that the older construction sceal+NP barely holds 
its own in the sample when its 14 occurrences are cast against 380 instances of 
sceal infinitive. Given this introductory outline, section 3.3.1. deals with the background of
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the use o f sceal '■ NP  whereas the focus in the next sections falls exclusively on some 
diachronic and synchronic issues pertaining to sceal+infinitive. the theme of 3.3.2. is the 
motivation behind the transition from sceal NP to sceal infinitive, in 3.3.3. the syntactic side 
of sceal+infinitive is looked into, then I turn to the semantics of the construction in 3 .3 .4. 
Separate sections are devoted to the growing independence of the past/subjunctive form 
sceoJd- (3 .3 .5) and the issue of negation with scea! (3 .3 .6).
+infinitive +NP total
sceal 380 14 394
Table 3.3.1. Distribution of complementation types with sceal
3.3.1. sceal NP
As hinted at in the previous section, sceal+NP carrying the meaning ‘to owe’ constitutes the 
earliest layer in the use of the verb which, despite being clearly on the decline in Old English, 
manages to stay alive till well into Middle English. The last example given by OED comes 
from 1530, which might even suggest the postponement of the demise of the structure till the 
beginning of Early Modern English, yet in light of a 150 odd year gap between this example 
and a previous one, a statement seems warranted that the construction to a large extent dies 
; out in Middle English. It is also worth noting how limited the sense of owing in the case of 
\sceal+NP is. As corroborated by the fourteen instances in my sample as well as by the 
sentences given by B&T and OED, the debt denoted by sceal can only be financial. Witness 
that in Old English we do not observe any bleaching of the meaning of the debt a la agon to 
geldanne (cf. 3 .1.3 ). Thus, each of the fourteen examples comes from a code of law where 
either a particular sum of money is meant:
(3.3.1) Gif monnes sconca bid ofaslegen wiS 5aet cneou, Qaer sceal LXXX scillinga to 
i f  man's shin is cut- o ff against that biee, there shall 80 shillings to 
bote.
compensation
‘If a man’s shin is cut off the body, then he is to be paid 80 shillings in compensation.’ 
(COLAW2 72)
or some less specified financial commitment is talked about:
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(3.3.2) weaxe sio bot be Sam were, swa ilce swa sio manbot deS j^ e
increase the fine according-to the price-of-man, as same as the fine does that 
|)am hlaforde sceal
to-the lord shall
‘The fine (for killing a man) increases according to the price of the man, so does the 
fine due to the lord.’
(COLAW2 76)
The application of sceal \NP  in my sample is restricted to positive sentences where the
subject remains unexpressed. The impossibility to point to the debtor is a direct consequence
of the universality of law statutes. Any person guilty of the crime described in (3.3.1) and
(3.3.2) becomes the debtor.
As might be gathered from B&T, the meaning ‘to owe’ of sceal+NP is 
interchangeable with that of agan to geldanne, consider the following illustrations from the 
West-Saxon Gospels - (3.3.2) - and from the Lindisfarne Gospels - (3.3.3):
(3.3.3) J^ a saede he joam forman. hu mycel scealt fru minum hlaforde? 
then said he to-the first how much shalt thou to-my lord?
‘Then he asked the first, ‘How much do you owe my lord?”
(SEG25.\LK (WSCp) B8.4.3.3)
(3.3.4) sui dicebat primo quantum debes domino meo
cuoaeS 6aem forSmesto huu micel aht 5u to geldanne hlaferde minum.
said to-the first how much ought thou to pay to-lord my
‘(He) asked the first, ‘How much do you owe my lord?”
(SEG62.\LKGL (Li) C8.1.3)
Although far from qualifying for a conclusive piece of evidence, this equivalence may suggest 
that agan to geldanne is ousting sceal+NP at least in the Northumbrian dialect. Much more 
certain is the fact that it is not sceal gy/dan that takes over the meaning of sceal+NP even 
though such a scenario would be imaginable. In my sample there is only one sentence where a 
material obligation is communicated via sceal gyldan, an indication of the structure enjoying 
no incidence boost expected from an item gradually extended to new contexts.
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To sum up this brief attempt at characterizing the use of sceal + NP in Old English, it 
needs to be said that the construction shows incipient signs of obsolescence. The instances of 
sceal+NP make up 3.5 per cent of the total number of the occurrences of the verb sceal in the 
sample and another vibrant construction agan to geldanne seems to encroach upon part of the 
territory originally reserved for sceal+NP. With the wisdom of hindsight, the ultimate ME 
demise of the NP complements of sceal along with the sense of owing which accompanies the 
verb is not surprising. What is more, the obsolescence of both, the form and meaning, at the 
same time, helps realize the bond between the two and lends support to Plank’s (1984: 311) 
conjecture that ‘I doubt that the loss of premodal-object constructions can be made sense of 
when seen in isolation from the semantic development of the (pre)-modals. This ability to take 
plain direct objects, without intervening main verb, would definitely seem to correlate with 
the presence of what is usually called ‘notional’ meaning, and consequently ought to 
disappear when a verb loses this kind of meaning, exchanging its lexical status for a 
grammatical one.’
3.3.2. From sceal+NP to sceal+infinitive
It will sound like a truism if I quote Aijmer (1996: 72) saying that ‘there are many possible 
semantic paths which are only constrained by the lexical source. ’ She is here concerned with 
the developmental paths of ability expressions yet the statement is universal enough to 
embrace sceal. Bybee et al. (1991) and Bybee et al. (1994) make numerous references to the 
PDE cogener of sceal, i.e. shall, while discussing the origins of futurity markers cross- 
Jinguistically. Shall then, prior to becoming eligible to express various notions associated with 
futurity, is shown to have gone through the stage of obligative meaning which ensues the pre- 
jmodal sense ‘to owe.’ With the shift from obligation to future being widely attested, the 
¡earlier one, that is, from ‘to owe’ to obligation is more difficult to stumble upon. Bybee et al. 
¡(1994: 258-259) identify two parallels. One of them is the Danish cognate of shall, skal, 
jwhich treads the same path, the other parallel being from Cantonese. Eventually, Bybee et al. 
(1994) reconstruct a frequently attended diachronic path in accordance with which lexical 
sources of various specified origins, including those centered on the concept of owing, 
converge to proceed toward future via obligation. Denning (1987) provides a few partial 
parallels. Since his paper concentrates on obligation expressions, he does not specify any 
post-obligation stages of their semantic paths. His examples of obligation expression which 
originate from forms meaning ‘to owe’ include: Latin dëhëre, Breton die, Welsh dylai and
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Mandarin ga t'. As pointed out in 2.4., in van der Auwera and Plungian’s (1998: 95) view, 
which has a slightly different take on the obligative side of the path, lexical items denoting 
such concepts as owe, duty, belong, be good\proper, sceal being clearly one of them, head for 
deontic necessity. Future, obviously, is also acknowledged as a direction to take by sceal, yet, 
future, as such remains outside the purview of this dissertation.
Although agan and sceal begin their deontic necessity bound paths at diverse starting 
points, the former as a verb of possession, the latter as verb of owing, the both paths cross 
when the structure agan to geldanne comes into being with the sense ‘owe’ (cf. 3.1.3. and 
3.3.1). While passing through the field of necessity, the two paths stay relatively close to 
each other and come to have more crossing points. The second major crossing point is a 
selective approach to necessity in that both verbs ‘skip the participant-internal dimension and 
go directly to the deontic subtype of participant external necessity’ (van der Auwera and 
Plungian 1998: 95). In 3.1.8. I made an attempt at accounting for the omission of PI necessity 
in the case of agan. Since both verbs make the same move, the semantic motivation behind it 
must be similar, if not the same. Let me therefore repeat my main argument adjusted to the 
whereabouts o f sceal. The situation created by sceal meaning ‘to owe’ as in (3.3.1), (3.3.2) 
and (3.3.3) assigns the roles to two participants, namely a creditor/victim and a debtor. The 
relationship between the participants, describable in terms of a socially agreed commitment, 
causes an inference of deontic necessity to arise easily. The debtor is obliged to return the 
money or financially compensate for a loss. The source of the necessity is clearly defined as, 
on the one hand, coming from outside the debtor/obligee and, on the other hand, totally 
contingent on a social agreement or legal norms rather than on some objective circumstances. 
The former matters as much as the inference of necessity is instantly bonded to an obligee- 
external source, hence the omission of PI necessity. A direct consequence of the latter is that 
sceal comes to express deontic necessity with the domain of more general PE necessity taken 
no notice of.
It is noteworthy that if for sceal the semantic change goes hand in hand with a 
syntactic one in that infinitival complements are substituted for NP complements, a sign of 
progress on the way toward grammaticalization (cf. Bolinger 1980, also Fischer 1994 for 
discussion), agan is already one step ahead of sceal. That is to say that while the semantic 
shift from ‘to owe’ to deontic necessity is underway in the case of agan, infinitival
9 As noted by Borys (2005), a similar development takes place in Polish to the extent that the verb pomnien 
‘should' stems from the noun wina ‘guilt, trespass’ (proto-Slavic *vina. Old Church Slavic vina). The 
intermediate stages that facilitate the shift are the adjective winny guilty; indebted' and the prepositional phrase
po wiriie.
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complements are not a novelty, as they are accepted as a pivotal part of the construction agan 
to geldanne which cumulatively amounts to the meaning ‘owe.’ The equivalent syntactic 
change in the complementation of agan takes place earlier, as shown in 3.1.2. and 3 .1.3., 
which may be explained on the grounds of the different lexical origins of the two verbs.
3.3.3. sceal with the infinitive - syntactic points
As for the type of the infinitival complements, sceal, much like pearf exhibits full attachment 
to plain infinitives (cf. Warner 1993). In my sample I do not find any examples to the contrary 
except for a) six instances of what Warner (1993: 113) would refer to as ‘postverbal ellipsis’ 
and b) three instances where sceal is followed by a prepositional phrase and one where
instead of an expected infinitive of a verb of motion we encounter a directional adverb. The b)
types are illustrated respectively below.
(3.3.5) Wa me, forbam Jte ic sceal to helle for binum yfeldaedum 
woe me, because I  shall to hell fo r  your evil-deeds 
‘Alas, because I shall go to hell for your evil deeds.’
(COEPIHOM 88)
(3.3.6) bonne sceolde fvrd ut eft ongean bast hi up woldon.
when should army out again toward that they up would
‘when the army should have gone out again to meet them as they went up. ’
(COCHROE4 1010.19)
On a purely semantic side, there is a remarkable affinity between such a construction and 
other instances of sceal+infinitive as the meaning involved here is that of deontic 
necessity/future. Denning (1987: 53) calls modals used with a prepositional phrase and no 
main verb following ‘semantically auxiliary’ as the absence of the main verb makes them stop 
short of meeting the formal criteria for auxiliaryhood (cf. Warner 1990, also Huddleston 1980 
for Present-Day English). Also, Denning (1987: 53) remarks that such constructions are 
preserved in present day German ‘when a verb of motion is not expressed (e.g. Ich muss zu 
Hause ‘I must go home,’ with gehen ‘to go’ understood).’ It is of relevance that the 
unexpressed main verb is not semantically arbitrary, witness the following statement made by
Plank (1984: 325): ‘S urely  th e  m odal exp ressions to g e th e r  w ith  th e  ad v erb s  o r  p repositional 
phrases did convey  th e  n o tio n  ‘d irec tio n  to w ard s  (o r  f ro m )’, th e re  being  alw ays th e  possib ility
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of inferring a semantically neutral verb of movement in such contexts. (...) In the 17lh century 
[in English] directional adverbs and prepositional phrases largely cease to occur with the 
modal s, but also with the modality expressions which definitely retain verbal status, and an 
infinitival verb of movement now has to be employed to convey directional notions.’ 
Considering these assessments, in the following sections the constructions of the type 
characterized above are discussed on a par with other instances of sceal+infinitive.
As for postverbal ellipsis, an analysis of my sample matches the results obtained by 
Goossens (1987a: 126) in that, barring one exception, my examples belong to those ‘with an 
ellipted infinitive in a clause of comparison introduced by swa (swa). ’ All of them conform to 
the major criterion of post-auxiliary ellipsis, namely, an antecedent of the ellipted VP should 
be retrievable from the context (cf. Hankamer and Sag 1976, Sag 1979, Warner 1993, Miller 
1997). Consider (3.3.7):
(3.3.7) And se Se nele Godesbodan hyran mid rihte ne godcundre lare gyman 
and this who not-wants God's meseengers hear with right nor God-given teaching heed 
swa he sceolde 
as he should
‘And that who is not willing to rightfully listen to God’s messengers nor heed God’s 
teaching as he should’
(COWULF4 47)
where the complements of nele, viz. Codes bodan hyran mid rihte and godcundre lare gyman 
are also to be taken as the logical complements of sceolde. To be sure, no example of 
pseudogapping is to be found in my sample (cf. Warner 1993: 114 for sceal with 
pseudogapping).
Before I go on to the discussion of the semantic tenets connected with sceal + infinitive, 
[it seems feasible to present the statistics attained after the obligative instances of 
sceal+infinitive have been cast against the three clause types: affirmative, negative and 
¡interrogative. Table 3.3.2. provides the resultant numbers with a proviso that I have excluded 
58 cases of sceal + infinitive which clearly carry the meaning of future. Future per se will not 
be dealt with in this dissertation.
While Table 3.3.2. is supposed to have a merely referential function and I reserve 
[more space for a detailed discussion of negation with sceal in 3 .3 .6 ., it bears highlighting the 
fact that sceal, unlike agan and fiearf displays no preference for negative contexts. This time
104
an asymmetry which holds between the number of affirmative and negative clauses indicates 
an unquestionable preponderance of the former. Also, it should be noted that the interrogative 
sentences fail to play any significant role in a way no different than in the case of the other 
two pre-modals discussed so far.
_ ____ _______ _ ________ affirmative negative interrogative total
sceal + infinitive 
with a sense of necessity and necessitv\future
284
(88 .2%)
34
(10.6%)
4
( 1.2%)
322
( 100%)
Table 3 .3 .2. Distribution of clause types with sceal infinitive
3.3.4. Semantics of sceal + infinitive
In distinguishing different senses of sceal+infinitive, one has to focus on two areas: deontic 
necessity and futurity. Furthermore, the two meanings turn out to overlap to a certain degree, 
thereby becoming fertile ground for merger. Table 3.3.3. presents the results of my 
interpretation of the meanings of the instances of sceal + infinitive in the sample. As with the 
previous verbs, a word of caution should ensue concerning the tentative nature of the numbers 
obtained in Table 3 .3 .3. Suffice it to say that the meanings of the pre-modals, due to their 
indeterminacy, must be approached with a healthy dose of likelihood and common sense. In 
¡my sample, over 70 per cent of the examples belong to the necessity type (notice that 
¡Goossens (1987a: 127) finds the merger type prevalent in his sample), a number not left 
unaffected by my intentional selection of texts where a considerable quantity of necessity 
expressions could be expected, viz. the OE Laws, the Benedictine Rule, etc. It should be 
stressed, however, that an access to a rich number of necessity expression takes priority over 
¡an attempt at establishing the precise distribution of the meanings with which sceal + infinitive 
is used.
necessity necessity\future future total
sceal + infinitive 268
(70.53%)
54
(14.21%)
58
(15.26%)
380
( 100%)
Table 3 .3 .3 .. Distribution of meanings o1' sceal + infinitive
The 58 examples carrying a sense of futurity are not going to be discussed further in 
any capacity whatsoever. What is of interest, however, is the rationale behind an expression of
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PE/deontic necessity raising the possibility of its gradual encroachment upon futurity. 
Conradie (1987) proposes the blame be put on the existence of a semantic axis which is neatly 
adumbrated in Figure 3.3.1.:
KNOWLEDGE>ABILITY>PERMISSION>OBLIGATION>PROMISE>FUTURITY 
Figure 3 .3 .1. A semantic axis of modal meanings
The meanings, shown on the example of the Afrikaans modals, have a tendency to gradually 
move in a right-hand direction. Thus, say, a marker of permission is likely to come to signal 
obligation and subsequently promise. According to Conradie (1987) two factors facilitate this 
progress: the fuzzy nature and performative value of the modal meanings. While both of these 
points are addressed in 2.1. and 2.3., the latter deserves some more consideration. A 
performative aspect is ascribed to, inter alia, obligation and an expression of obligation can be 
understood as a transaction between the speaker and hearer. In a default case the speaker 
makes use of his or her authority in order to get the hearer to act. At the same time, Conradie 
(1987) observes that the speaker may choose to achieve his or her aim, viz. to get the hearer to 
act without explicitly showing his or her authority and/or overtly indicating the hearer’s 
involvement. This is a stage at which the expression of obligation takes on a shade of 
indirectness. What was formerly an obligation to do something turns into an intention/promise 
to get something done. Once deprived of performativity, the expression is generalized into a 
token of future-oriented intention, as illustrated on the development of the Afrikaans cognate 
of sceal, zullen. Thus, an erstwhile obligation in (3 3 .8):
(3 .3 .8) Jy sal doen wat ek se.
You shall do what I say.
becomes an intention, (3.3.9), and a clear future reference sneaks in, (3.3.10):
[3.3.9) Ek sal jou help.
T will help you’
(3.3.10) Ic sal dief sijn.. ,/Al soudic hanghen bider kelen...
‘I shall be a thief, even though I’ll be hanged’
(all examples and translation from Conradie 1987:177)
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Another hypothesis, which partly ties in with Conradie’s (1987), is the one already 
invoked in 3.3.2. and proposed by Bybee et al. (1991) and Bybee et al. (1994). They 
dismantle the development of modal meanings into a series of paths, one of which, that
alluded to in 3.3.2., is shown in Figure 3.3.2.:
OBLIGATION>INTENTION>FUTURE 
Figure 3 .3 .2. A simplified path of development of obligation into future (adopted from Bybee
et al. 1994: 240)
Bybee et al. (1994) argue that the change from obligation to futurity is inferential in nature.
Especially in the first person, a statement of obligation such as I  have to go now (...) strongly implies that 
the speaker intends to leave soon. For example, this implication had become part of the meaning of shall 
by the Middle English stage and is amply represented in texts. Similarly, Old Spanish uses of the future 
from infinitive plus haher frequently express intention of a first person subject, for example in El Canlar 
del Mio Cid. (...) fI]t is from the intention sense that that the prediction use can develop. Especially with 
regard to a third person, a statement of intention implies prediction. (Bybee et al. 1994: 264)
Also supportive of the inferential mechanism of change are Traugott and Dasher (2005), who
stress that obligation expressed by the present forms of the English modal verbs is often
future-oriented. It is frequently future that is the time indicated or implied for acts rendered 
necessary to be carried out, which paves the way for a resultant inference of futurity in the 
meaning of a modal of obligation. Finally, an interesting undertaking is an attempt made by 
Bybee et al. (1991) at assessing the degree of advancement of an expression of obligation on 
the way to becoming a marker of futurity. Four stages are distinguished in the process of this 
change, called FUTAGE 1, FUTAGE 2, etc. respectively. The earliest stage FUTAGE 1 will 
be characteristic of the prevalent obligative semantics of the item, the last stage FUTAGE 4 
being reached when the futurity of the expression evolves into epistemicity. Relevant is the 
fact that in this scenario, OE sceal, as barely drafted into the service of futurity, is seen to be 
going through FUTAGE 1 (cf. Table 3.3.3 ).
3.3.4.1. Deontic necessity of scectl infinitive
The use of scea/+infinitive in the field of deontic necessity has been widely recognized as the 
primary function of the verb. Tellier (1962), Visser (1963-73), Mitchell (1985), Goossens
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]987a) and Warner (1993) to name few, while using different nomenclature, all address 
leontic necessity as the context behind most of the occurrences of seen I < infinitive. 
dictionaries like B&T and OED, quite understandably, point to a complex analysis as relevant 
o the obligative semantics of sceal, for example B&T lists nine meanings which could be 
fathered under the heading of deontic necessity. 1 side with those linguists who opt for a 
îolistic approach which puts the various meanings enumerated by B&T in a uniform 
»erspective of deontic necessity. Additional support for such a stance is gathered from 
Palmy’s (2000) force dynamics which posits one conceptual scheme for a context of deontic 
lecessity. Invariably, two participants in this scheme, the agonist (the obligee) and the 
Antagonist (the source of necessity) clash by virtue of being driven by opposing tendencies, 
he alternating factor being the nature of the Antagonist.
Even a homogenous approach must, however, be able to account for all the nuances of 
the deontic necessity inherent to sceal + infinitive. These, it seems, can be handled by showing 
that they are stretched along a cline, which find its illustration below:
(3.3 .11) Hælend him ()a ondswarede 7 cwæjx fou scealt fvlgean me. 7 lætan J^ a deadan 
Lord him then answered and said, thou shalt follow me, and let the dead 
bergean heora deade. 
bury their dead.
‘The Lord then answered him saying, ‘You shall follow me and let the dead bury their 
dead.”
(COBLICK 154)
(3.3 .12) Hælend hire (Da ondswarode, 7 cwæj), Martha, . . (>u scealt on æghwylce tid Godes 
Lord her then answered, and said, Martha, thou shalt on each time God’s 
willan wercan, 
will work
‘The Lord then answered her saying, Martha, you shall fulfill God’s will at any time.’ 
(COBLICK 36)
(3.3.13) Ic awyrged sceal. Jjeoden, of gesyhôe (iinre hweorfan.
I accursed shall lord from sight thy depart 
‘And I must go forth, accursed, from Thy sight, O Lord.’
(COGENESI 1034)
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(3 3 .14) On 5isum wraecfullum life we sceolon earmra manna helpan. we sceolon 8a hungrian 
m this wretched life we should poor men help, we should the hungry 
fedan. nacode scrydan. cuman underfon. 
feed, naked clothe, visitors receive
‘In this wretched life we should help the poor, feed the hungry, clothe the naked and 
receive visitors.'
(COAELHOM 258.83)
(3.3.15) 7 gyf he wel gelend bi8, he sceal beon gehorsad,
and i f  he well provided-with-land is, he should he horsed 
‘If he is a landowner, he should be horsed.’
(COLAW4 5.3)
(3 .3 .16) Hwylc se abbod beon scyle. 
what the abbot be shall 
‘What the abbot should be like.’
(COBENRUL 2)
(3.3 .17) Abbod, 3e 3aes wyr3e sy, fjaet he mynsteres wealde, he sceal a gemunan, hwaet he is 
abbot, who that worthy be, that he monastery run, he shall remember, what he is 
‘The abbot who is worthy to run the monastery, should remember what he is.’ 
(COBENRUL 2.1)
(3.3.18) Sceap sceal gongan mid his fliese 06 midne sumor;
sheep shall go with his fleece until mid summer
‘A sheep should go with its fleece until midsummer.’
(COLAW2 69)
(3 .3 .19) Ceorles wor8ig sceal beon wintres 7 sumeres betyned;
churl's homestead shall be in-winter and in-summer enclosed 
‘A churl’s homestead should be fenced in winter and summer.’
(COLAW2 40)
¡3.3.20) Ealra haefde XII and nigonhund, fc>a seo tid gewearS |oaet he friOgedal 
all had twelve and ninehundred, when the time became that he death 
fremman sceolde. 
effect should
‘He was all nine hundred and twelve when the time came that he was to die.’
(COGENESI 1140)
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An analysis of the cline cannot but start with examples (3.3.11) and (3.3.12). Both 
representative of the core of the cline, (3.3.11) and (3.3.12) turn out no less modally strong 
and subjective than the core examples of PDE must (cf. Coates 1983). A much cited example 
with reference to a high degree of subjectivity (cf. Warner 1993: 162), (3.3.11) carries 
necessity generated by the speaker. So does (3.3.12), yet (3.3.12) seems to lag one step behind
(3.3.11) in terms of the performative force as the main verb in the former, rather than specify 
a single action, refers to an activity which is to be repeated over a longer period of time. If one 
also allows for the authority of the speaker (it is both times Jesus), the statement found in 
OED is Hilly warranted that sceal ‘in the second person [is] equivalent to imperative.’ Notice 
also that both examples exhibit some potential for an inference of futurity. Perhaps (3.3.12) 
less so, as the phrase on ceghwylce tid enhances a sense of the general present.
Lower on the cline there are two first person examples (3.3.13) and (3.3.14) which, 
when juxtaposed, evince considerable differences. One with the speaker, the subject of
(3.3.13) acknowledges a necessity coming from an outside source, seems resigned to it and, 
what is crucial, makes no effort to resist it. Due to the sense of the acknowledgement of the 
deontic necessity, (3.3.13) is not subjective at all. (3.3.14), on the other hand, belongs to the 
class of pseudo-exhortations whose operation could also be seen in the case of cigan and 
pearf. Sceal yields the parallell picture in that the speaker is trying to manipulate the audience 
by including himself among its members. The necessity, religious or moral in nature, due to 
this manipulation is rendered less painful by the speaker, which shows the speaker’s 
involvement in imposing the necessity.
The next three examples, (3.3.15) through (3.3.17), all share a generic third person 
subject as well as a piece of instructive literature as the source from which they are taken. 
Another common thread running through all of them is a non-activity main verb following 
sceal. (3.3.15), which contains a passive structure, follows the already familiar formula of 
using a pre-modal of deontic necessity in a code of law. Taken from The Benedictine Rule,
(3.3.16) and (3.3.17) have got subjects exposed to a slightly less urgent necessity than that in 
(3.3.15). While in (3.3.15) there is a legal commitment, in (3.3.16) and (3.3.17) the necessity 
could be equated with ‘what is proper/good/reasonable.’ This weakening of the sense of the 
necessity is brought about by the stative character of the main verb in (3.3.16) and the mental 
activity verb in (3.3.17).
What is of prime interest in examples (3.3.18) and (3.3.19) is the wide scope of sceal. 
It is, nevertheless, particularly interesting to note that in (3.3.18) the criterion indicative of 
wide scope with non-epistemic modality, that of the inanimacy of the subject, is not met. In
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other words, the subject of (3.3.18) -  a sheep -  although by all accounts animate, cannot 
logically be regarded as the Agonist. The genuine Agonist -  a shepherd or owner -  who is in 
control of the event, remains defocused in the background. Cumulatively then, there emerges 
a scenario in which wide scope co-occurs with an animate subject, which hints at the 
inadequacy of the inanimate subject criterion. A solution to this problem would be to use the 
label a non-controller subject in lieu of an inanimate subject as a factor behind wide scope. 
This seems a reasonable and sufficient option as other than that the mechanism of agonist 
demotion in (3.3.18) stays intact. So does it in (3.3.19), a prototypical example of wide scope, 
agonist demotion and an inanimate subject all involved so that both examples boil down, in 
essence, to causative structures. Causative paraphrases of (3.3.18) and (3.3.19) respectively 
are presented below:
(3.3.18)a The shepherd/owner must/should make a sheep go with its fleece on till 
midsummer.
(3 .3.19)a The churl must/should make his homestead be enclosed in summer and winter.
Witness that in (3.3.18)a and (3.3.19)a the obligee appears as the subject, agent and Agonist 
all in one (cf. Talmy 2000: 442).
So much for Agonist demotion and scope, it is also noteworthy that in both (3.3.18) 
and (3 .3.19) there is clear deontic necessity of a legal nature whose impact is somewhat 
diluted due to the blurred identity of the obligee. The passive structure in (3.3.19) also 
contributes to the weakening of the necessity force by pushing this example closer to the 
periphery of the cline.
The last example to go by in illustrating the cline of sceal, that is (3.3.20), exemplifies 
an interesting case of a past necessity recurring in Genesis. This type of necessity, used with 
reference to the subject’s death, is a force of inevitability which falls upon the subject (cf. 
Traugott 1989: 40). The pecularity of such a force consists in the fact that neither the speaker 
nor the subject are in a position to question it, let alone resist it. The speaker’s involvement 
and authority over the subject being absent, the example cannot be ascribed any subjectivity.
With the cline of the deontic necessity of sceal+infinitive fleshed out above, I can 
proceed to the next phase of this pursuit which is to gain an insight into how sceal in 
examples (3.3.11) through (3.3.20) fares with respect to Coates’s (1983: 36) parameters which 
help gauge the strength of necessity as well as subjectivity of a given occurrence of a 
necessity verb. The matrix obtained after these examples are checked against the parameters
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is also to clarify the gradience of the deontic necessity expressed by sceal. The parameters 
adopted to reflect the obligative semantics of sceal largely coincide with those used with agan 
(cf. 3.1.5 ), the only modification being the additional feature (i) paraphrasable by ‘it is 
inevitable that.’ As a feature typical of rather objective contexts, it is at the periphery of the 
cline, especially if we recall that the necessity that arises in connection with feature i) remains 
outside the control of the speaker and the subject. Another adjustment is the label non- 
coniroller subject used instead of inanimate subject in (h) and the label controller subject 
used in lieu of animate subject in (f) for the reasons discussed in connection with example 
(3 .3 .18). The order of the parameters is shown below and the resultant matrix follows in Table
A ■4 ..
(a) second person subject,
(b) speaker involvement,
(c) speaker has authority over subject,
(d) verb is agentive,
(e) paraphrasable by ‘it is obligatory/absolutely essential that’,
(f) controller subject
(g) paraphrasable by ‘it is important that’,
(h) non-controller subject.
(i) paraphrasable by ‘it is enevitable that’
(adopted from Coates 1983: 36)
112
Parameter g
(3.3.11) + + + + + + - - -
(3.3.12) + + + + + + - - -
(3.3.14) - - + + - + + - -
(3.3.15) - - + - + + - - -
(3.3.16) - - + - - + + - -
(3.3.17) - - + - - + + - -
(3.3.13) - - - + + + - - -
(3.3.18) - - + - + - - + -
(3.3.19) - - + - + - - + -
(3.3.20) - - - ? - + - - +
strong necessity/subjectivity 
(core)__________________
weak necessity/subjectivity 
______________ (periphery)
Table 3 .3 .4.. Matrix to show the gradience of the deontic necessity of sceal+ infinitive
Even without going into much detail, it is plain from the above matrix that the 
necessity of sceal+infinitive embraces the widest spectrum of the relevant features among the 
verbs discussed so far. Each parameter is visibly pressed into the service of the deontic 
necessity of sceal+infinitive. Furthermore, the gradience of the necessity in Table 3.3.4. 
materializes into a finely drawn and clearly defined core, a massive skirt and a slightly blurred 
yet noticeable periphery. It is especially the quality of the core that sets apart the cline of sceal 
from those of agan and pearf. The core of the deontic necessity of sceal, embodied by 
examples (3.3.11) and (3.3.12) on the matrix, can be defined as a context where the necessity 
is generated by the speaker who, with the aid of his authority and active involvement, imposes 
the necessity upon the Agonist hidden under a second person pronoun. Of course, even within 
the core there is some gradiance to be observed, e.g. the contrast between the single action in 
(3 .3 .11) and an action to be repeated in (3 .3 .12), which bears upon the force of the necessity. 
Sceal possesses the core of necessity meaning whose strength and subjectivity are reminiscent 
of that of PDE must (cf. Coates 1983: 37). As with the other two verbs, the core examples of 
the deontic necessity of sceal are few, five in my sample to be exact, which is in accordance 
with Coates’s (1983) observation that usually only minority of examples meet the criteria 
required for inclusion within the core. The skirt of the cline is represented by the most 
numerous group of sentences as here I include examples (3.3.14) through (3.3.13). Many skirt 
examples come from homiletic and legal contexts hence the authority of the speaker achieves 
the distinction of a common factor, and so does a generic human subject. Observe that 
throughout the skirt, the force of the necessity alternates between stronger and weaker, 
features (e) and (g) respectively, which further adds to the gradience. The borderline between
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the skirt and periphery, despite all its fuzziness, has got two focal points: the appearance of 
subjects which, regardless of whether animate or inanimate, are not real addressees of the 
necessity on the one hand and a special type of necessity, viz. inevitability on the other hand. 
Examples which are responsive to the former often have the force of the necessity attenuated 
by a passive structure and a non-activity verb. At the same time, however, the authority of the 
speaker, a feature typical of the core, can be relevant for periphery examples. The examples 
where the force of inevitability is the case figure lowest on the scale of subjectivity, as such a 
force is merely reported and stays beyond the participants’ control. What is more, inevitability 
as a force without any definite Antagonist shows that the deontic necessity of sceal shades 
into general PE necessity (cf. van der Auwera and Plungian 1998: 80-81). Finally, it should be 
pointed out that the configuration of the features accepted by the peripheral examples 
considerably diverges from Coates’s (1983: 37) matrix of must in that my peripheral examples 
rather than, crudely speaking, stay around the lower righthand comer of the matrix, dare to 
reach for features reserved for the skirt, if not for the core of the cline.
By way of summary, I gather the cline shown in Table 3.3.4. has enough of a hint that 
the modality of sceal + infinitive is rather mature. The verb has no difficulty in accepting 
features like speaker-generated necessity and wide scope, which brings to mind long 
established modals of necessity. Nor does the main verb complement of sceal hamper the 
force of the necessity as was the case with pearf. Table 3 .3 .5 ., where I have assembled the 
[ypes of verbal complements of sceal, substatntiates this claim since non-activity verbs and 
passive structures, that is, complements potentially responsible for weakening the force of 
lecessity and pushing the instance of sceal toward the weak end of the cline, turn out to make 
tp significantly less than half of all infinitival complements of sceal.
— activity verb non-activity verb passive structure total
SCL'LI I 171 85 12 268^
(necessity) (63.8%) (31.72%) (4.48%) (100%)
sceal 41 12 1 54
(necessity/future) (76%) (22 .2%) (1.8%) (100%)
Table 3 .3 .5. Frequency of main verb complements of sceal with the sense of necessity and
necessity/future
1 Here are included the three examples of scea/+PP/AdvP as the missing verb implied is each time an activity
erb (cf. 3.3.3.).
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3.3.4.2. Indeterminacy between deontic necessity and futurity
In this section I would like to turn back to the coexistence of the senses of deontic necessity 
and futurity in see a! infinitive. In 3.3.4. the trajectory of development from PE necessity to 
futurity is accounted for and the remarks of Traugott and Dasher (2005) concerning the 
inferences of futurity in the meaning of the PDE modals of necessity are invoked. At this 
point it is worth repeating that the indeterminate cases are those of merger rather than 
ambiguity. It is not picayune that in sentences like (3.3.21) and (3.3.22) one is not left to 
decide between deontic necessity and futurity. The two senses fill the semantic space offered 
by the verb and complement each other thereby bringing on an effect of a necessity to 
perform an act in the future. (3.3.21) and (3.3.22) serve to illustrate the group of 54 cases 
where the merger most obviously comes to the fore, which is not, in fact, to deny that in the 
majority of the necessity examples a notion of futurity is, to a lesser or greater extent, also 
present.
13 .3 .21) Wajtam J>e Jiser sceal wunian on wite.
Woe to-those who there shall remain in punishment.
‘Woe to those who will (have to) be punished’
(COWULF4 67)
‘(3.3 .22) ftast he aet Godes dome be heom eallum gescead agyldan sceal. 
that he at God 's doom to them all account render shall 
‘That he will (have to) render an account to all of them on the judgement day.’ 
(COBENRUL 31.12)
3.3.5. A note on sceolde
The theme for this section is inspired by an interesting aspect of sceal evidenced by Goossens 
'1987a). The researcher shows that the past\subjunctive forms sceolde/sceoldon/sceolden 
tchieve the distinction of being more grammaticalized than the present forms of the verb. It is 
jloossens’s (1987a) suggestion that sceal and sceolde be assigned a different categorical 
¡tatus within Functional Grammar in that the former should be understood in terms of 
>redicate formation and the latter is an operator. The two labels correspond to two stages on a 
entative, as we are warned by Goossens (1987a: 119), grammaticalization path (cf. 2.7.1). 
Thus, predicate formation covers the uses of modals with PI, PE, deontic and epistemic
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notions whereas an operator is a diachronically subsequent stage when a modal comes to have 
a function of a marker of futurity or a conditonal or subjunctive mood. This grammatical 
advancement of sceoide can be seen in a) the fact that sceolde does not seem to occur with NP 
objects -  in my sample there is not any such example to be found, b) the idea of necessity in 
sceolde being weakened as the form is primarily used in other contexts than those which 
might point to sceolde qualifying for a mere past equivalent of sceal In what follows the 
arguments presented are based on my sample yet it should be borne in mind that they both 
draw inspiration and correspond to those put forward by Goossens (1987a).
Thus, in my sample there are 75 instances of the past/subjunctive form 
sceolde scolde scoldon sceolden scolden. Whereas the last two forms are subjunctive, the first 
three can be either subjunctive or indicative. Out of the 75 instances, twelve and six occur in 
main and relative clauses respectively so it is among these 18 instances that one can look for 
genuine cases of past PE necessity. Consider (3.3.23), which exemplifies the former category.
(3.3.23) 6a sceolde se ealdorman Ailfric laedan f)a fyrde. ac he teah for6j?a his ealdan 
then should the commander ALlfric lead the army hut he draw forth his old 
wrenceas 
tricks
‘Then commander TElffic was to lead the army but he brought forth his old tricks.’ 
(COCHROE4 1003.7)
jor (3.3.20) above. The remaining 57 instances, those engendered in other dependent clauses, 
¡branch into 27 cases where the sceold- scold- forms are hardly questionable exponents of 
[futurity in the past, which is classified as a postmodal use by van der Auwera and Plungian 
¡(1998: 98), and 30 cases where the notion of PE necessity, albeit apparently expected, is seen 
to overlap with non-factuality triggered by a potential subjunctive reading. Such overlapping 
¡can be observed when sceold-, scold- comes in a dependent clause whose matrix clause 
contains a form, be it a verb, adjective or noun, with a meaning permeated by a more or less 
visible sense of PE necessity. The most prominent of such expressions in my sample are 
hatan, biddan, cypan, Iceran, gercedan, gebyrian, as in
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(3.3.24) se cyng sende /Elfun biscop mid j)am aejielinge Eadwarde. 7 /Elfrede ofer se. Joaet 
the king sent E/fnn bishop with the princes Edward and Alfred over sea. that 
he hi bewita sceolde.
he them guard should
‘The king sent bishop Elfun with the prince Edward and Alfred over sea so that he 
should guard them. ’
(COCHROE4 1013.35)
(3.3.25) Him gebyrode fcaet he sceolde faran )aurh Samaria land.
To-him was-needful that he should go through Samaria land 
‘He needed to go through the land of Samaria ’
(COWSGOSP 4.4)
In (3 .3 .24), the king, given his authority, sends the bishop with a task to perform. The sceolde 
clause is a purpose clause, which invites two diverse readings. On the one hand, this can be a 
question of periphrastic subjunctive where sceolde, virtually empty of any obligative 
semantics, serves to mark non-factuality of the action specified by the main verb. Such an 
interpretation ties in with Krzyszpien’s (1980) scheme where the subjunctive forms of the OE 
pre-modals are shown to alternate with inflectional subjunctive only to oust it eventually. If 
interpreted otherwise, sceolde is a past form of sceal which repeats the necessity encoded in 
the matrix verb. Plank (1984: 343), far from being bewildered by the appearance of such 
modality repetitions, refers to them as ‘redundant modality, viz. the presence in a sentence of 
more than one modality expression where one would seem to suffice, or also of one modality 
expression where none seems required.’ Furthermore, redundant modality, according to Plank 
(1984), and the demise thereof in Middle English instantiates a trend whereby modality 
gradually more and more often comes to be conveyed inferentially without any explicit 
marker, e.g.
(3.3.26) Everybody dies someday. = Everybody must die. (example from Plank 1984:342)
Similarly, example (3.3.25) opens up a possibility of a two-fold analysis. Observe also that on 
either interpretation, it is not entirely clear whether we have got to do with PI or PE necessity. 
The context stops short of clarifying the details of the source of the necessity that Jesus, the 
person behind both the oblique pronoun in the matrix clause and the subject of sceolde, is
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subject to. The form gebyrode hints at PI necessity yet it cannot be verified beyond any 
shadow of a doubt.
Overall, it seems that both lines of interpretation, periphrastic subjunctive and 
redundant modality are tightly interlaced. In instances like (3.3.24) and (3.3.25), the 
proposition in the dependent clause, at least from the perspective of the subject of (3 .3 .24) and 
the logical subject in (3 .3 .25) is non-factual, hence the resort to the subjunctive is justified. At 
the same time, periphrastic subjunctive is only trying to hold its own in Old English against 
the still vital inflectional subjunctive and, consequently, given its not yet solidified status, 
sceolde cannot be expected to be a fully grammaticalized subjunctive form totally divorced 
from any meaning of necessity (cf. Krzyszpieh 1980).
Finally, in trying to address the initial question of whether sceolde should be treated as 
separate from sceal, I have presented, following Goossens (1987a), the major arguments 
showing that sceo/de has a higher degree of grammaticalization than sceal. Nevertheless, it 
seems that there are not enough semantic grounds on which this detachment of sceolde could 
be ultimately validated. Were sceolde an independent form, one could expect it to appear in 
present tense context. In my sample, all the main clause instances of sceolde are seated in a 
past context, the dependent clause instances having a matrix clause marked for the past tense 
as well. According to Bybee (1995), the rise of sceolde should as an independent present 
tense form is observed in Middle English and it goes together with the idea of hypotheticality 
traceable to the verb’s meaning.
3.3 .6 . Negation with sceal infinitive
As noted in 3.3.3. sceal emerges as a verb of necessity which, unlike agan and pearf, 
generally steers clear of negative contexts (cf. Table 3.3.2 ). Left with the group of 33 
negative instances of sceal + infinitive, one can still elict some quite clear cut formulas. First of 
all, one far-reaching parallel between the negation of sceal and PDE must is cast into view. 
Much like must, sceal is a modal of PE necessity which has got the proposition under 
negation, not the modality. The change that such a mode of negation brings to the table is 
noticeable in, for example, the following sentence culled from the Benedictine Rule, which is, 
quite matter-of-factly, the seat of a great majority of the negative examples of sceal in my 
sample:
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(3.3.27) Ne sceal mon yfel mid yfele gyldan, ne nanum men naenne teonan ne don, 
not shall man evil with evil pay, nor to-no man no calumny not do
‘One cannot return evil for evil or cause any calumny to anyone.’
(COBENRUL 4.19)
(3.3.27), being one of the rules prescribed for a good abbot to observe, is best conceivable as a 
necessity not to act, rather than lack of necessity. None of the negative examples in my 
sample admits modality negation as a more feasible or likely option when interpreted, an 
index to the verb’s consistent behavior with respect to negation, unlike pearf (cf. 3.2.5 ). This 
consistency seems to continue till Present-Day English as Palmer (1979: 64) concludes that 
‘must not (mustn ’t) and shall not (shan '1) negate the event, i.e. they lay an obligation or give 
an undertaking that the act will not take place’ and that ‘there is no way of negating modality 
with SHALL ’
Negation of the proposition seems to have little, if any, effect upon the overall force of 
necessity of a pre-modal in a given sentence. It is because with negation of the proposition, 
the status quo between a particular Antagonist and Agonist is preserved in that the Antagonist 
persists in imposing a necessity upon the Agonist, the only difference being that it is a 
necessity not to act in a given way. Observe that modality negation brings about a 
considerable change in the involvement of the Antagonist and Agonist. In 3.2.4.2. and 3.2.5. 
the withdrawal of a potential necessity by the Antagonist, a fact associated with the sense of 
no-necessity-to in the case of pearf, is seen as a direct consequence of modality negation. 
Sceal, being susceptible to negation of the proposition, carries the same force dynamic 
scenario regardless of whether it is in a positive or negative sentence. There is then no 
obstacle to some negative examples being included amonge the sentences illustrating the cline 
of the deontic necessity o f sceal + infinitive in 3.3.4.1. Nevertheless, I find it more plausible to 
¡illustrate and analyze negative examples here so that it would not escape anyone’s notice that 
the continuum of deontic necessity embraced by the negative examples of sceal+infinitive is 
Hot as extensive as that in the case of the positive examples. Consider the following:
(3.3.28) Swelce he openlice cwaeóe: Ne sculon ge no eallunga to swióe lufian óisne 
also he openly said: not shall you not entirely too much love this
middangeard,
middleyard
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‘He also openly said, ‘You should not have too much affection for this world 
whatsoever.”
(COCURA 51.395.27)
(3.3.29) Ne sceal mon manslean, ne on unriht hæman, ne stelan, ne unalyfedlice 
not shall man man-slay, nor on sin have-intercourse , nor steal, nor unlawfully
gelustfullian,
desire
‘One shall not kill, commit adultery, steal, unlawfully desire’
(COBENRUL 4.4)
(3.3.30) Ond eac cuæô Salomonn ôæt (...) ure gesuinc ne scolde beon on oôres monnes 
and also said Salomon that (...) our labor not should be on another m an’s
anwalde.
power
‘And Salomon also said that our labor should not lie within someone else’s power.’ 
(COCURA 36.249.25)
Example (3.3.27), with the second person pronoun, the speaker’s involvement and authority, 
stakes a claim to the core, which seems reasonable even despite the non-activity main verb. 
Otherwise, the core remains empty as the remaining instances fail to meet the criteria for core 
inclusion. 27 out of the 33 negative examples have a profile illustrated in (3.3.27) and
(3.3.29), namely a generic third person subject and no overt mark of the speaker’s 
involvement. All such instances having a form of a rule or regulation reminiscent of the 
biblical commandments, the actual force of the necessity is felt as rather strong and can be 
paraphrased as ‘it is obligatory/absolutely essential that not.’ Still, they reside in the skirt of 
the cline. The periphery of the cline is as poorly represented as the core since (3.3.30) is the 
sole instance eligible for relegation to the periphery on the grounds of the inanimate/non­
controller subject and state verb beon.
On the whole, allowing for a very small number of negative instances of 
sceal infinitive in the total number of all the occurrences of the structure in the sample, I 
conclude that negative sceal appears to suffer from a syndrome of a relatively young form 
used to express deontic necessity. The differences between the clines of the necessity of 
positive and negative sceal are striking. While the deontic necessity of positive sceal is 
endowed with a strong and subjective core as well as a weaker and blurred periphery, the core 
and periphery of the deontic necessity of negative sceal are virtually non-existant, barring the
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two solitary examples (3.3.28) and (3.3.30). The lack of a fully fledged core is a feature that 
the deontic necessity of negative sceal shares with that of agan (to) infinitive, a verb whose 
obligative semantics is in a state of emergence. It is also of importance that the negative 
instances of sceal are more amenable to non-activity verbs as infinitival complements than all 
the instances of deontic sceal1! infinitive when taken cumulatively irrespective of a clause type 
(compare Table 3.3.6. and Table 3.3.5 ).
- ------------------ _____ activity verb non-activity verb passive total
negative sceal + infinitive 16 16 1 33
Table 3 .3 .6 . Frequency of main verb complements of negative sceal with the sense of
necessity and necessity/future
This outline of negation with sceal+infinitive leads me to argue that the infrequence of 
the structure has as its basis a strong association with formal and/or official prohibition. 
Reliance on third person generic subjects and high percentage of non-activity verbs following 
the pre-modal render the deontic necessity conveyed by negative sceal regulation-like in 
character. Negative sceal seems somewhat fossilized in those formal contexts and, unlike its 
positive counterpart, fails to filter through to more subjective and performative discourse.
3 .3 .7. Summary of sceal
The story of sceal delineated above shows an erstwhile verb of owing turning into an 
accomplished verb of deontic necessity and subsequently slowly branching into the post- 
modal uses as a marker of futurity and periphrastic subjunctive. As with agan and pearfi all 
the layers are represented in the sample. Importantly, as is the case with agan (to) infinitive, 
sceal has much mileage out of the fact that an inference of deontic necessity is already present 
in the earlier meaning of the verb, namely ‘to owe.’ The inference with a specific Antagonist 
comes to define the deontic necessity of sceal + infinitive in Old English. This meaning of 
sceal + infinitive eclipses all the other uses of the verb. If it is borne in mind that sceal is the 
most frequent pre-modal, as made clear in Table 3 .1., and that in over 70 per cent of instances 
it carries deontic necessity, sceal^ infinitive shapes up as a primary token of deontic necessity 
among the pre-modals. The high frequency translates into a predictably extended continuum 
of the deontic necessity of sceal+infinitive. The continuum provides a close parallel to that of 
must, i.e. a PDE modal of deontic necessity in that apart from the skirt and periphery, it yields
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a consistent subjective and performative core. Interestingly, the burden of the deontic 
necessity is carried in broad strokes by sceal f infinitive in positive clauses. Negated 
sceal infinitive, taking up 10.6 per cent of all the instances of the construction in the sample, 
stops short of constituting a full-fledged counterpart to positive sceaH infinitive
3.4. mot
Although not central to the study of the expression of necessity in Old English, mot has 
received due attention from linguists more on account of its later development which 
culminates in its status as a marker of necessity in Present-Day English (cf. Coates 1983 for 
British English, Myhill 1996 for American English, Collins 1991 for Australian English). 
Most grammarians touch upon the semantics of OE mot in the course of pursuing diachronic 
studies (cf. OED, Ono 1958, Tellier 1962, Visser 1963-73, Denison 1993, Warner 1993, 
Tagliamonte 1996, Traugott and Dasher 2005) and some researchers focus solely or primarily 
on the OE stage (cf. B&T, Mitchell 1985, Goossens 1987b). Such a variety of studies implies 
that a wide range of nuances relevant to the meaning of mot has been elaborated on. For the 
sake of scratching the surface, let me briefly report on how some of those scholars 
characterize the meaning of mot. While B&T offers a fairly concise approach in that their 
dictionary specifies two senses of mot, viz. ‘to be allowed’ and ‘to be obliged,’ Ono (1958) 
relates the semantic areas of mot to those of PDE may and must. The possibility and 
permission of mot have been taken over by may in Present-Day English and necessity has 
remained the main domain of the PDE cogener of mot most, namely must. The main thread of 
Tellier’s (1962) account is to put in sharp contrast the semantics of mot and meeg as well as to 
stress a steady increase in the incidence of the occurrences of the sense of necessity with mot 
by the eleventh century. Denison (1993) and Warner (1993), on top of citing mot in 
connection with such notions as possibility, permission and necessity, caution against 
ignoring epistemic readings of the verb. Among all those undertakings, it is Goossens’s 
(1987b) that, by means of a corpus based method, casts the semantics of mot in a meticulous 
diachronic framework. With 100 examples of mot obtained from ¿Elfric’s Homilies, the 
researcher looks into the meanings of mot as arranged on a modal track, which is 
simultaneously reconstructed in the process. Needless to say, Goossens’s (1987b) article has 
got many premises in common with the present research, e.g. the fuzziness of modal 
meanings, and will be invoked once a need arises. Otherwise, this section will be taken up 
with scrutinizing two areas of the meaning of mot, namely permission and PE necessity,
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without an analysis of which the system of the necessity markers in Old English would prove 
far from complete.
The path of the semantic development of mol is alternative to the paths implicated in 
the cases of agan, pearf and see at. Traugott and Dasher (2005: 122) note that the roots of mot 
are to be searched in ‘[P]IE *med- “take appropriate measure, be fitting/mete.”’ Due to the 
operation of Grimm’s Law, Gothic has (gajmot which Prokosch (1939: 193) cites as 
belonging to Class VI of the preterite-presents. The only signification of (ga)mot adduced by 
Prokosch (ibid.) is ‘to have room,’ the verb’s Old High German and Old Saxon cognates, 
nmoz and moI respectively, developing meanings which integrate such notions as ability, PE 
possibility and permission (cf. Tellier 1962). In Bybee et al.’s (1994: 199) picture, mol is a 
token whose meaning could be seen as evolving along the following path:
ability _________ root possibility_________________ epistemic possibility
permission
Figure 3 .4.1. A semantic path leading to permission and epistemic possibility
Traugott and Dasher (2005: 122) observe that ‘the OE meanings [of mot] were inherited from 
Gothic and Early Germanic mot- “ability, measure, to have room for,”’ hence they can be said 
to arise in the contexts of physical ability. As further argued by Bybee et al. (1994), the 
physical aspect in physical ability undergoes bleaching, which yields physical ability being 
generalized into more general ability. At this stage, ability is seen to be sucked into the vortex 
of even more intensive generalization. Working with an example of PDE can, Bybee et al. 
(1994: 192) maintain that:
The (...) [next] step in the progression (...) is the generalization from ability to root possibility. (...) this 
step can also be seen as the loss of a specific component of the meaning, the component that requires that 
the enabling conditions reside in the agent. This generalization resembles the one just described: since the 
enabling conditions for an agent to perform an act do not lie entirely in the agent, but also depend on the 
external world, can would also be used in cases in which the enabling conditions are both in the agent and 
outside the agent, as in I  can ride that horse or I  can play that sonata. In these cases the properties of the 
horse and the sonata are of some significance in determining the agent’s ability, since horses can be more 
or less difficult to ride, sonatas can be more or less difficult to play. Thus can generalizes to predicate all
123
sorts of enabling conditions -  those internal to the agent as well as external conditions (...)• (Bvbee et al.
1994 : 192)
Along the same lines, mot finds itself in a position to convey root possibility which, 
somewhere along the way, swerves in the direction of permission. Although it is not made 
explicit in Figure 3.4.1., Bybee et al. (1994) leave no doubts as to the permission of mot 
subsequently jumping over to obligation. It should also be pointed out that cross-linguistically 
the path in Figure 3.4.1. is frequently attested. Bybee et al. (1994: 189) list 50 forms from 27 
languages in their sample which are seen to have made a smaller or greater number of stops 
along the path. Interestingly enough, permission is only one of the two options of 
development from root possibility, some forms choosing the epistemic possibility destination.
The transition from permission (deontic possibility) to obligation (deontic necessity) is 
overtly marked on van der Auwera and Plungian’s (1998: 111) map of modality. Interestingly 
enough, beside examples of forms making a leap from deontic possibility to deontic necessity, 
e.g. mot, Dutch moeten, German müssen, Danish md or Hungarian -hat -het, van der Auwera 
and Plungian (1988: 99) cite German dürfen which travels the same distance in the reverse 
direction.
The most significant difference between the paths etched by Bybee et al. (1994) and 
van der Auwera and Plungian (1998) on the one hand and the modal track of mot in Goossens 
(1987b) on the other hand, is the fact the latter foresees the derivation of a permission reading 
from an ability reading without a salient intermediate stage in the vein of Bybee et al.’s (1994) 
root possibility or van der Auwera and Plungian’s (1998) PE possibility. Instead, Goossens 
(1987b) admits blends between ability and permission which facilitate the derivation. A 
notion ä la root/PE possibility occurs later on the modal track in the disguise of contingency 
which Goossens (1987b: 231) characterizes as a case where ‘the shift is (...) away from some 
enabling/permitting/compelling authority to some external circumstance with respect to which 
the state of affairs is regarded as possible. Since this state of affairs is state-like and beyond 
the control of the subject, there is no focus on enablement of the subject (. ..).’ There really 
seems to be no obstacle to equating contingency with root/PE possibility with a proviso, 
however, that, according to Goossens (1987b), it enters once permission and even obligation 
with mot are established. Also, in his sample, the author does not find any example where 
contingency would be the only interpretation available; rather, the sense of contingency is 
¡intermingled with those of permission and obligation.
124
The research that ensues is conducted on a sample of 190 examples of mot from the 
following texts making up the OE part of the Helsinki Corpus: Bede’s Ecclesiastical History, 
Elfric’s First and Second Letter to Wulstan, /Elfric’s Letter to Sigefyrth, Elfric’s Preface to 
Catholic Homilies I, H, /Elfric’s Catholic Homilies I f  /Elfric’s Lives o f Saints, /Elfric’s Letter 
to Sigeweard, E lfric’s Preface to Genesis, A Homily fo r  the Sixth (or Fourth) Sunday after 
Epiphany, Wulfstan’s Institutes o f Polity, Wulfstan’s Homilies, The Blickling Homilies, 
Alfred’s Preface to Cura Pastoralis, Alfred’s Cura Pastoralis, Alfred’s Preface to 
Soliloquies, Alfred’s Introduction to Laws, Lacnunga, The Benedictine Ride, The Battle o f  
Brunanhurh, The Anglo Saxon Chronicle MS A and E, Marvels, Laechoc, Alfred’s Boethius, 
Fates o f  Apostles, Elena, Juliana, Genesis, Dialogues o f Gregory the Great, Lews (Eleventh 
Century), West-Saxon Gospels, The Old Testament, Meters o f Boethius and Laws (Late; 
William). The corpus thus assembled contains 255, 338 words.
A semantic analysis of my sample, the tentative results of which are presented in 
Table 3.4.1., bolsters Bybee et al.’s (1994) and van der Auwera and Plungians’s (1998) 
approaches in that the notion of PE possibility does heavily overlap with PI possibility. Since 
the issue of PI and/or PE possibility is not per se relevant to the topic of this dissertation, I 
lump together the instances where either of those two senses seems to prevail. I will briefly 
discuss those instances in 3.4.2. Quantitatively it is the area of permission that unquestionably 
dominates and those cases along with those of deontic necessity and those ambiguous 
between the two meanings will be in the spotlight in 3.4.3., 3.4.3.1., 3.4.3.2., 3.4.4., 3.4.5. and
3.4.6. Throughout these sections the term permission is used despite its missing from the van 
der Auwera and Plungian’s (1998) map of modality, a major source of nomenclature in this 
undertaking. I have chosen to avail myself of the term on account of its commonly understood 
precision, yet it is taken to lie within the confines of deontic possibility. The five epistemic 
examples of mot, due to their frequent compatibility with deontic necessity readings, are 
handled together with the examples of deontic necessity in 3.4.5. Finally, a word of caution 
seems proper concerning the tentative nature of the semantic analysis conducted in Table
3.4.1. for reasons discussed in 3.2.4.1.
V PE PE possibility permission permission/deonticnecessity deonticnecessity epistemic total
mot 23
( 12.1%)
137
(72.2%)
4
(2 .1%)
21
( 11.0%)
5
(2 .6%)
190
( 100%)
Table 3 .4.1. Distribution of meanings of mot
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3 4 1. Syntactic considerations
Unlike the other pre-modals of necessity, mot does not co-occur with any special meaning that 
would require the verb to take NP complements. Neither B&T nor OED adduce any instances 
pointing to the contrary. In my sample, however, one example apparently contravenes this 
routine practice, consider (3.4.1):
(3.4.1) Gif he hine triewan wille, [)aet he to dsere lame facn ne wiste, Jjaet he mot.
i f  he him clear-of-a-charge wants, that he to the loan ill-design not knew, that he may.
‘If he wants to clear himself of the charge on the grounds of being unaware of the ill- 
design of the loan, he may.’
(COLAW2 19.2)
Despite mot + infinitive regularly regularly co-occurring with the sense of permission, such a 
structure cannot be taken as an option in (3.4.1). Evidently, the pronominal form feet in feet 
he mot stands for the phrase hine triewan in the protasis and should be treated as an NP 
complement, as it were. Denison (1993: 307-308) provides a handy account of similar 
structures in later English and echos Plank’s (1984: 336) observation that they mark their 
presence in English ‘about until the end of the 18th century or even longer.’ Both scholars 
reach a consensus on the treatment of the pronoun in (pre)modal + it/that as an anaphoric 
substitute for a VP which finds itself within the range of a modal.
Mot follows in the footsteps of sceal to the extent that it shows unshaken preference 
for plain infinitives. Also, no less than in the case of sceal, this preference is overcome, or, 
perhaps, not materialized when the infinitive is absent in the course of frequent operation of 
postverbal ellipsis. On such occasions, mot goes either by itself, as in (3.4.2), or in 
conjunction with another pre-modal mceg in a binomial expression, as in (3.4.3):
(3 .4.2) j^ a ic for gode wille gemundbyrdan, gif ic mot, for eow 
whom I  fo r  God will protect, i f  I  must, from  you
‘I will defend them against you before God, if so I may."
(COGENESI 2476)
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(3 4.3) utan don swa us Jtearf is, beorgan us geome wi5 |)£ene egesan 7 helpan ure sylfra 
let ’.s' do as us need is, protect us earnestly against the terror and help our self 
fta hwile Jte we magan 7 motan. 
while we may and must
‘Let’s do what is necessary to protect ourselves from the terror and help ourselves 
while we may.’
(COWULF4 72)
If in postverbal ellipsis, the infinitive can make no appearance by virtue of its antecedent 
being present in the preceding clauses (cf gemundbyrdan as an antecedent of mot in (3 .4.2) 
and beorgan and helpan as antecedents of magan and motan in (3.4.3)). Furthermore, my 
sample contains two cases of mot followed by a directional adverb with an infinitive ‘to be 
inferred otherwise,’ as B&T puts it. The infinitive called for in both cases being logically a 
verb of motion, the prerequisites for such constructions are given a fair share of attention in
3.3.3. and will not be dealt with here. (3.4.4) serves to epitomize this type of the construction 
with mot.
(3 4.4) ne hi swa fide ne motan into his faegeran healle,
not they so foul not must into his beautiful residence 
‘they, so foul, cannot enter his beautiful residence.’
(COAELET3 144)
The last point to make from the domain of syntax concerns the clause patterns with 
mot. Laid out in Table 3.4.2. is the distribution of the three clause types which unequivocally 
points to preponderance of the affirmative type. While interrogative clauses, much in the same 
mode as with the previously discussed pre-modals, have a negligible presence, it is only with 
the meaning of permission that negative sentences make their way to a significant number of 
examples. Negated permission, viz. prohibition, will be an important point where permission 
and deontic necessity converge, section 3 .4.3 .2. being a proper locus for a meticulous study of 
this convergence.
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'— — - ------------ —_____ affirmative negative interrogative total
PIPI. possibility 21
( 11%)
2
(1.1%)
0 23
( 12.1%)
permission 81
(42.7%)
53
(28%)
3
(1.5%)
137
(72.2%)
permission/ deontic necessity 4
(2 .1%)
0 0 4
(2 .1%)
deontic necessity 21
(11%)
0 0 21
(11%)
epistemic 5
(2 .6%)
0 0 5
(2 .6%)
total 132
(69.5%)
55
(29%) (1.5%)
190
(100%)
Table 3 .4 .2. Distribution of the clause patterns with the particular meanings of mot
3 .4.2. mot with the sense of PI/PE possibility
As argued in 3.4., the prime mechanism for change from PI to general PE possibility is the 
semantic bleaching of the agent’s potential as an enabler of the action expressed in the 
proposition. As a result of the bleaching, the role of the enabler is gradually taken over by 
some unspecified agent-external circumstances (cf. Bybee et al. 1994: 192). At the same time, 
these two meanings are most operative at the early stages of the semantic evolution of mot 
and its cognates in the Germanic languages and, as shown by Goossens (1987b) and Traugott 
and Dasher (2005), in Old English they are rather uncommon. The relatively small number of 
such examples in my sample, namely 23, is corroborative of this statement. Remarkably, even 
more uncommon are cases where a PI possibility reading precludes any other interpretation 
consonant with it, all of Goossens’s (1987b) ability examples being shown to be tainted with a 
sense of permission. (3.4.5) below seems to me one of few good candidates for carrying ‘the 
putatively original Germanic participant-internal ability meaning’ (Traugott and Dasher 2005: 
122) with a proviso that it is uttered as the speaker’s wish:
[3 .4.5) ac daer ic nu moste mod gefedran. Oinne ferdlocan. fedrum minum,
but there I  now must mindfurnish, thy soul's enclosure, wings my 
‘But if I might your mind furnish, your soul’s enclosure, with my wings’
(COMETBOE 24.1)
Vluch more noticeable is the shift away from PI possibility toward PE possibility especially in 
;uch elliptical sentences where mot is juxtaposed with mceg as in (3.4.3). With mceg assuming
128
responsibility for a sense of ability, the very juxtaposition casts mot into a role of an exponent 
of PE possibility. Note that if we magan can be glossed as we are able then motan is left with 
a gloss it is possible fo r  us, the possibility being agent-externally conditioned by some 
generally accepted state of affairs. Besides, it is Tellier (1962) who on more than one occasion 
draws our attention to the fact that the primary difference between mceg and mot consists in 
subject-intemally-conditioned potential typical of the former and subject-externally- 
conditioned potential inherent to the latter.11
Overall, Goossens (1987b) is not mistaken in approaching most of the occurrences of 
mot as semantic blends (he mostly applies double labels like permission/obligation, etc.). 
Different senses are subject to intense intertwining so that sometimes all three, namely PI 
possibility, PE possibility and permission must be taken into account in one example, e.g.:
(3.4.6) Swa se Faeder ... sealde him anweald ftaff he moste deman forQam J?e he is mannes 
so the Father gave him power that he must judge because he is man's 
sunu 
son
‘So the Father gave him power so that he might judge because he is man’s son.’ 
(COWSGOSP 5.27)
The meaning of moste in the subordinate clause is a logical development of the meaning of 
anweald ‘power’ in the main clause. Given the authority of the giver, the power he gives 
implies granting Jesus permission to make judgments. At the same time, power to make 
judgments equals endowing Jesus with potential to make them, hence the sense of PI 
possibility. Nor can we rule out an option that the Father was just establishing a state of 
affairs where it would be objectively possible for Jesus to make judgments.
3 .4.3. mot with a sense of permission
It is mentioned in 3.4.1. that some markers of PE possibility are faced with an option to take 
on an aspect of deontic possibility in the shape of permission, mot constituting a prime case in 
point. That this process o f meaning change is gradual can be judged by example (3 .4.6) where
11 Nevertheless, this interpretation of the binomial mceg 7 mot can only be tentative. Molencki (1991: 28) 
interposes a caveat that the two elements in a binomial may not and often do not reinforce any difference in 
meaning. Even if  the remark pertains to matrix clauses, which the relevant clause in (3.4.3) is not, one cannot 
rale out a possibility that the juxtaposition of mceg and mot is only a stylistic device.
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the meaning of permission is seen to more or less obviously creep in. Two teams of scholars, 
van der Auwera and Plungian (1998) and Traugott and Dasher (2005) perceive the change in 
slightly different terms. The former speak of a case of ‘semantic shrinking or specialization’
( van der Auwera and Plungian 1998: 88), that is to say, the role of the enabler shifts from 
some nebulous objective circumstances to a more and more definite source, say a religious 
doctrine, social establishment and, eventually, the speaker. Interestingly enough, given that an 
earlier development of mot, that from PI to PE possibility, proceeds according to the rules of 
semantic bleaching, i.e. deletion of one component of the verb’s meaning, the change from PE 
possibility to permission sees mot going through the reverse process, i.e. a new component of 
meaning is added. Consequently, permission differs from PE possibility in that the former is 
restricted by the definiteness of the enabling/permitting force. For Traugott and Dasher 
(2005), on the other hand, there are strong grounds for treating the whole evolution from PI 
through PE possibility, which they term participant-external ability, through permission as 
purely inferential. It is argued that just as a PI possibility reading in some contexts invites 
inferences of an agent-external source of the ability, so, along the same lines, ability 
contingent on some unspecified external source may spark an inference that there is a 
concrete entity that makes the action possible or permitted. Once such inferences become 
inseparable from the meaning of mot, the verb gains access to the expression of permission.
As a matter of fact, it seems that there is no good reason why the two hypotheses could 
not be constructively married. If the operation of inferences is the prime mechanism for the 
permission-bound change of mot, then specialization is a direct consequence of the workings 
of this mechanism. A permission reading arises inferentially as a possible interpretation after 
PI and PE possibility meanings with mot are widespread, as can be seen in (3.4.6). In time, 
such inferences of permission with mot spread over a community of speakers until they are 
accepted as part of the meaning of the verb (cf. Levinson 1995 and Traugott and Dasher 2005 
on how invited inferences become first generalized invited inferences and then coded 
meanings). Eventually we find such sentences as (3.4.7):
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(3.4.7) Se teweda man mot ofye sijje wifian, and geong wuduwe mot eft ceorlian
the lay man must other time take-wife, and young widow must again take-husband 
ac nan ne mot swa|)eah syllan him bletsung 
but none not must though give them blessing
‘A layman may take another wife, a young widow may marry again, but, nevertheless, 
no one can give them blessing. ’
(COAELET3 156)
which cannot but be interpreted as containing mot by means of which permission is granted 
(the first two occurrences of the verb) or denied (the third occurrence of the verb). The 
acceptance of the inferences of permission results in the specialization of PE possibility by 
restricting its original semantic structure ‘enabling conditions exist’ (Bybee et al. 1994: 192) 
through adding to it an additional characteristic ‘enabling conditions exist and come from a 
specific agent-external source. ’
At this point, since the relatedness of permission to necessity related meanings may 
seem tenuous at best, let me justify the reasons for the inclusion of permission among the 
issues central to the topic of this dissertation. It is true that some scholars admit more links 
between permission and possibility than between permission and PI/PE necessity. Van der 
Auwera and Plungian (1998) do not even see it fit to designate a separate label for permission 
on their semantic map of modality, a tacit assumption that permission is one with deontic 
possibility. Importantly, due to this inclusion, permission is rendered part of the path of 
possibility which runs only parallel to the path of necessity on the map. In fact, such treatment 
of permission testifies to van der Auwera and Plungian (1998) building on earlier tradition in 
linguistics. In Palmer’s (1986: 98) view, permission and necessity are shown as opposite poles 
in ‘a basic system of weak and strong deontic modality (at least of directives).’ On the other 
hand, however, the fact that permission is closely related to the notion of possibility does not 
pose any insurmountable stumbling block. The well known logical equivalence of possibility 
and necessity in terms of negation both on the epistemic and non-epistemic plane (cf. Lyons 
1977, Palmer 1979, Tregidgo 1982):
necessary p = not possible not p 
necessary not p = not possible p 
possible p = not necessary not p 
possible not p = not necessary p
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bears upon the equivalence of permission and PE necessity, which leads Lyons (1977: 832) to 
state that ‘if X is not obliged to do a  (where a is either an individual or generic act), he is 
permitted not to do a, and if he is obliged to do a, he is not permitted not to do a; (...). Also, 
if X is permitted to do a , he is not obliged not to do a, and if X is not permitted to do a, he is 
obliged not to do a ( ...) .’ Remarkably, many scholars, for example Palmer 1979, Tregidgo 
1982, Coates 1983, have treated these correlations as a point of departure in further 
investigation into the affinity between permission and PE necessity and in this respect I intend 
to follow suit.
Also, it is often emphasized that a relation of implication holds between PE necessity 
and permission but not vice versa. That someone is obliged to perform an act logically implies 
that the same person is also permitted to perform this act but, somehow, that somebody is 
permitted to act stops short of implying that this person is also obliged to act (cf. Lyons 1977, 
Hermeren 1979, Conradie 1987). As for the genesis of this implication, Lyons (1977: 837- 
836) observes that imperative sentences, usually reserved for communicating mands, in 
appropriate contexts may serve to give permission. Thus, for example, Come in! uttered on 
hearing a knock on the door, is tantamount to permission rather than a mand. Curiously, the 
implication runs counter to the attested diachronic development in that the meaning of 
permission precedes PE necessity on the paths of the evolution of modal meanings 
reconstructed by Bybee et al. (1994) and van der Auwera and Plungian (1998) as well as on 
the axis of modal meanings proposed by Conradie (1987).
Finally, in order to wrap up the theme of the relevance of permission to a study of PE 
necessity, let me quote Coates (1983: 87) who, drawing upon Lyons (1977) as well as her 
own research of the PDE modals, states that:
granting permission has much in common with imposing obligation -  all such personal directives are 
governed by the addressee-based condition that the speaker must believe that the addressee is able to carry 
it out. However, where mands, such as MUST, commit the speaker to the desirability of the action 
concerned, permission granting utterances do not (see Lyons 1977: 745). Moreover, they are strictly neutral 
in terms of the addressee’s wishes, though in practice such utterances have the implication that the 
addressee does want to do the action concerned. (Coates 1983: 87)
Having settled the theoretical issues, I proceed to the practical part, i.e. a look at the 
137 corpus examples o f mot expressing permission. The very number of those instances in the 
sample, when confronted with the frequency of other meanings (cf. Table 3.4.1), testifies to
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Goossens’s (1987b: 229) words that ‘MOTAN still clearly has a permission core’. As shown 
in Table 3.4.2., it is only with this permission core that negative clauses with mot get a fair 
share of the total number of the occurrences. I find it, therefore, feasible to first consider the 
affirmative and interrogative clauses (those where there is an actual idea of permission) and 
thereupon the negative clauses (which contain negated permission, i.e. prohibition). The 
former group excludes three occurrences where mot, although not itself negated, appears in a 
subordinate clause which is embedded in a negative main clause, which results in an overall 
sense of prohibition.
3 4 3.1. Permission in affirmative and interrogative clauses
The range of possible nuances carried by the 81 occurrences of mol with the meaning of 
permission is aptly shown on the following examples:
(3.4.8) bebead him, Qus cweQende: Of adcum treowe Qises orcerdes 8u most etan. 
ordered him thus saying: from each tree of-this orchard thou must eat 
‘(He) ordered him thus saying: ‘You may eat from every tree in this orchard.” 
(COOTEST 2.16)
(3.4.9) 7 J)us cwaed. Min feeder, mot ic )>e ohtes ahsian. 
and thus said: My father, must I  thee anything ask 
‘and thus said, ‘My father, may I ask you something?”
(COBEDE 3.266.22)
(3 4.10) Borges mon mot oSsacan, gif he wat, Jjaet he ryht de5.
Guarantee-of-security man may deny, i f  he knows, that he right does 
‘One may deny the guarantee of security provided that he is certain that it is lawful.’ 
(COLAW2 41)
(3 .4.11) Be oxanhyrde: ... 7 his metecu mot gan mid hlafordes heorde 
on ox shepherd and his cow must go with master's herd 
‘Concerning ox shepherds: ... and his cow may go along with the master’s herd.’ 
(COLAW4 12)
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(3.4.12) Se bisceop J)a moste under Moyses x  habban wif and cild for (rsere gesetnysse 
the bishop then must under Moses ’ law have wife and child fo r  the tradition
‘According to Moses’s law, a bishop could have a wife and child on account of the 
tradition.’
(COAELET3 76)
(3.4.13) We sceolon (...) leahtras and unlustas forseon, Jraet we heofena rice habban 
we shall vices and evil-pleasures reject, that we heaven kingdom have 
motan.
must
‘We should reject vices and evil pleasures so that we could have the heavenly 
kingdom. ’
(COAELET3 22)
As can be noticed, the above examples are arranged so as to reflect a cline extending from the 
most subjective and modally strongest examples to the least subjective and modally weakest 
ones. Without a doubt, the cline brings to mind comparisons with the clines of deontic 
necessity. Although most of such comparisons are in essence justifiable, there emerges one 
pivotal difference. The very force of deontic necessity, when distilled to the bare essentials by 
disregarding subjectivity-inducing parameters such as the speaker’s authority, speaker’s 
involvement, etc., varies from context to context ranging from very strong, almost order-like 
among the core examples of sceal+infinitive, e.g. example (3.3.11) to weaker, advice-like 
among the skirt/peripheral examples of agon (to) infinitive, e.g. (3.1.16). In other words, the 
force imposed by the Antagonist upon the Agonist in a deontic necessity scenario is gradable, 
some deontic necessity examples require translation along the lines of ‘it is 
obligatory/absolutely essential that’ and some other prefer an ‘it is important that’ gloss. The 
force of permission per se is nowhere near a gradient. A common denominator in all 
permission examples is that, as Coates (1983: 87) notes speaking of PDE can, they ‘can be 
paraphrased with the words ‘permitted’ or ‘allowed.” This constraint on permission becomes 
self-evident when one resorts to Sweetser’s (1990) comments on the force-and-barrier nature 
of permission. Permission-granting means withdrawing a barrier which would otherwise 
thwart the Agonist’s actions. Were the Antagonist to restore the barrier back to place, we 
would have to do with a proper case of prohibition. Indeed, it is hardly conceivable that the 
situation admits any options in between in the type of, say, a barrier partly lifted (for similar 
considerations concerning Present-Day English, see Matthews 1991: 112-113).
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Thus, if it is not the force of permission that can be held responsible for the existence 
of the cline of permission, some other factors must be considered in an attempt to account for 
this cline. The position atop the cline of (3.4.8) and (3.4.9) is guaranteed by their directive 
character in the sense of Lyons (1977). They are both directive in that (3.4.8) carries the 
speaker’s permission and (3.4.9) is a request for the hearer’s permission. (3.4.8) approaches 
an epitome of a permission-granting directive as the subject is directly addressed in the 
second person, the speaker (God) is endowed with authority and cannot be suspected of lack 
of involvement. Nor can the speaker in (3.4.9) be assumed to fail to acknowledge the hearer’s 
authority. Both examples figure high on a scale of subjectivity, too. Considering that there are 
only 3 such directives in my sample, including 2 interrogative clauses, it could be argued that 
they are only used in prescribed contexts involving participants of significantly different 
status in a society, family, etc. (cf. Warner (1993: 164-165) for similar examples). Examples
(3.4.10) through (3.4.12) represent what Lyons (1977) calls deontic statements to the extent 
that the speaker in each of them seeks to report on the validity of permission issued by 
someone else. In (3.4.10) and (3.4.11) the state of permission exists in the present and 
originates in legal regulations, hence little, if any, involvement of the speaker. As with the 
cases of deontic necessity inspired by some legal body, the subject, when Agonist, is often 
generic. The same can be said of (3.4.12) in which the permission is clearly indicated as 
holding under specific circumstances in the past. The source of this permission is the law of 
Moses, that is to say, an interface of legal and religious norms, which is index to those two 
sources constituting major guidelines for the generation of permission and deontic necessity 
in the OE texts. It is also worthy of note that mot with the sense of permission is on familiar 
terms with wide scope, consider the instance of the verb in (3.4.11) where the subject is not 
exactly the addressee of the permission, the Agonist being demoted. Another point of interest 
is that mot clearly favors main verb complements which prototypically stand for activities and 
call for an agent. The type of permission granted via mot usually refers to dynamic actions to 
be performed by willful agents, as illustrated in examples (3.4.8) through (3.4.11). As 
evidenced in Table 3.4.3., the trend continues unabated regardless of the meaning that the 
verb goes with.
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—'— — activity verb non-activity verb passive structure total
permission/ 105 31 1 137
prohibition (55.3%) (16.4%) (0.5%) (72.2%)
permission/deontic 4 0 0 4
necessity (2 .1%) (2 .1%)
deontic necessity 15 5 1 21
(7.9%) (2 .6%) (0.5%) (11%)
other meanings 24 4 0 28
( 12.6%) (2 .1%) (14.7%)
total 148 40 2 190
(77.9%) (21 .1%) (1%) (100%)
Table 3.4.3. Distribution of infinitival comp ements with mot
In example (3.4.13) we witness the use of mot in a subordinate clause, a sort of 
environment where the meaning of permission is more likely to be on the wane. In this 
particular case, mot comes in a future oriented purpose clause which has a permission reading 
tainted with an overtone of a wish. Goossens (1987b: 231) is far from bewildered by such 
overtones when he remarks that ‘permissions have a natural link with wishes in that whatever 
one is permitted is to be consonant with one’s wishes (giving a permission removes an 
obstruction for an activity which the permissee wants to carry out/be involved in, etc.).’ The 
occurrence of mot in purpose clauses correlates with the integration of the verb into the 
I structure of periphrastic subjunctive. Again, Goossens (1987b: 232) notes that, despite the 
[apparent indicative mood in (3.4.13), by the time of TElfric the distinction between plural 
: indicative and subjunctive forms falls by the wayside so that the indicative form, in fact,
E  signals a subjunctive structure. By the same token, as mot joins the ranks of subjunctive 
markers along with sceolde (cf. 3.4.3.) and mceg (cf. Krzyszpien’s 1980), a permission reading 
becomes less salient in favor of the grammatical function.
Purpose clauses aside, mot with a weakened idea of permission can be traced to 
situations where the meaning of the verb depends for its relevance on a preceding expression 
from which a sense of permission can also be derived. Similar cases embracing sceolde are 
recognized and reviewed in 3.3.5. under the heading redundant modality (cf. Plank 1984). 
Goossens (1987b: 230), while focusing on some of such examples, adds a syntactic dimension 
by stating that we have to do with ‘a semantic weakening [of permission] owing to the 
(syntactic) embedding after a verb of a particular (semantic) class.’ What he means are 
sentences of the following type:
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[3.4.14) On 5am ilcan steode f>e God him geu5e fiast he moste Engleland gegan.
On the same place where God him granted that he must England subdue 
‘On that same spot where God granted him that he should/might gain England, 
(COCHROE4 1086.72)
Syntactically, pcet he moste Engleland gegan is a direct object of the verb geunnan in the 
matrix clause. At the root of the semantics of geunnan is the satisfaction of the indirect 
object’s wish and if the wish happens to be an action, then to answer this wish is to grant 
permission to act. Thus, there are strong grounds for arguing that a verb like geunnan opens 
up a possibility of a permission reading, which renders the occurrence of mot in the 
subordinate clause somehow excessive. Witness also that the notion of attempting to satisfy 
the indirect object’s wish encoded in geunnan rules out deontic necessity as the meaning of 
mot. Other main clause verbs which have mot ensuing in the subordinate clause in my sample 
are. biddan (‘to ask’ 4 times), gepafian (‘to grant’ 2 times), on/on (‘to receive’ 2 times), 
gildan (‘to grant’ 1 time), wi/nian (‘to long for’ 1 time) and forgiefan (‘to give’ 1 time). As 
regards such structures, it is vital to notice that a sequence of a permission expression 
followed mot may extend beyond a matrix clause -  embedded clause configuration. I find one 
interesting instance:
(3 .4.15) 5eah be Saes apostoles leafe laewede man mot for neode oSre siSe
though according-to the apostle's permission lay man must fo r  need other time
wifian. 
take-wife
‘Though in accordance with the apostle’s permission, a layman may marry again if he 
needs to.’
(COINSPOL 190)
where the permission of mot stems from the idea of permission explicitly present in the noun 
leaf permission, license. From a semantic perspective, there is no deviation from the already 
observed formula in that the meaning of mot builds upon that of a preceding element, viz. 
leaf. Syntactically, however, mot belongs to the VP, a structurally higher constituent than the 
adjunct adverbial containing leaf
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3.4.3.2. Prohibition
In this section I aim to review the 56 examples where the permission of mot is negated, which 
results in the meaning of prohibition. Needless to say, negated permission is a clear indication 
that it is modality that in within the scope of negation. As a result, in each of the 56 examples 
we obtain a one-is-not-permitted-to reading rather than one-is-permitted-not-to which would 
be a concomitant of proposition negation. As hinted at earlier, prohibition of mot can be 
realized in two ways, that is to say, either by negating mot itself:
(3 .4.16) Na he ne mot beon mid laswedum scrude gescryd. 
nor he not must be with lay clothes dressed 
‘Nor can he be dressed in lay clothes’
(COAELET3 206)
or, alternately, by negating the VP in the main clause in which the clause with mot is 
embedded:
(3.4.17) Nis nanum weofodjDene alyfed, Joaet he wifian mote, ac is aelcum forboden. 
not-is to-no altar-servant permitted, that he take-wife must, but is to-each forbidden 
‘An altar servant is not permitted to marry. It is forbidden’
(COINSPOL 149)
Prohibition of the former type outnumbers that of the latter type by 53 to 3. For the sake of 
clarity, it should be noted that the number of explicit prohibition examples, which the former 
type might be called, is consistent with the number of negative clauses in the permission row 
in Table 3 .4.2. The 3 examples of implicit prohibition, a label adopted for the latter type, are 
included among the affirmative clauses in the same table as, formally, mot is not negated. 
Despite this formal difference, it should be stressed that example (3.4.17) contains a sense of 
prohibition no less valid than example (3.4.16). In both cases there is no room for doubt that 
the action which the Agonist is implied to be willing to undertake is disallowed. Still, the fact 
that speakers choose implicit prohibition over explicit in some circumstances stands to prove 
that a sentences like (3.4.17) need some accounting for. In 3.2.5. a similar challenge is faced 
in the case of pearf and, having eliminated negative raising as a mechanism behind such 
structures, I argue that a negative marker is moved from the clause with a pre-modal to the
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main clause on the grounds of emphasis. Evidently, the same solution is applicable to mot. By 
shifting negation to the main clause in (3.4.17), the speaker/writer makes sure that prohibition, 
i.e. modality, is emphasized. The import that the speaker/writer assigns to the emphasis of the 
prohibition in this case becomes even more noticeable when one considers the somewhat 
redundant addition of ac is œlcum forboden which yet more enhances the notion of 
prohibition. Therefore, it seems a feasible conclusion that implicit prohibition occurs in 
sentences marked for emphasis. Note also that (3.4.17) is an intriguing example of redundant 
modality in that a sense of prohibition is revealed in the main clause and then, in its own turn, 
mot somehow superfluously follows in the subordinate clause. Were one to say that mot 
carries mere permission here, the meaning would be strikingly incongruous with the 
prohibition in the main clause. I conjecture that mot in (3 .4.17), owing to the shift of negation 
to the main clause, takes over the function of a periphrastic subjunctive marker. If the 
modality is marked elsewhere (the main clause), the pre-modal, relieved of its lexical burden, 
proceeds to signal non-factuality of the proposition.
Interestingly enough, in the Institutes of Polity I find a sentence which, on top of being 
semantically parallel to (3.4.17), contrasts nicely with it. Consider (3.4.18):
(3 .4.18) And preoste is forboden, Jîæt he beon ne mot. ... æt ]3am brydlacum,
and to-priest is forbidden, that he be not must, at the marriage-ceremony 
‘A priest cannot be at the marriage ceremony’
(COINSPOL 193)
The parallelism pivots on the fact that in (3.4.18) prohibition is also expressed in the main 
clause and, thereafter, mot in the subordinate clause ensues. Nevertheless, at this point 
(3 .4.18) deviates from (3 .4.17) in that mot, in the presence of the negative marker, repeats the 
already-stated prohibition, which makes (3.4.18) a more prototypical case of redundant 
modality than (3.4.17) (witness the indicative form mot in (3.4.18) vs. subjunctive mote in
(3.4.17)). It might be conclusively reasoned that (3.4.17) becomes an alternative to structure 
like (3 .4.18) as the repetition of modality from the main clause gives way to the use of a pre- 
modal in the subordinate clause as a marker of the subjunctive. Unfortunately, any detailed 
investigation into this issue is outside the scope of this dissertation.
Sentence (3.4.18) brings us to the 53 explicit prohibition examples. All these sentences 
are truly negative with the particle ne accompanying mot. The vast number of such examples
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in the sample renders it possible to see a cline of prohibition running from the most subjective 
to the least subjective occurrences. Respective examples follow:
(3.4.19) Jju scealt eac yfelne ege an forlaetan, woruldearfoda, ne most 5u wesan for 5asm 
thou shall also evil fear one forsake, worldly-qfflictions, not must thou he fo r  these 
ealles to ormod,
all to discouraged
'Thou shalt also forsake the evil fear of worldly afflictions, nor must you be 
discouraged by all of them’
(COMETBOE 28)
(3.4.20) On j)am daege ge ne mot an cwejaan aet J^ aere maessan: dominus uobiscum,
on that day you not must say at the mass: dominus vohiscum
‘On that day you must not say ‘dominus vobiscum’ during the mass’
(COAELET3 34)
(3.4.21) Forj)on)je he mot maessian, jseahjie he munuc ne sy, and munuc ne mot maessian, 
because he may say-mass, although he monk not be, and monk not must, say-mass 
butan he maessepreost sy.
but he priest be
‘Because he may say mass even though he is not a monk, and a monk cannot say mass 
unless he is a priest’
(COAELET3 119)
(3.4.22) Sawla ne moton manfremmende in minum leng aehtum wunigan. 
souls not must working-wickedness in my long property stay
‘souls may not stay long in my property working wickedness’
(COCYNEW 905)
(3.4.23) Hi ne most an na wifian on nanre wudewan ne on forlaetenan wife be
they not must not marry on no widow nor on abandoned woman according-to 
Godes leafe })a ac on claenum maedene.
God’s permission but on pure maiden
‘According to God’s law, they must not marry a widow or an abandoned woman but a 
pure maiden’
(COAELET3 130)
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It will be clear from these examples that the instances of mot with a sense of prohibition form 
a cline analogous to the cline of permission analyzed in 3.4.3.1. Using Talmy’s (1985, 2000) 
and Sweetser’s (1990) force dynamic terms, the major difference between the clines could be 
described as occasioned by a barrier placed by the Antagonist in the way of the Agonist in the 
case of prohibition. As noted in 3.4.3.1., permission calls for a scenario where the barrier is 
withdrawn, thereby making it possible for the Agonist to act. Since the other parameters 
affecting the cline of prohibition match those pertaining to the cline of permission, I will limit 
my discussion to a few major points. Thus, prohibition in my sample has very weak 
association with directives as there are only two examples where the speaker is one with the 
Antagonist (see (3.4.19)). Otherwise, the sample abounds in deontic statements which, with 
the notable exception of (3.4.22), take the subject as the Agonist. As with permission, in such 
cases the prohibition most often originates in religious ethics or a legal code. The Agonist 
may be specific (see (3.4.20)), yet is much more frequently generic (see (3.4.21), (3.4.22) and
(3.4.23)). The speaker may relate prohibition issued in the present and holding for the present 
with a possible future orientation (see (3.4.19) through (3.4.22)) as well as prohibition 
relevant for the past (see (3 .4.23)). By way of summary, it bears remarking that the core of the 
cline of prohibition is poorly represented, even more so than that of permission. For instance, 
my sample evinces no strongly subjective examples with the speaker overtly marking his or 
her involvement. At the same time, as might be expected, most examples swarm toward the 
less subjective skirt and periphery.
3.4.4. Permission/prohibition vs. deontic necessity
It will have been noticed that in Table 3.4.2. the deontic necessity of mot yields only 
affirmative clauses. This may be felt as an understatement which calls for an explanation. The 
; point at issue here is that the distinction between prohibition and necessity-not-to is anything 
i but watertight. If one bears in mind that prohibition (or negated permission) belongs in the 
' domain of possibility, then one of the four points where the paths of necessity and possibility 
cross could be invoked, namely the one that says that necessary not p  = not possible p  (cf.
3.4.3 ). Among corollaries of this equivalence, which have been extensively studied cross- 
linguistically (cf. Horn 1989, Palmer 1995, 1997, de Haan 1997, van der Auwera 2001), is the 
fact that lack of permission, viz. prohibition-to implicates necessity-not-to. A prohibition 
reading invites an inference of or is even synonymous with a reading of deontic necessity-not- 
to. There is then nothing of a coincidence in Goossens’s (1987b: 232-233) words that ‘a (. . .)
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factor that promotes the broadening of MOT AN to include an obligational sense hangs 
together with the negative. A denied permission amounts to an obligation-not-to: under 
negation the distinction between permission and obligation is considerably diminished.’ A 
similar line of reasoning is assumed by Molencki (2003) and Traugott and Dasher (2005). The 
latter scholars further this point by promoting the assumption that sometimes permission, 
especially if granted from a position of power, may be interpreted as an unpleasant restraining 
force. The effect of undesirability of permission in some contexts is compatible with 
undesirability of a barrier which stands in the way of the Agonist, i.e. prohibition. An 
interplay of such negative associations may contribute to an analysis of the meaning mot in an 
affirmative as an unpleasant compelling force, i.e. deontic necessity rather than expected 
withdrawal of the barrier, i.e. permission.
A well known fact crucially at stake when it comes to the shift of mot from a token of 
permission/prohibition to that of deontic necessity is the reanalysis of the past form moste as a 
present form in Middle English. This fact has been addressed on a number of occasions as yet 
another clue that helps understand the very shift. Traugott (1989: 40) says that ‘past 
permission was interpreted as implying obligation’ and Traugott and Dasher (2005: 125) 
further this argument by adding that ‘it is likely that in OE reports of permission to act invited 
the inference that the instruction was performed, or that the action granted was fulfilled, 
thereby reducing the options available both to the permittee and to the subject of the 
subordinate clause, especially where the authority is all powerful (...) .’ Although the 
relevance of this argumentation does not raise doubts, it has also been observed that not until 
Middle English does moste become a fully accepted present form, which indicates that the 
inferencing of deontic necessity from past permission plays a bigger role in establishing the 
sense of deontic necessity with mot in Middle English than in initiating it in Old English. For 
example, Goossens (1987b: 233) stumbles upon 12 obligative instances of mot in his 100 
example sample, out of which as many as 3 contain moste. These results are in line with mine 
in that among 21 examples of mot with the sense of deontic necessity (cf. Table 3.4.1. and 
Table 3.4.2.), moste occurs once and moston twice.
Overall, it seems that the earliest forays of mot into deontic necessity are to be linked 
with 1) the possibility o f the interpretation of prohibition as deontic necessity-not-to, 2) the 
projection of speakers’ negative associations upon the permission of mot in general 
occasioned by the unfavorable nature of prohibition as well as of some permission granting 
acts. This, to a large extent, answers the question of lack of negative sentences with mot when 
it conveys deontic necessity. As the shift from permission to deontic necessity in mot is
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underway, the negative form of the verb may be meant or understood as either prohibition or 
deontic necessity-not-to. As both meanings are logically synonymous, the best solution is to 
lump all the negative examples together under the heading prohibition since it is still 
permission that is the semantic core of the verb in Old English.
3 .4 .5. Deontic necessity of mot
That the appearance of the meaning of deontic necessity in the case of mot is a cause of some 
bewilderment toward the end of Old English may be gathered from the following two
examples.
(3 .4.24) Eala, swær is seo byrôen, }oe Godes bydel beran sceall. 
oh! heavy is that burden, that God's messenger bear shall 
‘Oh! heavy is the burden that God’s messenger has to bear’
(COINSPOL 51)
(3.4.25) Eala, eala, ... swær is seo byrôen jje Godes bydel beran mot 
oh, oh, heavy is the burden that God 's messenger bear must 
‘Oh! heavy is the burden that God’s messenger has to bear’
(COWULF4 61)
The two versions of the same sentence, both written in the eleventh century, have the same 
meaning of deontic necessity reinforced by the two different verbs. Whilst the author of the
Institutes o f Polity prefers a more conservative form sceall, in Wulfstan’s Homilies we find
mot. This indicates that, at the beginning of the eleventh century, according to Solo (1977), 
mot joins sceal as a marker of dontic necessity and becomes capable of replacing it. A few 
examples presented below and intended as a illustration of the cline of the deontic necessity of 
mot will help us pinpoint the details of the strength of the deontic necessity and specify how 
subjective the use of mot can be:
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(3 .4.26) Ac man mot on eornost motian wi5 his Drihten, se jse wyle Joaet we sprecon mid
hut man must on earnest argue with his Lord, this who wants that we speak with
weorcum wi3 hine; 
deeds with him
‘but man needs argue on earnest with his Lord, he who wants us to talk to him with 
our deeds’
(COAELET4 970)
(3.4.27) manna gehwylc, ... )3onne mot he beon aerost 5inga gemynegad 7 gewisod
qf-each man then must he he first of-things warned and instructed
Jjaet he cunne hu he of hae}?endome maege to cristendome... cuman
that he knows how he from heathendom may to Christendom ...come
‘Each man must be first warned and instructed so that he should know how he may
come from heathendom to Christendom’
(COWULF3 2)
(3 .4.28) And gyf man gehadodne mid faehj e^ belecge 7 secge, £>aet he waere
and i f  man one-in-holy-orders with feud  charge and say, that he were 
daedbana (. ..) ladige mid his magum, £>e feh6e moton mid beran
one-who-murders clear-himself with his kinsmen, who feud  must with bear 
‘and if man charges a man in holy orders with enmity and says that he wanted to kill 
him (. . .) let the charged one clear himself with his kinsmen, who must bear the feud 
with him’
(COLAW3 5.2)
(3 4.29) Leofan men, we motan swy6e waerlice on aelce wisan us healdan gyf we us sculan
beloved men, we must very cautiously on each manner us hold i f  we us shall
wi6 deofol gescyldan, 
against devil shield
‘Beloved men, we must act very cautiously in each way if we should protect ourselves 
from the devil’
(COWULF3 114)
(3.4.30) Hwaet Jjonne haebbe haele^a aenig, guma aet Jjaem gilpe, gif hine gegripan mot se
what then have mortal any, man at the glory, i f  him grip must the 
eca dead aefter fjissum worulde?
everlasting death after this world
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‘But what profit does a mortal possess in this world's glory, if he must be gripped by
the everlasting death after this life9
(COMETBOE 11.1)
First of all, it cannot escape anyone’s notice that in the sample the obligee in the subject 
position never takes the second person pronoun. As a result, no example is utterly 
performative. Nor do I find any uncontroversial directives. Examples (3.4.26) and (3.4.27) are 
the best candidates as the necessity, in some part at least, seems to stem from the speaker. On 
the other hand, the necessity in both utterances takes the Christian ethics as a background, 
which makes it impossible to say to what extent the speaker is an actual source of the 
necessity and to what extent he merely states that the necessity is binding on the Agonist. 
Note that in both cases the necessity has a rule-like character due to the generic subject. A 
generic subject is a common theme inherent to 19 out of the 21 deontic necessity examples. 
Mot is then used to report third-party-generated necessity whose target is a more or less 
specified group of people. The necessity in (3.4.27) seems weaker than that in (3.4.26) on 
account of a passive structure being employed in the former. As shown in Table 3 .4.3 ., mot of 
deontic necessity, when compared with the remaining occurrences of the verb, boasts a higher 
proportion of main verb complements which are other than active verbs (6 out of 21 take non­
activity/passive verb complements), which is a factor which weakens the overall force of the 
necessity of mot.
The other examples, (3.4.28) through (3.4.30) as well as (3.4.25), rank among deontic 
statements, the speakers finds it appropriate to report that a state of necessity exists, thereby 
considerably diminishing the subjectivity of these examples. (3.4.28) is an excerpt from a 
code of law where the speaker’s authority may be a factor yet subjectivity and the speaker’s 
involvement are clearly ruled out. Still, the best paraphrase for this use of mot seems ‘it is 
obligatory/absolutely essential that.’ In (3.4.25) God is the Antagonist whose 
order/recommendation is shown to affect God’s messenger. Here mot is seen to overlap with 
sceal (cf. (3.4.24)) in that both can serve to express weaker deontic necessity. (3.4.29) is an 
example of what Coates (1983: 35) calls pseudo-exhortation, the speaker including himself 
among the Agonists, which yields we in the subject position. This type commonly finds its 
way to homilies (compare 3.2.4.3. and 3.3.4.1.) and is to be treated as an oratory technique 
although it is more subjective than, say, (3.4.28) which exemplifies a legal necessity. Mot in 
¡the last example, i.e. (3.4.30), which is taken from poetry, approximates to example (3.3.20) 
where the necessity conveyed by sceal is a force of inevitability. As noted with reference to
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(3.3.20), such examples are devoid of any subjectivity whatsoever. Nevertheless, two points 
are noteworthy in connection with (3 .4.30). 1) (3 .4.30) is another case of the encroachment of 
mot upon the meaning of sceal, which is critical to the process of displacing shall by must in 
the function of an exponent of deontic necessity in later English (cf. Warner 1993, Traugott 
and Dasher 2005), 2) although no far-reaching conclusions are entitled to follow from just one 
example in the sample, it could be argued that, much as in the case of sceal (cf 3 .3 .4 .1), the 
cline of deontic necessity in its periphery verges on more general PE necessity. A force of 
inevitability, as in (3.4.30), derives from no particular source and, therefore, could be 
described as part of a generally accepted state of affairs, which is, by definition, a preliminary 
condition of general PE necessity (cf van der Auwera and Plungian 1988: 80-81).
Having taken a look at the cline of the deontic necessity of mot, we follow the routine 
procedure and cast the examples discussed against the parameters indicating the gradience of 
the deontic necessity. The selection and order of the parameters does not diverge from those 
in the case of sceal (cf. 3 .3 .4.1) and will not be repeated here. The resultant matrix follows in 
Table 3.4.4.:
Parameter a b c d e f  g h i
(3.4.26) - ? ? + - + + -
(3.4.28) - - + + + + -
(3.4.27) - - 7 - - + + -
(3.4.29) - - ? + - + + -
(3.4.25) - - - + - + + -
(3.4.30) - - - + - ? +
W
strong necessity/subjectivity weak necessity/subjectivity
(core) (periphery)
Table 3.4.4. Matrix to show the gradience of the deontic necessity of mot
Seminal to the matrix of mot is a resemblance that it bears to that of agan (compare 
Table 3.1.3 ), which is to be linked with the fact that both verbs are clearly beginners in Old 
English when it comes to expressing deontic necessity. As is the case with agan, or even more 
obviously so, the cline o f mot has an empty core. There are no strongly subjective cases with 
necessity leveled at the Agonist hidden under the second person pronoun. With the notable 
exception of (3.4.30), all the examples flock toward the skirt of the cline. Although the
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particular skirt examples vary in the details of their ability to respond to the features ranging 
from (c) to (g), the stability of the skirt pivots on features (d) verb is agent ive and (f) animate 
subject being almost unwaveringly embraced. Also, the force of deontic necessity alternates 
between stronger and weaker, features (e) and (g) respectively, the latter being predominately 
the case. Such alternation, or, to be more precise, movement along a continuum from strong to 
weak necessity, can also be seen in the case of sceal, with a proviso that steal shows 
preference for strong necessity (cf. 3.3.4.1.) The already mentioned example (3.4.30) belongs 
in the periphery of the cline. It is, at the same time, the sole instance whose force of necessity 
is best described in terms of feature (i) paraphrasable by 'it is enevi table that. ’ Another 
aspect of exceptionality inherent to (3.4.30) is that the subject {death) is only to be treated as 
animate on account of it being personalized. In other words, the death is ascribed human 
qualities and is therefore an agent in the sentence. It cannot go unnoticed in this context that 
mot in my sample is only attested with narrow scope (see feature (h)), another clue testifying 
to relatively short experience of mot with deontic necessity. Interestingly enough, wide scope 
which is operative with mot of permission and prohibition (see examples (3.4.11) and 
(3 .4.22)) does not seem to be automatically projected upon mot of deontic necessity. Traugott 
and Dasher’s (2005: 126) comment on the subject is that ‘in earlier ME examples of 
obligation mot- involve an obligee that is human or at least a body-part (e.g. heart, hand, 
metonymically used for some aspect of human cognition or behavior), but in the later ME 
period the deontic mot- is extended to contexts in which the obligee is inanimate.’
In short, it has been brought up on a number of occasions (cf. Tellier 1962, Solo 1977, 
Warner 1993, Traugott and Dasher 2005 among others) that the meaning of deontic necessity 
is a late OE development in the semantics of mot. The matrix in Table 3.4.4. supports the 
viability of the notion that deontic necessity is a novelty in the case of mot. There are no 
subjective core examples or wide scope examples which emerge only after long-standing 
flirtation of a pre-modal with deontic necessity. Instead, the matrix presents us with densely 
populated skirt which is somewhat periphery-oriented by virtue of weaker necessity being 
abundantly represented. This picture perfectly matches my observation made above while 
commenting on the cline examples, that with mot we usually observe deontic necessity which 
the non-Antagonist speaker communicates to the Agonist, e.g. (3.4.26). The Agonist tends to 
be generic and the main verb complement demands that they be an agent.
The cline of necessity aside, I would like to underscore two infrequent uses of deontic 
necessity mot, which has a bearing on the holistic picture of mot as a pre-modal of deontic 
necessity. The first of them, illustrated in (3 4.31), is to be seen in a wider framework of
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redundant modality. Mot of deontic necessity joins the likes of sceal (cf. 3.3.5) and mot of 
permission (cf. 3.4.3.1.) and of prohibition (cf. 3.4.3.2.) in that it is capable of repeating the 
necessity which is already communicated in the main clause by means of the passive structure 
n ces beboden:
(3.4.3 1) Hym wass beboden, on heora gehealdsumnyssum on Moyses lage, })æt hy moston 
them was ordered, on their keeping on Moses ' law, that they must
lufian heora agene frynd, and hatian heora fynd; 
love their own friend, and hate their enemy
‘In the keeping of Moses’ law, they were ordered to love their friend and hate their 
enemy’
(COAELHOM 80)
The other use of mot is linked with the juxtaposition of the verb with adverb nede(s) nyde(s) 
meaning ‘necessarily,’ which in my sample appears once:
(3.4.32) ôa gerædde seo cyng 7 hiswitan eallum t)eodscipe to fjearfe. jaeah hit him
then advised the king and his council all nation to advantage, though it to-them
eallum laô wære. Jræt man nyde moste j)am here gafol gyldan.
all loath were, that man necessarily must the enemy tribute pay
‘Then advised the king and his council for the advantage of all the nation, though they
were all loath to do it, that they needs must bribe the enemy with a tribute.’
(COCHROE4 1006.41)
Apparently, nyde serves to enhance the deontic necessity conveyed by moste where the pre- 
modal by itself would be insufficient, which results in a modally harmonic combination in the 
sense of Lyons (1977: 807) or Hoye (1997). A good question in its own right is why mot 
requires harmonic reinforcement in the shape of nede(s). One part of the answer is that when 
mot occurs in the company of nede, the whole structure is emphatic. According to Molencki 
(2003), another factor behind the genesis of the construction may be that, as mot is developing 
the meaning of deontic necessity in late Old English, the presence of nede(s) helps 
disambiguate a necessity reading. As a matter of fact, the juxtaposition has been investigated 
at length by Molencki (2003) and Traugott and Dasher (2005). Molencki (2003) probes into 
the history of must needs in English, especially into the emergence of the epistemic meaning
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of the structure, which is derived from the adverb in the late fourteenth century. Importantly, 
the construction remains harmonic in the sphere of epistemicity as mot follows nede(s) and 
develops the meaning of certainty. Subsequently, the structure becomes a fixed phrase until its 
demise in the nineteenth century. The point made by Traugott and Dasher (2005) concerns the 
role of nede(s) in the promotion of past form most- to present tense use. Basing their study on 
the ME part of the Helsinki Corpus data, Traugott and Dasher (2005: 135) observe that after 
the year 1420 nede is coupled exclusively with most-. Working on the same data, Molencki 
(2003: 75) says that ‘the ratio of mot(e) nedes vs. most(e) nedes is 10:18.’ The appearance of 
obligative nede(s) with past most- successfully bocks the assumption that a meaning of 
permission in the past is intended. Rather, one is likely to interpret the sequence as implying a 
state of deontic necessity which, owing to the force of nede(s), holds in the present.
Finally, there are 5 instances of mot in my sample with an available epistemic reading, 
two of which follow in (3 .4.33) and (3 .4.34):
(3.4.33) [me maeig]... 7 ra8e aefter 6am, gif hit mot gewiderian, mederan settan, 
one may and quickly after that, i f  it may be-fme-weather, madder sow
‘One may quickly afterwards, if the weather may be fine, plant madder’
(COLAW4 12)
(3.4.34) ealneg hi wepaS, 7 aefter 5aem wope hi gewyrcea5 8aet hi moton eft wepan. 
forever they weep, and after the weeping, they accomplish that they must again weep 
‘They weep all the time and after the weeping what they accomplish is that they must 
weep again’
(COCURA 54.421.18)
It is commonly agreed that the OE pre-modals do not have any strong leaning toward 
epistemic meanings and, as a result, undisputable epistemic cases prove difficult to find (cf. 
Goossens 1982, Traugott 1989, Denison 1993, Warner 1993). Cases, including (3.4.33) and
(3.4.34), that are pointed to as exponents of epistemicity usually have a non-epistemic 
interpretation as well. Note that mot can express two types of epistemic meaning, epistemic 
possibility and epistemic necessity in (3.4.33) and (3.4.34) respectively. Traugott and Dasher 
(2005: 130), while calling (3.4.33) one of a class o f ‘impersonal constructions in which there 
is no controlling subject,’ describe it as a convenient environment for the advent of 
epistemicity of mot. A development from root/PE possibility to epistemic possibility is 
predicted by Bybee et al. (1994) as shown in Figure 3.4.1. (3 .4.33) follows this path, that is to
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say, if the hearer is unable to imagine any enabler responsible for causing the weather to be 
fine, they are likely to believe that the possibility of the fine weather follows as the speaker’s 
judgment, hence epistemic possibility. In (3.4.34) epistemic necessity comes into being as 
‘the invited inference from obligation to act at some generic time that is future’ (Traugott and
Dasher 2005: 130).
3.4.6. Indeterminacy between permission and deontic necessity
An affirmative clause containing mot can be indeterminate between a reading of permission 
and deontic necessity. Such indeterminacy is a case of ambiguity a la Coates (1983) as a 
decision must be made which meaning is intended. I have identified four such examples in my 
sample, two of which are given below:
(3.4.35) gif he ne wille his wspenu sellan, jronne mot he feohtan on hine. 
i f  he not want his weapon give, then m ust he fight against him
(permission) ‘If he does not want to give his weapon, then he may fight against him’ 
(deontic necessity) ‘If he does not want to give his weapon, then he must fight against 
him’
(COLAW2 42.4)
(3.4.36) And gif ungefullod cild ferlice biQ gebroht to t>am maessepreost, |3a2t he hit mot 
and i f  non-baptized child suddenly is brought to the priest, which he hit must
fullian sona mid ofste, J^ aet hit ne swelte hasSen. 
baptize soon with haste, that it not die heathen
(permission) ‘If unexpectedly an non-baptized child is brought to a priest, he may 
baptize him in haste so that he would not die pagan’
(deontic necessity) ‘If unexpectedly an non-baptized child is brought to a priest, he 
must baptize him in haste so that he would not die pagan’
(COAELET4 71)
Ono (1958: 66) wrestles with a similar case of ambiguity encountered in Beowulf and, having 
adduced contradictory translations by various interpreters, concludes that ‘whatever the 
author’s intention may have been, the meaning of the Old English *motan may be said to be 
somewhat ambiguous in that it cannot be determined by context alone. ’
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3.4.7. Summary of mot
The above sections have demonstrated that mot lies at the heart of the present study in that not 
only does it show relevance for the semantic areas of permission and deontic necessity but 
also these two readings are responsible for 85.3 per cent of the instances of the verb in the 
sample (cf. Table 3.4.1). With all the meanings conveyed by mot in the sample analyzed, it is 
possible to reconstruct the semantic development of the verb and fit it onto the path of 
possibility shown in Figure 3.4.1. and Figure 10.4. At the same time, mot, as the only pre- 
modal, succeeds in stepping beyond mere possibility onto the path of necessity in that it 
becomes available to deontic necessity. Quantitatively, it is permission that dominates, a 
conclusion that I share with Goossens (1987b). The number of the deontic necessity examples 
is roughly equivalent to that of the PI/PE possibility examples, which reflects the fact that, 
from the diachronic perspective, the PI possibility of mot is on the decline while the deontic 
necessity is only starting to expand. With the permission and deontic necessity of mot 
obviously put in the spotlight, I contrast the two types of the occurrences of the verb in terms 
of such parameters as subjectivity, performativity and scope. Mot of permission, having a 
long standing tradition in Old English, is shown to be familiar with subjective and 
performative contexts as well as with wide scope on occasion. An interesting observation is 
that the modal experience which mot gains in the field of permission does not have much, if 
any, bearing upon mot of deontic necessity. In other words, mot of deontic necessity begins its 
modal development anew. Diagnostic of an early phase of the development is the fact that the 
occurrences of mot of deontic necessity are attested with mostly weakly subjective and non­
performative contexts and narrow scope only.
3.5. mteg
Mceg merits inclusion in the present study mainly as a contender of mot for the meaning of 
permission. To a large extent, the evolution of mceg/may in English tells a story of how the 
verb gradually encroaches more and more upon the territory of permission, formerly occupied 
by mot must (cf. Table 3.4.1). In Present-Day English, as made transparent by Coates (1983: 
139), permission is the core of the non-epistemic meaning of may, yet in Old English the 
permission of mceg is usually approached with caution, if not hesitation. B&T adduces four 
meanings of mceg, the fourth one being specified as ‘may (because a thing is permissible or 
lawful, because there is sufficient cause).’ Both OED and Visser (1963-73), which offer a
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diachronic approach unlike B&T, illustrate the sense of permission of may with OE examples, 
yet, there is no denying that considerably more such examples are to be found from Middle 
English onwards. Tellier (1962) consistently stresses the fact that in OE mceg and mol 
converge in the notion of possibility (pouvoir), the diflfemce being that the possibility of mceg 
is subject-intemally conditioned, which amounts to ability, whereas the possibility of mot has 
a motivation external to the subject, hence the meaning of PE possibility and permission. If 
nothing seems to threaten the viability of this system in the language of Boewulf, the first 
cracks are noticed by Tellier (1962: 118) in the prose of Ailfric in the tenth century. It is when 
mceg starts to appear in a subordinate clause which is a complement of the verb unnan, as in 
Tellier’s (ibid) example.
(3.5.1) Hyre ge-ufre Joa se slmihtiga wealdend Joaet heo untrume menn mihte gehaelan 
her granted then the almighty lord that she infirm men might heal 
‘It was granted to her by the Almighty Lord that she could heal infirm people’
(Ainsi II. 128.)
Since the meaning of unnan, ‘to grant, give’ is a suggestion that it is the authority of God that 
stands behind the subject of mihte’s ability to heal, one is inclined to infer PE possibility, if 
not permission, as the most likely reading of mihte in this case. In 3.4.3.1 I discuss the use of 
mot in the same environment, mot constituting a more natural choice as a pre-modal following 
unnan (cf. Goossens 1987b). Despite these occasions on which mceg is seen to oust mot in Old 
English, it is not until the thirteenth century that Tellier (1962. 147) points out that ‘de fait 
MAI a souvent le sens “permission” qui est justement bien atteste dans une oeuvre comme 
l’Ancrene Riwle.’ [in fact, MAI often has the meaning of permission well attested in a work 
like Ancrene Riwle].That the frequency of the permission of may subsequently grows apace 
can be gathered from Kakietek’s (1972) research on Shakespearean use of the modals where 
this meaning of may figures prominently alongside ability and epistemic possibility.
Turning back to the views on the OE permission of mceg, one could invoke Krzyszpien 
(1980: 51) who, before embarking on an investigation into the employment of mceg as a 
subjunctive marker, says that the verb ‘expressed either ability which was not dependent on 
on outward conditions, or objective possibility, or, perhaps, permission.’ The most detailed 
treatments of the semantics of mceg are offered by Goossens (1987b) and Kyto (1991). Both 
are corpus-based studies. As with mot, Goossens (1987b) works on a sample of 100 examples 
of mceg taken from the language of /Elfric with a view to identifying the links between
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particular meanings of mœg and, thus, establishing a path of the semantic evolution of the 
verb. In the OE and ME part of her research, Kytó (1991) focuses on the syntactic and 
semantic rivalry between cann and mœg. With the aid of the Helsinki corpus, she probes into 
the parallel shift of cann toward general ability and of mœg from ability toward neutral (PE in 
our notation) possibility. Also, an epistemic development of mœg is looked into. So is the 
pace at which both verbs lose nominal complements thereby accelerating the process whereby 
cann and mœg grammaticalize into auxiliaries.
The semantic path traveled by mœg to a large extent coincides with that of mot. The 
original Indo-Europenan semantics inherited by mœg makes it a verb of ability/PI possibility 
which goes in the direction of PE and deontic possibility. OED and Prokosch (1939) point to 
the Teutonic root *mag- ‘to be able or powerful’ as responsible for the meaning and shape of 
mœg. This root is also visible in the OE noun meaht ‘might, power’ and its PDE continuation 
might. According to Prokosch (1939. 193), among the Indo-European cognates of *mag- there 
are Old Slavic mogą (Polish móc), Lithuanian magóti ‘be helpful’ and Greek 
‘contrivance.’ In the Germanic branch we find Gothic mag, Old Norse ma, Old Saxom mag 
and Old High German mag. In Gothic the earlier notion of physical ability in mag is seen to 
have expanded into both PI and PE possibility. Tellier (1962: 33) says that the Gothic verb 
‘est employé avec toutes les nuances possibles et imaginables de la notion de « pouvoir » : 
soit capacité physique ou intellectuelle inhérente au sujet ; soit éventualité, possibilité, 
circonstances extérieures (= MOT AN) ; soit permission’ [is used with all the possible and 
imaginable shades of the notion of pouvoir such as physical or intellectual ability of the 
subject, possibility, external circumstances (=MOTAN), permission]. As regards mag with a 
sense of permission, Tellier (ibid) identifies only one uncontroversial example in Wulfila.
(3.5.2)a Ni magt auk ju anamais fauragaggja wisan.
(Lk 16.2.)
which in the West Saxon Gospels is also rendered by means of mœg :
(3.5.2)bagyf jjine scire, ne miht }?u lencg tunscire bewitan 
hand-over thy farm, not may thou longer farm administer
‘Hand over your farm, you may administer over it no longer’
(COWSGOSP 16.2.)
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Bybee et al. (1994: 190) remark that the development of mag mceg from physical ability to 
general ability/PI possibility and further to PE and epistemic possibility in the Germanic 
languages is not unparalleled by similar developments in other languages. They adduce Latin 
*potere possum ‘to be able’ originating in potens ‘strong, powerful’ whose French and 
Spanish cognates pouvoir and poder stand for PE and epistemic possibility. The particular 
stages attained by mceg in its semantic evolution in Old English proceed in accordance with 
the order shown in Figure 3.4.1. The details, mechanisms and motivations behind the 
progression are handled in 3 .4., 3 .4.4. and 3.4.5. using the example of mot and need not be 
repeated here.
The sample to be analyzed in the following sections consists of 167 examples of mceg 
obtained from the following texts in the OE part of the Helsinki Corpus: /Elfric Catholic 
Homilies II, A Homily fo r  the Sixth (or Fourth) Sunday after Epiphany, The Blickling 
Homilies, Alfred’s Introduction to Laws, The Benedictine Ride, The Anglo Saxon Chronicle 
MS A and E and Genesis. The corpus attained contains 79, 919 words. Tentative scrutiny of 
the semantics of mceg in the sample is demonstrated in Table 3 .5.1. The premises adopted 
here invite comparisons with those underlying Goossens’s (1987b) approach to the meanings 
of mceg. He treats possibility as a common denominator in the semantics of the verb, a 
variable being the source of possibility. The source can be subject-internal, subject-external or 
indeterminate between the two. Thus, there are the following correspondences between 
Goossens’s (ibid.) division and mine: internal possibility - PI possibility, internal/external 
possibility - PI/PE possibility and external possibility - PE possibility/permission. I have 
singled out the three permission examples, questionable as they may be, as they are, after all, 
the raison d ’etre of the discussion of mceg in this study. Lack of any separate treatment of 
epistemic possibility by Goossens (ibid.) also stems from the absence of any uncontroversial 
instances. Since fuzziness of modal meanings is one of the theoretical pillars of this 
undertaking, I have reserved a separate column in Table 3.5.1. for the instances where 
epistemic possibility seems to prevail. The following sections offer a close look at some of the 
examples from the sample as well as at crucial implications of their appearance. In 3.5.1. I 
undertake to highlight the syntactic patterns of mceg. Having handled the syntactic points, I 
proceed to analyze and illustrate the three possibility meanings of mceg in 3 .5.2. A separate 
section, 3.5.3, is devoted to the forays of mceg into the domain of permission.
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\ PIpossibility PI/PEpossibility PEpossibility permission epistemicpossibility total
mceg 67 36 56 3 5 167
(40.2%) (21.5%) (33.5%) (1.8%) (3%) (100%)
Table 3.5.1. Distribution o 'meanings of mceg
3.5.1. Syntactic considerations
It is commonly stressed that mceg co-occurs with direct objects, prepositional objects and can 
be used intransitively, especially when the meaning involved is PI possibility (cf. B&T, OED 
and Visser 1963-73 for examples). Denison (1993) adds that /^ -c lau ses  are not out of place 
as complements of mceg. That all such patterns, which are indicative of main verb behavior, 
are the exception rather than the norm is clear from the frequency of their occurrence. Kyto’s 
(1991: 145) research shows that mceg takes main verb characteristics in 0.8 per cent of cases 
in the OE part of the Helsinki Corpus. In my sample I find only one example of an NP 
complement (3.5.3) and one case of a prepositional complement (3.5.4) after mceg.
(3.5.3) {)at drihten, {>e ealle {ting m ag and ealra Jtinga wylt, gehale {tone untruman ... 
that lord\ who all thing may and all thing wants, heal this infirm 
broOor.
brother
‘so that Lord, who can do anything and who is willing to do anything, would heal the 
infirm brother’
(COBENRUL 28.15)
(3.5.4) hie hindan ofridan ne meahte a r  hie on Jtam fastene waron, {tar him 
them from-behind overtake not might before they on that fortress were, where them 
mon to ne meahte:
man to not might
‘he (King Alfred) could not overtake them before their arrival in the fortress, where 
they could not be come at’
(COCHROA2 877.3)
(3 .5 .3) is a straightforward case of PI possibility where an NP complement is most naturally 
expected (cf. Visser 1963-73: 501-502). The complementation of meahte in (3.5.4) raises
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more controversy. Two interpretations seem to come into play here; on the one hand, to him 
in him mon to ne meahte can be taken a complete prepositional complement in itself, which 
brings this use of mceg close to pure PI possibility as in (3.5.3). The whole clause could then 
be paraphrased as ‘one was not able to attack/come against them.’ Alternatively, a feasible 
interpretation of the complementation of meahte in (3.5.4) could be supplied on the grounds 
of a verb of motion to be logically inserted between the pre-modal and the prepositional 
phrase. Structures of the same type with sceal are dealt with in 3.3.3. and with mot in 3.4.1. 
The latter option has the advantage of allowing a reading of mceg in terms of PE possibility. 
Note that external factors, viz. the fact that the opponents are in the fortress, have a bearing 
upon King Alfred’s army inability to attack them. (3.5.4) can be contrasted with (3.5.5) where 
mceg is followed by the directional adverbs inn and ut. Unlike the former, (3.5.5) raises no 
doubts as to the need for a verb of motion to be inferred:
(3.5.5) bedicodon sy55on Jaa burh uton frast nan mann ne mihte ne inn ne ut.
trenched afterwards the city from-without that no man not might neither in nor out 
‘Afterwards they trenched the city from without, so that no man could go in or out’ 
(COCHROE4 1016.45)
A default syntactic pattern of mceg has the verb followed by a plain infinitive. A 
considerable number of instances, 18 to be precise, circumvent the practice by conforming to 
the tenets of postverbal ellipsis. In 3 .4.1. it is demonstrated that in elliptical contexts mceg can 
be conjoined with mot in a binomial expression, which example (3.4.3) is meant to illustrate. 
In the present sample there are two instances that subscribe to this pattern. Otherwise, mceg 
occurs on its own with the antecedent verb invariably present in the preceding context, as in:
(3 .5.6) an cyrceweard Yware ... nam ¡3a be nihte eall Joet he mihte. 
one churchwarden Yware took then by night all that he might 
‘a churchwarden, whose name was Yware, .. took away by night all that he could, 
(COCHROE4 1070.17)
3.5.2. mceg with the sense of PI, PE and epistemic possibility
As can be seen in Table 3.5.1., the PI possibility of mceg is abundantly represented. The 67 
examples make up the largest semantically uniform group among the instances in the sample.
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In accordance with Bybee et al.’s (1994) scheme, PI possibility of mceg in these examples 
stands for general capacity residing in the agent/subject. This capacity develops out of 
physical ability due to bleaching of the physical aspect (cf. 3.4.). This type is illustrated in
(3.5.7) below:
(3.5.7) o55e hwa is swa heardheort J?aet ne maeg wepan swylces ungelimpes? 
or who is so herdhearted that not mag weep of-such misfortune 
‘or who is so hardhearted as not to weep at such misfortune?’
(COCHROE4 1086.16)
It can be noticed that the feature of hard-heartedness is an aspect of the subject’s 
psychological construction rather than of his or her physicality. The PI possibility of mceg 
does not seem then to be limited to any particular kind of the subject’s capacity.
Much as in the case of mot, bleaching of PI possibility continues to the extent that the 
role of the subject-internal factors as the enabler is gradually taken over by conditions outside 
the subject. A major difference between the development of mot and mceg is that in the latter 
case the shift can be actually observed to be taking place in Old English. Compare (3.5.8) and
(3.5.9):
(3 .5.8) forSon Joe nan wyrhta ne mass god weorc wyrcean for Gode buton lufon 7 geleafan. 
because no worker not may good work perform before God but love and faith 
‘because no worker can perform any good work before God without love and faith’ 
(COBLICK 70)
(3 .5.9) Hwaet we nu gehyrajD Joaet we magon mid J^ aere sodan hreowe ece blisse geeamian. 
what we now hear that we may with that true penitence eternal bliss earn 
‘we have now heard that we can earn eternal bliss with true penitence’
(COBLICK 197)
It seems that the meaning of mceg in (3 .5.8) marries PI and PE possibility whereas mceg in
(3.5.9) is primarily devoted to expressing PE possibility. In the context of (3.5.8), both 
subject-internal and subject-external enabling conditions are more or less equally feasible. On 
the one hand, it follows from the constitution of the human being that he or she is not able to 
perform any good work for God except for that performed by means of love and faith. On the 
other hand, one may take (3.5.8) to mean that in the God-created reality it is impossible for
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the human being to achieve any good but with the help of love and faith. The two readings 
coexist in a state of merger in that one does not preclude the other and vice versa. The 
possibility in example (3.5.9) is determined by the subject-external system of penitence and 
reward. I have included examples (3.5.8) and (3.5.9) in the categories PI/PE possibility and 
PE possibility repectively in Table 3.5.1. They serve to show that the meaning of mceg 
proceeds from PI through PE possibility until it verges on permission
A final point in this section is concerned with the epistemic possibility of mceg. It has 
been pointed out by Goossens (1982), Kyto (1991) and Warner (1993) that the presence of the 
adverb eape ‘easily’ often helps reinforce the epistemic force of mceg. Among the five 
epistemic examples in my sample, mceg is paired with eape twice. It is Goossens (1982. 77- 
78) who voices an observation that mceg stops short of expressing epistemicity without some 
contextual aid. In fact, in the five epistemic instances, a PE possibility interpretation must be 
taken into account. Overall, the number of my epistemic examples in percentage terms, 
namely 3 per cent, equals the figures obtained by Kyto (1991: 153) from her research based 
on the Helsinki Corpus.
3 .5 .3. mceg with the sense of permission
The inference-based mechanism responsible for the specialization of PE possibility to 
permission is discussed in good detail in 3.4.3. The same mechanism can be seen at work in 
the case of mceg. The following examples are the three cases of mceg which I have assigned to 
the permission category in Table 3.5.1.:
'3.5.10) ])onne wass se Halga Gast ahafen ofer Jja godes leomeras ... J)aet hie mihton 
therefore was the Holy Ghost raised over the G od’s disciples that they might 
jsurh }ra gife ojterra manna synna adilegian, 
through the gifts other men's sins blot-out
‘therefore the Holy Ghost came upon the disciples of God (...) so that they might, 
through that gift, blot out other men’s sins’
(COBLICK 65)
3.5.11) Joaet gehwa to gedreoge on Jjaem lytlum faece gan maege, 
that everyone to relief in that short period go may 
‘so that everyone might relieve themselves in that short period’
(COBENRUL 8.10)
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(3 5.12) God secj) ]?a claenan heortan him on to eardienne; j)onne ne ma^g fraet Godes tempi
God seeks the clean heart him on to dwell; therefore not may that God's temple 
beon besmiten, 
be defiled
‘God seeks a pure heart to dwell therein, therefore God’s temple may not be defiled’ 
(COBLICK 126)
With much probability, it is with such examples of mceg in mind that Goossens (1987b: 221) 
says that ‘as a rule we get no permission readings (the involvement of some kind of authority 
as an enabling factor is at best an overtone in a few instances).’ What should not be missed, 
however, is that an overtone of permission, or we might say, an inference of permission varies 
from context to context ranging from rather weak to salient. The arrangement of the examples
(3.5.10) through (3.5.12) shows the increasing intensity of the inference. In (3.5.10) a slight 
sense of permission emerges alongside a combination of PI and PE possibility. PI possibility 
follows from the fact that the disciples became endowed with an ability to absolve sins. At the 
same time, the endowment occurs as a result of the intervention of the Holy Ghost, that is to 
say, the Holy Ghost made it possible for the disciples to absolve sins. Given the authority of 
the enabler, the establishment of the possibility may be interpreted as an act of permission 
granting. (3 .5.11) engenders an environment with a more visible sense of permission. The 
example is an excerpt from the rules of night prayers. Considering the instructive nature of the 
text, an idea of permission prevails over a general PE possibility reading. Finally, it seems 
that the only interpretation that example (3.5.12) yields is one in terms negated permission. 
Note that (3.5.12) is a negative sentence which contains a passive structure and an inanimate 
subject. It is one of Goossens’s (1987b: 222) observations that passive structures and 
inanimate subjects with mceg ‘clearly favor an external reading.’ In the homiletic context of 
(3.5.12), the external factor is to be associated with the religious doctrine, hence the meaning 
of permission.
3 .5 .4. Summary of mceg
Admittedly, the reservations held by scholars about the meaning of permission in the case of 
mceg find enough justification in the corpus data. Only three permission cases (1.8 per cent) in 
a 167 example sample clearly demonstrate that this meaning plays hardly any role in the 
semantics of the verb. To say then that mceg expresses permission in Old English would equal
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stretching reality a little. The permission of mceg arises only as an invited inference which has 
not been generalized yet. It typically takes a context of PE possibility in which an Antagonist 
other than objective external circumstances is conceivable. The Antagonist, be it a person of 
authority or an accepted set of rules, becomes an enabler of the action. As it happens, in none 
of the examples in the sample the inference of permission is salient enough to occur 
independently of a more expected PE or/and PI possibility reading. The above research 
indicates that mceg remains a verb largely at the disposal of PI and PE possibility in Old 
English yet.
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Chapter 4 
Verbs of necessity other than 
the pre-modals
4.0. Introduction
Up to now I have been concerned solely with the expression of necessity and permission by 
the predecessors of the PDE modals. It would be a fallacy, however, to assume that these 
meanings do not extend beyond the pre-modals. In this chapter I aim to review other verbs 
that share the semantics of PI, PE necessity, permission and prohibition with the verbs 
discussed so far. What is common to these verbs is that they are ‘’’performative” 
(“illocutionary”) verbs: verbs which under specific conditions can be used (...) to have the 
force of doing (Traugott and Dasher 2005: 190). The specific conditions meant are 
‘(typically) first person present tense, indicative, active’ (Traugott and Dasher ibid.). As 
further pointed out by Searle (1976, 1979) and Traugott and Dasher (ibid.), the performative 
nature of the lexical verbs of necessity, permission and prohibition, brings them close to 
modals in their performative use.
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4.1. Verbs of PI and PE necessity
Considering that a possible list of OE verbs which to a lesser or greater extent encroach upon 
the domain of PI and PE necessity would be difficult to exhaust, I have confined the list to 
those verbs which recognize PI and/or PE necessity as their unquestionably dominant use. Six 
verbs that are thus included here are hatan, bebeodan, beodcm, neodian, behofian and 
bepurfan. The number of the occurrences of each verb in the DOE corpus has been used to 
calculate the incidence of each verb per 100,000 words. The normalized frequencies of the six 
verbs, thus obtained, are given in Table 4.1. along with the total number the occurrences of 
the verbs retrieved from the DOE corpus. Such a procedure, besides having an obvious 
advantage of comparing the usefulness of the particular verbs, makes it possible to cast the 
frequency of these six verbs and the pre-modals of PI and PE necessity in a comparative 
framework. Among the six verbs, hatan can be seen to run significantly ahead of all the others 
if we consult the frequencies in Table 4.1. The second most frequent verb bebeodan fails to 
achieve half as good frequency as hatan. Nevertheless, even the normalized frequency of 
hatan which amounts to 57.6 is eclipsed by that of the most common pre-modal of PE 
necessity sceal, which equals 340.3 (cf. Table 3.1). If the uses of sceal other than necessity 
related are not taken into account (cf. Table 3.3.1. and Table 3.3.3 ), we arrive at the 
normalized frequency of the sense of PE necessity of sceal which equals 278 .0, a number 
which guarantees the status of sceal as the most commonly used verb of necessity in Old 
English. The normalized frequencies of pearf and agan (to) infinitive, 5.0 and 1.2 
respectively, would place the verbs at the bottom of the scale in Table 4 .1. The former number 
is decreased to 4.8 as 96.2 per cent of the occurrences of pearf are necessity related (cf. 3.2.1. 
and Table 3.2.3 ). Note that verbs of PE necessity {sceal, hatan, bebeodan) regularly recur 
much more often than verbs associated with PI necessity {behofian, beparfan, also pearf).
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Verb N. F. Total number of occurrences
hatan 57.6 3049
bebeodan 21.3 1126
beodan 12.6 665
neodian 8.6 455
behofian 2.6 136
bepurfan 2.2 118
Table 4.1. Frequency of lexical verbs of PI and PE necessity
4.1.1. hatan
OE hatan, a strong verb of Class 7, is a continuation of PIE *keid- ‘to set in motion’ which in 
proto-Germanic takes the form of *hait- ‘to call, summon,’ as we learn from Watkins (2000). 
The Germanic cognates such as Gothic haitan, Old Saxon hetan, Old Norse heita, Old High 
German heizan, heizzan (German heissen), Old Frisian heta, are regularly recorded with the 
sense ‘to name, call’ (cf. B&T and OED). The meaning ‘to bid, command,’ already present in 
the Gothic form, seems to have arisen from the active use of the verb ‘to summon, to be 
summoned’ rather than from a stative idea ‘ to name, to be named.’ According to B&T, in Old 
English there are two verbs hatan. one, that used with the meaning 1) ‘to bid, order, 
command,’ 2) ‘to promise, vow,’ 3) ‘to call, name, give a name to,’ is a cognate of Gothic 
haitan whereas the other, used with the meaning ‘to be called or named, have as a name,’ 
corresponds to Gothic haitada ‘I am called.’ Subsequently, both verbs merge into highte in 
the times of Chaucer.
An insightful study of hatan is undertaken by Nagucka (1980) who, unlike B&T, 
chooses to talk about one verb hatan and distinguishes between its two senses 1) ‘to call, 
name’ and 2) ‘to order, bid, command.’ She, accordingly, refers to the verb as hatan 1 when it 
is used with the former and as hatanl when it depends on the latter for interpretation. A 
central claim of Nagucka’s (1980: 37-38) paper is that the two senses of hatan cohere in that 
with either sense involved the verb is inherently causative and, as such, follows the same deep 
structure pattern:
subject NP -  causative V hatan -  direct object NP -  object complement NP
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The major difference is that hatan\ assigns stative meaning to the object complement NP 
whereas hatan2, besides turning the object complement NP into an uninflected infinitive in the 
surface structure, bestows an active component upon it. While any further investigation into 
hatcm\ falls outside the scope of this dissertation, the relevant occurrences shown in Table
4.1. are those of hatanl only (henceforth hatan). The following examples are illustrative of 
the contexts with hatan in the corpus:
(4.1) se wallenda (...) heht his [>egnas hine selfne beran ongean J)sem fyre 7 asettan, 
the ruler bade his servants him self bear toward the fire and lay 
‘the ruler ordered his servants to carry him toward the fire and lay him down,’
(SEG32.\Bede 2 B9.6.4)
(4.2) Ic fre halsige 7 beode 7 hate j?aet ]au gode aelmihtigum hyrsumige 
I thee entreat and order and command that thou to-god almighty obey
‘I beg and ask and order you to obey almighty God’
(SEG35.\Conf 10.5 B it. 10.5)
Example (4.1) is in keeping with what Nagucka (1980: 33) calls ‘a typical pattern: NP hatan 
NP V (infinitive). The NP subject is obligatorily human (. . .) and so is (. . .) [in most cases] the 
NP object required by hatan. The next element that must be used with the verb is the 
infinitive ( ...) .’ The direct object NP is rendered in the accusative form and the infinitive is 
uninflected, which makes hatan naturally belong in the class of verbs which require ACI 
complementataion, i.e. an accusative NP with an infinitive (cf. Callaway 1913, Nagucka 
1985, Molencki 1987, 1991 and Los 1999 for an extensive study of the origin and application 
of the ACI in Old English). Building on Lakoff (1968), Nagucka (1980: 33) further argues 
that the ACI structure of hatan is a transformational extension of the pcet-clause 
complementation that one can observe in (4.2).
The meaning of hatan, as evidenced by (4.1) and (4.2), is palpably engendered within 
the sphere of PE necessity, the latter example illustrating a performative use of the verb. We 
have to do with a very forceful necessity generated by the Antagonist (the subject NP) who 
expressly imposes it upon the Agonist (the direct object NP in (4.1) and the subject of the 
pcet-c\msQ in (4.2)). Ultimately the necessity has the force of a command leveled at the 
Agonist. The import of the necessity seems to be underscored in (4.2) where hatan, is 
conjoined with another verb of PE necessity, bebeodan, (cf. 4.1.2.) on the one hand but also 
with halsian ‘to ask, entreat.’ Halsian, which usually lacks any forceful element in its
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meaning, takes on an aspect of gravity and force in the company of bebeodan and hatan. 
What also frequently helps reinforce the strength of the PE necessity of hatan is the overtly 
stated difference in the social rank of the Antagonist and Agonist (se wallenda vs. his pegnas 
in (4.1). The same point is made by Nagucka (1980: 35) when she says that ‘the authorative 
character of the subject of hatan (...) is clearly evident from the context whether immediate or 
non-immediate.’ Another observation made by Nagucka (ibid.) is that the Agonist may be 
unexpressed, which results in a syntactic pattern without the direct object NP when the 
identity of the obligee is obvious or of no consequence.
4.1.2. bebeodan and beodan
If we go further down the scale of frequency presented in Table 4.1., we stop by the next two 
verbs of PE necessity, i.e. bebeodan and beodan. Although both used with largely the same 
meaning, they differ markedly when it comes to the rate of recurrence, bebeodan being nearly 
twice as popular as beodan in the DOE corpus. As might be expected from the similarity of 
form, both verbs share the common origin in the PIE root *bheudh- ‘to be aware, to make 
aware,’ as noted by Watkins (2000). OED points to Sanskrit budh ‘to present’and proto- 
Germanic *beudan ‘to communicate, inform, announce, proclaim command’ as the 
subsequent developments of the PIE form while in the Slavic branch *bheudh- has a reflex in, 
for example, Old Church Slavic bbdeti and Polish budzić ‘to wake up’ (cf. Bańkowski 2000 
and Boryś 2005). Apart from OE beodan, the proto-Germanic form spawns Gothic biudan, 
Old Saxon biodan, Old High German biotan (modern German bieten ‘to offer’ ), Old Frisian 
biada and Old Norse boida (Swedish bjuda). Bebeodan is one of a few prefixed12 derivatives 
of beodan in Old English (for a review offorbeodan, another verb derived from beodan, the 
reader should refer to 4.2.3 ). As a consequence, bebeodan and beodan are both members of 
Class 2 of strong verbs. Curiously enough, out of the two verbs, it is only the less frequent 
beodan that continues till Present-Day English. OED cites PDE to bid as a form which in Late 
Middle English results from beodan and biddan ‘to ask’ (PIE *gwhedh- ‘to ask, pray’) 
merging together. DOE cautions that already in Old English some forms and uses of beodan 
and biddan considerably overlap.
u As for the origin of the prefix be-, Watkins (2000: 3) notes that it, along with the preposition bi, be (PDE by). 
has PIE ambhi- ‘around’ as its source. Be- functions as an intensive prefix, yet, it may also signal no discernible 
differnce in meaning (cf. B&T) in comparison with a non-prefixed form.
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Little differentiated are bebeodan and beodan when it comes to the meanings they are 
credited with. The semantic specifications given in B&T to bebeodcm are 1) ‘to command, 
order,’ 2) ‘to offer, give up, commend,’ 3) ‘to announce’ whereas with beodan we find 1) ‘to 
command, bid, order,’ 2) ‘to announce, proclaim, inspire, bode, threaten,’ 3) ‘to offer, give, 
grant.’ With the sense of PE necessity, which is realized in the ‘to command, order’ 
specification, clearly taking precedence over the other meanings, it seems plausible to 
consider some of the actual uses of the verbs which actualize this sense:
(4.3) Eadwerd cyning byt 5am gerefum eallum, 5aet ge deman swa rihte domas swa
Edward king commands the reeves all, that you judge as just judgements as
ge rihtoste cunnon,
you most-right can
‘King Edward commands that all reeves should make as just judgments as they possibly 
can’
(SEG37.\LawIEw B14.7.1)
(4.4) Ne bud jju me na aelmessan to syllan, 
not order thou me no alms to give 
‘Do not order me to give alms’
(SEG24.\PPs B8.2.1)
(4.5) Noe soSlice dyde ealle 5a Sing, Se him God bebead.
Noe indeed did all the things, which him God commanded 
‘Indeed Noe did all the things that God ordered him to do’
(SEG23.\Gen B8.1.4.1)
On the whole, the same deep structure pattern can be detected with both verbs.
subject NP -  bebeodan\beodan -  indirect object NP -  direct object NP
which has a number of surface realizations. The subject NP in the nominative remains a 
constant element when the sentence is active. A preferred complementation type in the case of 
beodan is the indirect object NP in the dative followed by the direct object which takes the 
shape of a pcet-clause, as in (4.3) (cf. Molencki 1991 who, following Warner 1982 and
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Thrainsson 1979, argues in favor of treating OE complement clauses as NPs). Other 
possibilities include the dative NP ensued by the inflected or bare infinitive ((4.4) is 
illustrative of the former, more frequent, option) as well as the direct object rendered as an NP 
in the accusative.13 To be sure, passive sentences with beodan are rather uncommon. All these 
options are also available to bebeodan and in (4.5), for instance, bebeodan comes in a relative 
clause where the relative pronoun de stands for the direct object NP ecille da ding in the main 
clause. Unlike beodan, the lion’s share of the attestations of bebeodan is traceable to passive 
structures. Example (3.4.31) in section 3.4.5. fits into this category. Note that a passive 
transformation involves the shift of function of the /^/-clause from the direct object in an 
active sentence to the subject, as in (3.4.31).
Generally, the PE necessity encoded in the meaning of bebeodan and beodan seems 
no less obvious than that of hatan. It might be argued that the necessity of beodan is 
somewhat weaker than hatan and bebeodan, especially since the merging process of this verb 
with biddan is slowly underway thereby causing beodan to shade into a more reconciliatory 
sense of asking, entereating. Yet, the prototypical examples above show no trace of that. All 
the examples, with the notable exception of (3 .4.31), implicate the animate Antagonist (the 
subject NP) and Agonist (the indirect object NP). Much as in the case of hatan, that a given 
Antagonist should plausibly be a source of necessity stems from his or her high position in a 
particular social or religious state of affairs (consider the king vs. his reeves in (4.3) and God 
vs. those who believe in him in (4.4) and (4.5)). In (4.4) it can be noticed that with negation, it 
is the necessity that is negated rather than the proposition, hence we have to do with the 
meaning ‘do not order me to ...’ Lastly, a passive structure with bebeodan like (3.4.31) 
diverges from examples (4.3) through (4.5) by the fact that the Antagonist does not formally 
appear although his presence and identity (God) can be logically gathered from the meaning 
of the sentence. The absence of the Antagonist results from the ^ /-c lau se  taking over the role 
of the subject.
13 In Los’s (1999: 167-173) view, OE verbs of PE necessity, which she calls ‘verbs of commanding and 
permitting,’ are consistent in that they make use of two different syntactic and thematic structures. The syntactic 
structure like that of beodan, that is, one with a dative indirect object NP and a direct object is diagnostic of a 
three argument thematic configuration consisting of Agent, Recipient and Theme. Conversely, the ACI detected 
in the case of hatan points to a two-argument thematic frame made up by Agent and Theme only. The accusative 
NP and the infinitive that constitute the ACI are construed as one argument, namely Theme.
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4 1.3. neodian, behofian and bepurfan
Due to the lowest number of attestations among the verbs scrutinized in 4.1., as shown in 
Table 4.1., neodian, behofian and bepurfan will be handled together in this section. The same 
three verbs alongsidepearf have been lumped together before by Loureiro-Porto (2003, 2005) 
in her quest for the semantic forerunners of PDE need. Despite this semantic affinity, neodian, 
behofian and bepurfan are very heterogenous as regards their origin. In what follows then I 
aim to focus on each verb in its own right with a view to highlighting some aspects of their 
pre-OE past as well as their syntactic and semantic characteristics.
The entry provided for the ultimate predecessor of OE neodian by Watkins (2000: 57) 
reads PIE *nau- ‘death, to be exhausted’ whose prefixed variant *nau-ti- goes on to produce 
proto-Germanic *naudi~. The subsequent fate of this form in the Germanic languages is 
somewhat obscure. In the explanation offered by OED, we learn that in Old English there are 
two relevant nouns nied (nyd', ned, also nead and neod), whose meaning is 1/violence, force, 
constraint or compulsion,’ 2) ‘necessity,’ and neod ‘desire, earnestness, pleasure.’ Both nouns 
are subject to confusion especially given the fact that the former exhibits a considerable 
variation of forms, viz. mutated nied, nyd, ned vs. unmutated nead, neod. Moreover, the 
gender of the mutated variants alternates between feminine and neuter depending on the 
context. B&T, however, begs to differ. According to the data given there Old English has 
three related nouns stemming from *naudi-: neod (ned, nied, nyd) ‘desire, eagerness, 
diligence, earnest endeavour,’ neod (nead) ‘necessity’ and nid (nead, ned, neod, nied, nyd) 
which takes a number of necessity and compulsion related meanings. In Loureiro-Porto’s 
(2005) view, each of the three nouns gives rise to weak verb derived from it, hence neodian, 
neadian and nidan. As for the meanings of the three verbs as specified by B&T, let me draw 
on part of Loureiro-Porto’s (2005: 117) Table 3.3 which succinctly assembles the relevant 
dictionary information:
neodian ‘to be necessary’ 
neadian ‘to force, compel, constrain’ 
neadian, neodian ‘to be necessary’ 
nidan ‘to force, compel, urge’
Figure 4 .1. Signification of the verbs derived from neod, neod (nead) and nid in B&T (based
on Loureiro-Porto 2005: 117)
168
Nevertheless, considering the common origin of the three nouns in one PIE root, the 
semantic relatedness of the three verbs derived from them as well as their ultimate falling 
together as neden in Middle English (cf. Loureiro-Porto ibid.), a commonly assumed approach 
(e.g. Molencki 2002, van der Auwera and Taeymans 2004) is to treat neodian, neadian and 
nidan as variants of one verb collectively known as neodian. Interestingly enough, other 
Germanic languages, with the exception of Old High German which has notjan and noten, do 
not seem to foster such variation. B&T and OED adduce the following verbs as the cognates 
of neodian . Gothic naupjan, Old Saxon nodian, Old Frisian neda, Old Norse neyda.
The most common use of neodian can be exemplified using the following examples.
(4.6) Da se Haelend nvdde done unclasnan gast ut 
then the Savior needed the unclean ghost out 
‘Then he forced the unclean spirit to go out’
(SEG25.\Lk (WSCp) B8.4.3.3)
(4.7) Forfon hy nedded se towearda winter, fast heo stille wundeon 
because them needed the coming winter, that they still remain 
‘Because the coming winter forced them to remain still’
(SEG.33.\Bede 4 B9.6.6)
(4.8)Nseron fa  Iuediscan ne sedymalaewe furh God geneadode to dam gramlican 
not-were the Jews nor the secret traitor through God needed to the cruel 
gefeahte
thoughts
‘Neither the Jews nor the secret traitor were compelled by God to the cruel thoughts’ 
(SEG10.VELS (Exalt of Cross) B 1.3.27)
Syntactically speaking, neodian emerges as a causative verb which follows the same 
deep structure pattern as hatan (cf. 4.1.1.), i.e.:
subject NP -  causative V neodian -  direct object NP -  object complement NP
In an active sentence, the subject is assigned the nominative case, the direct object NP taking 
the accusative, which can be seen in examples (4.6) and (4.7). A major differnce between 
hatan and neodian concerns the surface realization of the object complement. Apart from 
expected infinitives, be they bare or inflected, pcet-clauses, e.g. (4.7), the object complement
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can be a prepositional phrase -  this is the case in (4.8), which exemplifies a passive structure, 
though. Molencki (1991: 122) calls structures with a prepositional phrase complementing the 
accusative direct object NP ‘closest’ to PDE complex transitive constructions. With the 
options available to the surface manifestations of the object complement being established, 
example (4.6) stands out as seemingly being compatible with none of these options. Loureiro- 
Porto (2005: 189) categorizes such occurrences of neodian as monotransitive and proceeds to 
state that such a syntactic pattern has a bearing on the meaning of the verb, that is to say, the 
compelling force conveyed by neodian is strictly physical rather than social. I reason that, 
given the presence of directional ut after the direct object, there are grounds for treating this 
occurrence like those with the pre-modals where an infinitive of a verb of motion, is logically 
missing between the pre-modal and the directional adverb or a prepositional phrase (cf. 3.3.3. 
and 3.4.1. for example). (4.6) is then, I believe, a complex transitive structure with an object 
complement in the form of a formally absent but logically necessary infinitive of a verb of 
motion. Although this paragraph is not the proper locus for the discussion of the semantics of 
neodian, I would like to add here that the above syntactic construal of (4.6) paves the way for 
interpreting the force involved in social terms as well, besides physical. As Loureiro-Porto 
(ibid.) puts it, example (4.6) can be translated as ‘Then the Savior pushed the impure spirit 
out.’ Given the missing infinitive, the sentence could be analyzed as ‘The Savior 
orderedYforced verbally the impure spirit to go out.,’ the spirit being, after all, a reasonable 
creature.
Turning back to syntax, as evidenced by (4.8), neodian is to be found in passive 
structures. In such cases, the direct object NP becomes the nominative subject NP whereas the 
former subject NP can be either unexpressed or rendered as an optional PP such as purh God 
in (4.8).
As for the semantics of neodian, the contexts presented in examples (4.6) through
(4.8) clearly indicate PE necessity. Each time there are two participants, namely the 
Antagonist (the subject NP in an active sentence) and Agonist (the direct object NP in an 
active sentence) who remain engaged in a state of hostility due a necessity exerted by the 
Antagonist and imposed upon the Agonist. Needless to say, the Agonist typically finds the 
force unpleasant yet, as calculated by Loureiro-Porto (2005: 170), in 98 per cent of cases the 
necessity must be described as strong. A novelty in comparison with hatan, bebeodan and 
beodan, is that the necessity is not to be associated exclusively with the act of speaking. Note 
that the PE necessity inherent to these verbs is verbally announced and thereby has the force 
of a command. The necessity of neodian goes beyond that. As stated above, on the
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interpretation of (4.6) preferred by Loureiro-Porto (2005: 189) we get a physical force 
involved, or perhaps, a divine power to drive out evil spirits. In (4.8) the lack of necessity 
concerns the fact that God created no circumstances which would make the Jews and the 
secret traitor foster cruel or tormenting thoughts. What is worth remarking is that the identity 
of the Antagonist (God) in this example is known due to the optional PP (Juirh God) being 
included, (4.8) qualifying as a passive structure. Finally, we come to probably the most 
interesting case, the necessity of neodian in (4.7). Notice that not only is the Antagonist (se 
lowearda winter) inanimate but also, as such, unaware of its being a source of any necessity. 
The necessity exists only because the Agonist is reported to have experienced it. Summing up, 
it can be said that in the above instances no notion of a verbal command seems to be primarily 
the case. The PE necessity of neodian is a diversified and general obligation, reminiscent of 
that of sceal. Admittedly, I do not aspire to have exhausted all the aspects of the meaning of 
neodian here. A meticulous reader is again referred to Loureiro-Porto (2005), who goes as far 
as to consider very rare cases of PI necessity with neodian.
The other two verbs behofian (PDE behove) and bepurfan seem to have less complex 
past. Behofian, an OE weak verb of Class 2, is a form derived from noun behof ‘need, use, 
benefit.’ As we learn from Watkins (2000: 37), the noun itself is part of the Germanic 
inheritance and has been reconstructed as proto-Germanic *bi-hdf “that which binds,” 
‘requirement, obligation.’ *bi-hdf results from putting together the intensive prefix *bi and 
*hdfi, the latter being a Grimm’s Law-affected continuation of PIE *kop~, ‘a lengthened- 
grade variant’ (Watkins 2000: 37) of PIE *kap- ‘to grasp.’ The Germanic cognates of 
behofian are Middle Low German behoven, Middle Dutch behoeven and Swedish behova. As 
for the semantics of OE behofian, the entry for the verb in B&T says ‘to have need of, to 
need, require.’ The other verb to be covered in this section is bepurfan. As explained in 3.2., 
bepurfan formally ranks as a preterite-present verb, a corollary of its genesis being in 
attaching the prefix be- to the pre-modal pearf. As the details of the pre-OE origin and 
Germanic development of pearf are touched upon in 3.2., there is no need to repeat them here. 
This introductory picture of bepurfan will not be full, however, without invoking what B&T 
has to say about the meaning of the verb. Thus, in accordance with the information retrieved 
from the dictionary, bepurfan means 'to need, have need, want, to be in want, to require.’
A more insightful analysis of the syntax and semantics of behofian and bepurfan will 
be facilitated by a glance at the typical uses of the verbs:
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(4.9) La hw«t, we behofigafo ^ast we usse earan ontynen 7 usse heortan to Jjam godspellican 
lo what, we need that we our ears open and our hearts to the gospel 
larum
teaching
‘Lo, we need/ought to open our ears and hearts to the gospel’s teaching’
(SEG20.\HomU 8 (ScraggVerc 2) B3.4.8)
(4.10) stundmafrum genian «nig J?aet ne behofige biddan aenig J)inc. 
one-by-one pass any that not need ask any thing
‘Let anything be passed (to one another) so that no one need ask for anything’ 
(SEG49.\BenRGl C4)
(4.11) {)u wast hwaet ic befrearf «rj)amj)e j?e ic bidde. 
thou knowest what I  need before thee I  ask 
‘You know what I need before I ask you’
(SEG70.\ArPrGl 1 (Holt-Campb) C23.1)
The syntactic properties of both verbs are by and large similar. Sentences with either 
verb usually subscribe to the following deep structure pattern:
subject NP -  behofian bepurfan - direct object NP
The nominative subject NP seems indispensible with behofian (see Allen 1997 and Loureiro- 
Porto 2005 for arguments against acknowledging impersonal structures with behofian). If 
behofian in the surface structure is followed by a direct object NP, which accounts for 114 out 
of the 136 occurrences of the verb, the NP can take a genitive, accusative or dative form. 
Optionally, the deep structure direct object can be realized as a pcet-clause (16 times, e.g.
(4.9)), an inflected infinitive (4 times) or a bare infinitive (2 times, e.g. example (4.10)). 
Bepurfan exhibits more syntactic variation. The most common scenario assigns the function 
of the subject to a nominative NP and that of the direct object to a genitive or accusative NP. 
Infrequently, one finds an extrapolated /^/-clause in the role of the subject and a dative NP as 
the complement of the verb. Importantly, bepurfan in the DOE corpus shows no compatibility 
with infinitival complements. To be sure, passive structures are not integrated into the set of 
possible surface realizations of either behofian or bepurfan in the corpus.
As might be expected, the value ‘to need’ present in B&T’s paraphrase of the 
meaning of behofian and bepurfan signals PI necessity. Both verbs are primarily concerned
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with the expression of PI necessity. As observable in the case of pearf (cf. 3.2.4.1.), typically, 
a semantic construal of PI necessity requires only one participant whose needs are focused on. 
A force-dynamic account of PI necessity would invoke the idea of the divided self of the 
participant, that is to say, what the participant’s need (the Agonist) is confronted with his or 
her sense of responsibility, fear, inertia, etc. (the Antagonist). Canonically, the participant is 
the subject of behofmn and bepurfan, as can be seen in all the examples above (in 6.10 the 
subject appears in the preceding context). The semantic role of the direct object is to shed 
light on what it is that the participant needs. Examples (4.9) through (4.11) exemplify 
different kinds of internal needs: a religious need in (4.9), lack of a physical need in (4.10) 
and an unspecified general need in (4.11). This arrangement is notably altered when a pcet- 
clause is the subject of bepurfan. In such a case, it is the subject clause that stands for what is 
needed, the participant being identified by the dative NP. Also, it will be instructive to look 
again at example (4.9) as potentially open to a PE necessity interpretation. Witness that the 
necessity for Christians to keep their eyes and heart open to God’s teaching does not have to 
be viewed only as an internal need but also as an external requirement. This stands to show 
that with bepurfan, infrequently as it happens, we find instances that blend PI and PE 
necessity as well as ones that are indicative of PE necessity only (cf. Loureiro-Porto 2005: 
196, Table 3.34.).
4.2. Verbs of permission and prohibition
I have selected five verbs that fall into this category: forlcetan, Icetan, forbeodan, alysan and 
fysan. Inclusion of a given verb has been guaranteed by the majority of its occurrences 
centering on the expression of permission or prohibition. Consequently, I have excluded verbs 
like, say, bewerian, in the case of which the meaning of prohibition verges on marginality or 
is only inferential. Table 4.2 shows the normalized frequencies of the five verbs per 100,000 
words in the DOE corpus as well as the number of their occurrences. At this point, it seems 
plausible to compare these frequencies with those of the two relevant preterite-presents mot 
and mceg. Obviously, the normalized frequencies in Table 4.2. are nowhere near the results 
obtained for mot and mceg, 74.4 and 221.5 respectively (cf. Table 3.1). These raw numbers, 
however, undergo significant modification when seen in light of the findings connected with 
the distribution of meanings of mot and mceg, as presented in Table 3.4.1. and Table 3.5.1. 
With the borderline examples also taken into account, mot occurs with the meaning of 
permission/prohibition in 74.3 per cent of cases whereas mceg takes the same meaning in 1.8
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per cent of its occurrences. If these percentages are cast against the normalized frequencies of 
the verbs, we arrive at the normalized frequencies of the permission/prohibition meanings of 
mot and mceg, which are 55.3 and 3.0 respectively. Put simply, this is a clear indication that 
mot is the single most popular verb of permission/prohibition in Old English while mceg joins 
the ranks of verbs of rather mild popularity like forbeodan and alyfcin.
Verb N. F. Total number of occurrences
forlcetan 50.2 2657
Icetan 25.2 1336
forbeodan 5.5 290
alyfan 4.8 254
lyfan 0.8 44
Table 4.2. Frequency of lexical verbs of permission and prohibition 
4.2.1. fo r  Ice tan and Ice tan
The reasons for discussing forlcetan and Icetan in the same section are three-fold. They both 
occupy the position atop in terms of frequency in Table 4.2, they are morphologically related 
and they express permission if not negated. According to Watkins (2000), both verbs go back 
to the PIE root *le- ‘to let go, slacken.’ OED adduces *lcet as the proto-Germanic 
development of the PIE root. In the case of both forlcetan and Icetan we find cognates in the 
Germanic languages. Thus, the forms corresponding to the former are Old Saxon forlatan, 
Old High German firlctzan (modem German verlassen) or Old Norse fyrirlata whereas Icetan 
is related to Gothic letan, Old Saxon latan, Old Frisian leta, Old Norse lata and Old High 
German lazan (modem German lasseri). If the same roots hint at the kinship of the two verbs, 
it is in the prefix fo r  of forlcetan that the main morphological difFemce between the verbs is 
marked. Forlcetan and Icetan belong to Class 7 of strong verbs, of which Welna (1996: 72) 
says that ‘originally, this class included verbs with reduplicated preterites’ and hence the 
Northumbrian preterite forms forleort and leort.
In the case o f both verbs, other than permission readings are admitted. As for forlcetan, 
B&T quotes the following meanings: 1) to let go, permit, suffer, 2) to relinquish, forsake, 
omit, neglect. Lcetan, on the other hand, is credited by B&T with a larger set of meanings: 1) 
to let, allow, permit, suffer, 2) to let [alone], let go, give up, dismiss, leave, forsake, let
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[blood], 3) to let, cause, make, get, have, cause to be, 4) to make a thing appear, make as if, to 
make out, profess, pretend, estimate, consider, think, suppose. It might be argued that the 
sense of permission of forlcetan and Icetan arises from the idea of forsaking and tolerating 
already present in the PIE root. Typical permission contexts of both verbs are illustrated
below:
(4.12) Se mildheorta drihten J)e lM scinan his sunnan ofer [?a rihtwisan. and unrihtwisan 
the mildhearted Lord who lets shine his sun over the righteous and non-righteous
gelice.
likewise.
The mildhearted Lord who lets his sun shine over both the righteous and the non- 
righteous.’
(SEG06A/ECHom I. 28 Bl.1.30)
(4.13) Ne nimS hig nan man ast me ac laete hig fram me sylium. 
not takes it no man from me but I-let it from me self 
‘No one takes it away from me, I let go of it myself.
(SEG25.\Jn (WSCp) B8.4.3.4)
(4.14) ne waes he forlaeten Jtast he ofer him deadum gefege: 
ne was he allowed that he over him dead rejoice 
‘He was not allowed to rejoice over his death.’
(SEG32ABede 1 B9.6.3)
The most frequent pattern has the Antagonist occurring as the subject of Icetan, as can be seen
in (4.12) and (4.13), the identity of the source of permission being thus explicitly provided.
The Agonist is left with the function of the indirect object in form of an accusative NP 
whereas the nature of the thing permitted is elucidated by the bare infinitive in (4.12), 
although we should bear in mind that inflected infinitives do occasionally appear. It naturally 
follows then that both Icetan and forlcetan are included by Molencki (1987, 1991) among 
verbs which take the ACI complementation. In example (4.13), Icetan misses the infinitive 
which is to be understood as a verb of motion. This brings Icetan close to the pre-modals 
which, when followed by a prepositional phrase or a directional adverb, do not require that the 
infinitive be present (cf. 3.3.3., 3.4.1. and 3.5.1.). It is the passive structure in (4.14) that the 
Antagonist-Agonist configuration approaches that of the pre-modals in that the Agonist takes 
over the role of the subject with the Antagonist remaining backgrounded. Molencki (1991:
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28) points out that a passive transformation in the case of forlcetan turns the indirect object NP 
in the accusative into the subject NP in the nominative. Note also that the verb, as shown in
(4.13), can be complemented by a pcet-dmse.
The meaning of permission of both verbs seems to be quite general and is not 
necessarily to be associated with verbal permission. In example (4.13) the idea of permission 
is very weak, if not virtually absent. Lcetan is closer here to the meaning of ‘to let go, release’ 
which goes back to that of the PIE root *le~. It is interesting to note that the sense of 
permission fails in this example as the indirect object NP hig does not indicate any real 
Agonist. Conversely, lcetan in example (4.12) is an obvious, albeit figurative, case of a 
permission meaning. The figurativeness stems from the nature of the Agonist (the sun) which, 
although not usually ascribed consciousness, is visualized as the premissee able to control the 
process of shining. What is not surprising in the context of permission is the difference in the 
status of the Antagonist (God, the Creator) and the Agonist (the sun, an object created). The 
last example, (4.14), which contains fo r  lcetan, bring to mind the most prototypical sense of 
permission, that is, interpersonal or social. In fact, due to the negation of the permission,
(4.14) epitomizes a case of prohibition. The animate and conscious Agonist (he) was not 
allowed to act as he wished by the Antagonist whose identity remains undisclosed.
4 2 .2. lyfan and alyfan
Taking their morphological relatedness as a key factor, I have reserved the present section for 
other two verbs of permission among those shown in Table 4.2. The origin of both lyfan and 
prefixed alyfan is to be found in PIE *leubh- ‘to care, desire; love’, the same root that has 
spawned PDE belief and love. Watkins (2000) and OED regard the inference of ‘pleasure, 
approval’ present in the sense of ‘care’ and ‘love’ as conducive to the development of the 
meaning of permission. In Old English apart from the two related verbs, there is noun leaf 
(PDE leave) which stems from the same PIE root and is used with the meaning ‘permission.’ 
Other Germanic languages share similar evolution of the PIE root which in proto-Germanic 
has been reconstructed as *laubo. As specified by OED, the Germanic cognates of lyfan are 
Gothic (us)laubjan, Old High German lyfan (modem German (er)lauben) and Old Norse 
loyfa. In Old English both lyfan and alyfan are members of Class 1 of weak verbs.
Turning to the semantic side of lyfan and alyfan, let me resort to B&T again. As for 
the former, the dictionary points to the sense of permission as the only area in which the verbs 
can be employed (‘to give leave, allow, permit’). With alyfan, the field of application seems
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wider in that apart from the expected idea of permission (‘to give leave, permit’), we find an 
extension connected with giving and handing (‘to grant’). Having consulted the dictionary, let 
us take a look at some of the actual occurrences of the verbs in the corpus:
(4.15) God lyfde Adame {^ set he moste brucan ealra wsestma,
God allowed Adam that he must enjoy all fruit 
‘God allowed Adam to eat all the fruit’
(SEG15.\WHom 6 B2.2.1)
(4.16) Moyses for eower heortan heardnesse lyfde eow eower wif to forlaetenne.
Moses for your hearts’ hardness allowed you your wife to leave 
‘Moses allowed you to leave your wife because of the hardness of your hearts.’
(SEG25AMt (WSCp) B8.4.3.1)
(4.17) Da alefde Pilatus him j)aet. 
then permitted/gave Pilate him that
‘Then Pilate gave him that\allowed him to take it (the Lord’s body)’
(SEG16.\HomS 24.1 (Scragg) B3.2.24.1)
(4.18) And nis nanum men alefed for nanre neode {?is festen to abrecane 
and not-is no man allowed fo r  no need this fast to break
‘And no one is allowed to break this fast on any account’
(SEG17.\HomS 30 B3.2.30)
A general observation follows that both lyfan and alyfan appear in surface structures which go 
back to the following deep structure.
subject NP -  lyfan/alyfan -  indirect object NP -  direct object NP
Accordingly, in an active sentence, examples (4.15) through (4.17), the Antagonist is the 
nominative subject NP and the Agonist is the dative NP with the sentential function of the 
indirect object. Example (4.15) epitomizes a case of redundant modality already extensively 
looked upon in 3.3.5. and 3.4.3.1., where moste in the complement clause builds on the idea 
of permission made explicit by lyfde in the main clause. Syntactically speaking, it is worth 
noting that the direct object of lyfan is a /»«/-clause. In (4.16) and (4.17) we can see yet 
different kinds of direct objects. In the former, the indirect object is ensued by an inflected 
infinitive, inflected infinitives markedly outnumbering bare infinitives as the direct objects of 
both verbs. Alyfan in (4.17), on the other hand, assigns the function of the direct object to the
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pronominal NP hyt. The last example (4.18) is a passive structure, which accounts for 69 per 
cent of the occurrences of alyfctn (passives with lyfan are extremely rare). The passive 
occurrences alternate between such as (4.18), where there is no pronominal subject, and those 
which take hit as the subject. Consider, however, that, in absence of hyt as the subject, it is the 
non-fmite clause containing the inflected infinitive in (4.18) that is the actual subject which 
‘remains extraposed probably due to its ‘heaviness” (Molencki 1991: 28). Unlike with 
forlcetan, in a passive structure with alyfctn, the function of the Agonist as the indirect object 
NP in the dative stays intact.
The sense of permission is salient in all the examples above but (4.17). Judging by 
example (4.17) and the likes in the corpus, alyfcm may be conjectured to lose the meaning of 
permission in favor of the sense ‘to grant, give’ when the direct object of the verb is an NP. I 
venture a hypothesis, which is in need of further verification in a separate study, that the 
meaning ‘to grant, give’ of alyfan develops first and accompanies direct object NPs. At this 
stage, the NPs stand for more or less concrete objects. Once the verb starts taking clausal 
direct objects, a thing granted may be an action. Obviously, granting an action implies that the 
action is permitted, which allows time for the invited inference of permission to be 
strengthened. Witness that the strengthening of the inference is facilitated by the fact that the 
Antagonist-Agonist configuration before and after the appearance of the inference is the same. 
Once settled, the idea of permission that stands behind lyfan and alyfan seems rather 
homogenous. In all the active sentences presented above both participants, the Antagonist and 
Agonist, are explicitly present. As we have seen earlier with the verbs of necessity, e.g. hatan 
in 4.1.1., the discrepancy between the positions of the participants in a religious or social 
community is underscored. The Antagonist is always a person of authority and, thus, expected 
to grant or deny permission (God in (4.15), Moses, a religious leader in (4.16) or Pilate in
(4.17)). I reason that the permission of lyfan and alyfan is quite formal and requires that both 
participants be animate. The main semantic significance of a passive structure with alyfan is 
the possibility of concealing or leaving out the identity of the Antagonist. In (4.18) lack of 
permission is stated without disclosing the Antagonist who can, after all, be identified as God 
due to the context.
4.2.3 forheodan
As will be clear from Table 4.2., the verb of negated permission, i.e. prohibition, is greatly 
outnumbered by the occurrences of the verbs of permission. As for the origin of the verb,
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forbeodan (PDE forbid) is derived from another OE verb beodan ‘to command’ (cf. 4.1.2.) 
which, as specified by Watkins (2000: 11), originates in the PIE root *bheudh- ‘to be aware, 
make aware.’ OED notes that the prefixed form forbeodan used with the meaning of 
prohibition has cognates in other Germanic languages, some of which are Gothic faurbiudan, 
Old Norse fyrirbioda and Old High German far-, forpiotan (modem German verbieten). 
Forbeodan is a strong verbs of Class 2.
The verb allows litle beyond the use with the meaning of prohibition as we learn from 
B&T. The significance of forbeodan is described as ‘to forbid, prohibit, restrain, suppress.’ 
Forbeodan can appear in quite a wide range of structures, two of which are illustrated below:
(4.19) |)one fulan mete f)e Moyses forbead Godes folce to {ficgenne, 
the impure fo o d  that Moses forbade G od’s people to eat 
‘The impure food that Moses forbade the People of God to eat.’
(SEG10.VELS (Maccabees) Bl.3.25)
(4.20) him bi5 forboden 8aet he offrige Gode hlaf, 
to-him is forbidden that he offer to-God bread 
‘He is forbidden to offer bread to God.’
(SEG27ACP B9.1.3)
In (4.19) and (4.20) common patterns of the active and passive sentences with forbeodan are 
shown. Both can be integrated into largely the same framework as that observed in the case of 
lyfan and alyfan (cf.4.2.2). In an active sentence, as in (4.19), the Antagonist invariably 
occupies the subject position in the form of a nominative NP. The other participant, i.e. the 
Agonist, as can be seen in the same example, can be identified with the role of the indirect 
object NP in the dative. Occasionally, as also noted by DOE, the indirect object NP takes an 
accusative form. There is also a possibility that the Agonist is absent, which adds an aspect of 
general validity to the prohibition imposed. As for the type of the direct object, forbeodan has 
three options available: a preferably inflected infinitive14, as in (4.19), an accusative NP and a 
/wef-clause. A passive construction with forbeodan moves the direct object, be it a feet- clause 
as in (4.20), a nominative NP or an infinitive, to the formal position of the subject even 
though heavy clausal subjects tend to be extraposed in the mode already observed with alyfan
14 Los (1999: 179-180) argues that the occurrences of uninflected infinitives after forbeodan and alyfan are not to 
be found except for glosses and texts translated from Latin.
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(cf. 4 .2 .2 ). The transformation of an active structure into a passive one leaves the status of the 
Agonist as a dative NP intact.
Because of the negation of permission incorporated into the meaning of forbeodan, 
this verb has much in common with the verbs of PE necessity discussed in 4.1. The 
prohibition as seen in the examples is formal and carries the force of a command. In example
(4.19) prohibition occurs as a regulation introduced by the religious leader (Moses) and 
affects the whole group of people. It is a deontic statement as there is a past time reference. So 
is example (4.20) even though it refers to the present. On account of the third person Agonist 
and an implicit Antagonist, the example lacks any performative force. It is noteworthy that the 
action forbidden in (4.20) also has a religious character. Judging by other examples in the 
DOE corpus, it can be concluded that the prohibition of forbeodan is rather homogenous in 
that it usually requires a context in which someone issues a formal ban on an action which a 
conscious Agonist is taken to be willing to perform.
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Chapter 5 
Conclusion
In the body of this study I have focused on the verbal means employed to express non- 
epistemic necessity in Old English. Combining the elements of the functional and cognitive 
approaches to the modal semantics, I have conducted a corpus-based analysis of five pre- 
modals and eleven lexical verbs with a view to reconstructing the system of obligation 
expression in Old English. Much more attention has been paid to the pre-modals for a number 
of reasons: 1) they usually far outnumber the lexical verbs, 2) they can be seen at the interface 
of semantics and syntax in that they are just being slowly grammaticalized into auxiliaries, 3) 
modals tend to exhibit ‘(relative) semantic imprecision and opacity’ (Matthews 2003: 50).
A résumé of the investigation undertaken in the present dissertation can be given by 
showing the positioning of the pre-modals and the relevant lexical verbs on the continuum of 
deontic modality proposed by de Haan (1997: 15). In Figure 5.1. and Figure 5.2. the meanings 
of the pre-modals and the lexical verbs respectively are projected upon the continuum.
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weak strong
permission weak PE/deontic necessity 
a g a n _____
strong deontic necessity
pearf
sceal
mot
mceg
Figure 5 .1. The OE pre-modals on the continuum of deontic modality 
Figure 5.1. has the following implications.
a. Old English has one exponent of strong deontic necessity, that is sceal. It proves the only 
pre-modal to more than just occasionally embrace performative contexts of strong PE 
necessity. The subjectivity o f such examples is revealed through the fact that the speaker is 
the Antagonist and he or she is actually involved in the act of imposing the necessity. In other 
words, the gradience of the deontic necessity of sceal has a consistent core. The empty space 
left at the strong end of the continuum marks the fact that the core examples are still exception 
rather than rule and that there are no strongly subjective instances. It should be remembered, 
however, that in the majority of cases sceal expresses a strong force of necessity in non­
performative and thus mildly subjective contexts -  such instances have been shown to make 
up the skirt and periphery of the deontic necessity of sceal.
b. The deontic necessity ofpearf lags far behind sceal, which can be attributed to a network of 
reasons: even if pearf has a potential for performative use in that the verb frequently occurs 
with the second person pronoun, pearf prefers non-activity verb complements. It has been 
hypothesized that the preference goes back to the earlier meaning of pearf that is, PI 
necessity. Secondly, pearf is typically in need of a contextual hint if it is to convey speaker­
generated necessity. Thirdly, the very force of the deontic necessity of pearf is, unlike in the 
case o f sceal, a weak obligation.
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c. The deontic necessity of agcm and mot is far from deeply rooted yet in Old English. Both 
verbs are only starting to make inroads into this new semantic area. This materializes into a 
number of features: the force of necessity tends to alternate between a stronger and weaker 
obligation, both verbs are typically precluded from appearing in performative contexts (a 
visible sign of which is the absence of second person pronouns with mot), the Antagonist is 
institutional or doctrinal rather than the speaker. Interestingly, agcm in its weaker deontic 
necessity uses provides an equivalent to the notion SHOULD in Present-Day English, which, 
according to de Haan (1997. 126-129), occupies the middle of the continuum. A concomitant 
of a verb taking up the middle position is that its meaning does not change in negative clauses 
regardless of whether modality or proposition is negated.
d. Overall, it is still weaker deontic necessity in weakly subjective contexts that the 
occurrences of the four pre-modals capitalize on. The Antagonist tends to be institutionalized 
rather than individualized. The necessity imposed or reported usually follows from a set of 
accepted rules or legal regulations.
e. Out of the two permission pre-modals, mceg proves only marginally relevant as its meaning 
of permission comes to the surface as an inference invited by a context of PI or PE possibility. 
Mot, on the other hand, is capable of signaling a variety of contexts ranging from subjective 
performatives to deontic statements devoid of subjectivity. Concurrently, the latter prevail. 
Mot being the only pre-modal available to both permission and deontic necessity, a rigorous 
formal separation has been evident between the instances of the former and of the latter. 
Performativity, subjectivity and wide scope attested with the permission of mot are not 
instantly transferable to the deontic necessity instances of the verb.
Throughout the discussion of the pre-modals, a special emphasis has been put on the 
interaction of the pre-modals and negation. With agan and pearf, negative and non­
affirmative contexs engender most of the occurrences of the verbs. Mceg, mot and pearf 
regularly negate modality while sceal negates the proposition. As mentioned above, agan, 
when carrying weaker necessity, negates either modality or the proposition without impinging 
on the meaning. In the contexts of stronger necessity, it is the proposition that in in the scope 
of negation.
Turning to the lexical verbs, in Figure 5.2. I have assembled the deontic continuum 
with the positions of the necessity-related lexical verbs marked on it. No room on the 
continuum is made for behofian and bepurfan as these two, being tokens of PI necessity, stay 
outside the continuum. Although classed with the verbs of permission in 4.2., forbeodan takes
183
place among the verbs of necessity in Figure 5.2., which rests on the equivalence of negated 
permission, i.e. the meaning o f forbeodan, and necessity-not-to
weak strong
strong deontic necessitypermission 
forlcetan 
ice tan
weak PE/deontic necessity
alyfan
lyfan
hatan____
bebeodan
forbeodcin
beodan
neodian
Figure 5 .2. The lexical verbs on the continuum of deontic necessity 
The following points should be made concerning Figure 5.2.:
a. In the group of the verbs of necessity, hatan, bebeodan and forbeodan occupy more or less 
the same position, which indicates that they are all potentially performative verbs and they 
signal a strong force of necessity tantamount to a command or strong request. It is among 
these verbs that the strongest force of PE necessity resides. Still, performative and really 
subjective uses are hard to find, hence the space left at the strong end of the continuum. 
Beodan despite being frequently used on a par with the first three verbs, also shows 
inclinations toward weaker necessity. Conversely, neodian has very little potential for 
performative use as it is associated with a physical force rather that a verbal command.
b. Forlcetan, Icetan, alyfan and lyfan are largely synonymous. In all of these verbs some traces 
of earlier, non-modal meanings mingle with the sense of permission. Thus, one can detect the 
idea of giving, granting in alyfan and lyfan and the idea of letting go, releasing in Icetan and 
forlcetan.
It is possible to point to two major contrasts between the pre-modals and the lexical
verbs:
a. the pre-modals have a wider range of subjective uses, the meaning of a pre-modal is a 
gradient likely to express the force of necessity spanning from weak to strong, non­
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performative to performative. A lexical verb can be used performatively or non- 
preformatively, the force of necessity staying relatively stable. The meaning of a lexical verb 
is more precise due to the presence of the Antagonist in an active clause and the necessity 
being more semantically constrained.
b. the use of the pre-modals typically indicates an institutionalized Antagonist, e.g. religion, 
law, code of behavior. The Antagonist of a lexical verb in an active clause is more likely to be 
an individual. As a rule, the pre-modals convey necessity based on socially accepted 
regulations while lexical verbs indicate individual-generated necessity in active clauses and 
regulation-based necessity in passive structures.
c although the meaning of, say, permission of a lexical verb extends into other semantic 
areas, e.g. the permission of alyfati shades into the sense of giving and granting, I have not 
identified any case of modal polysemy with the lexical verbs. Their meanings do not move 
along the deontic continuum as actively as those of the pre-modals.
There is obviously room for further research especially in the field of lexical verbs of 
necessity, permission and prohibition. This brings us to the problem of the discrepancy in the 
amount of appeal that the modals and other exponents of modality have for researchers. 
Indeed, even the OE pre-modals seem to have more to offer to those who study both 
semantics and syntax. Once within the branches of modality, the meanings of the pre-modals 
tend to expand forming gradients and traveling along the paths that can be reconstructed. The 
concomitant process of grammaticalization ties in with this semantic change. Lexical verbs 
like the ones discussed in this study seem unattractive in comparison. Each of them has a 
relatively small portion of modal semantics at its disposal. Needless to say, the operation of 
grammaticalization is not a significant factor in the evolution of the lexical verbs of necessity.
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Wyrażanie przymusu w języku 
staroangielskim
Streszczenie
Celem niniejszej monografii jest charakterystyka przymusu wyrażanego przy pomocy 
czasowników dostępnych w tekstach staroangielskich. Zagadnienie to naturalnie wpisuje się 
w rozważania na temat modalności, jej semantycznej natury i urzeczywistnienia w języku. 
Punktem wyjścia jest lokalizacja przymusu w teoriach modalności, wyodrębnienie 
czasowników będących przedmiotem badań oraz sprecyzowanie miarodajnej metody 
pozwalającej na porównanie przymusu charakterystycznego dla każdego z czasowników.
Pojęcie PRZYMUSU, a raczej szersze pojęcie KONIECZNOŚCI, którego PRZYMUS 
jest integralną częścią, staje się obok MOŻLIWOŚCI, fundamentem koncepcji modalności 
Lyons’a (1977). Wyodrębnienie PRZYMUSU w tym i innych ujęciach modalności sprowadza 
się do przyjrzenia się KONIECZNOŚCI NIEEPISTEMICZNEJ, która obejmuje 
KONIECZNOŚĆ ZEWNĘTRZNĄ, KONIECZNOŚĆ WEWNĘTRZNĄ a także 
POZWOLENIE/ZAKAZ. POZWOLENIE/ZAKAZ, choć formalnie przynależą do 
MOŻLIWOŚCI NIEEPISTEMICZNEJ, są także w centrum mojego zainteresowania dzięki 
pozostaniu w logicznej zależności z KONIECZNOŚCIĄ. Stojąc na stanowisku, iż 
KONIECZNOŚĆ, podobnie jak inne znaczenia modalne, realizują się przede wszystkim w 
znaczeniu czasowników, w dalszej części pracy koncentruję się na dwóch grupach 
czasowników staroangielskich: pięciu czasownikach pre-modalnych i jedenastu czasownikach 
leksykalnych. Znacznie większy nacisk położony jest na analizę znaczeń czasowników pre- 
modalnych, które, morfologicznie zaklasyfikowane jako czasowniki przeszło-teraźniejsze, są 
zalążkiem systemu modalnego w późniejszym angielskim w rozumieniu Palmera (2003).
Przystępując do badań znaczeń wyodrębnionych czasowników, przyjmuję następujące 
założenie: znaczenia modalne tworzą zbiory nieostre (zob. Coates 1983), co oznacza, iż w 
danym przypadku znaczenie czasownika może mieć cechy desygnujące go bliżej centrum
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zbioru bądź bliżej peryferii zbioru. Centrum znaczenia KONIECZNOŚCI daje się określić 
poprzez zbiór cech, m in. siłę nacisku wywieranego przez antagonistę (źródło nacisku) na 
agonistę (osobę poddaną naciskowi) (zob. Taimy 2000), stopień subiektywności znaczenia, 
określenie czy w danym przypadku mamy do czynienia z kontekstem performatywnym czy 
też nie.
Stosując powyższe parametry w części badawczej, dochodzę do wniosku, że system 
wyrażania przymusu przy pomocy czasowników pre-modalnych dopiero się wykształca. 
Spośród pięciu czasowników pre-modalnych, jedynie sceal ze względna konsekwencją 
używany jest performatywnie, subiektywnie, wyrażając znaczną siłę nacisku wygenerowaną 
przez antagonistę. Podobnie jak w przypadku pozostałych czasowników pre-modalnych, 
przykłady użycia sceal ze znaczeniem KONIECZNOŚCI ZEWNĘTRZENEJ tworzą 
kontinuum rozciągające się od centrum do peryferii. Dwa czasowniki, agan i mat wykazują 
cechy świadczące o początkowym etapie funkcjonowania ze znaczeniem KONIECZNOŚCI 
ZEWNĘTRZENEJ. sporadycznie pojawiają się w kontekstach performatywnych i w 
zależności od konkretnego przypadku, wykazują znaczne wahania pomiędzy słabszą a 
mocniejszą siłą nacisku.
Podstawową różnicą w użyciu czasowników pre-modalnych i leksykalnych jest 
większa precyzja KONIECZNOŚCI czasowników leksykalnych, które również częściej 
wyrażają KONIECZNOŚĆ narzuconą przez zindywidualizowanego raczej niż 
zinstytucjonalizowanego antagonistę.
Część badawcza niniejszej pracy opiera się na badaniu tekstów staroangielskich 
zebranych w korpusach elektronicznych. Wykorzystane zostały dwa różne korpusy tekstów: 
The Old English Part of the Helsinki Corpus i The Dictionary of Old English Corpus.
204
Texts from the Helsinki Corpus used in the study
(COAELET3)
(COAELET4)
(COAELHOM)
(COAELIVE)
(COAEPREF)
(COAEPREG)
(COBEDE)
(COBENRUL)
(COBLICK)
(COBOETH)
(COBRUNAN)
(COCHROA2)
(COCHROA3)
(COCHROE4)
(COCURA)
(COCYNEW)
(COEPfflOM )
(COGENESI)
(COGREGD4)
(COINSPOL)
(COLACNU)
(COLAECE)
(COLAW2)
(COLAW3)
(COLAW4)
(COMARVEL)
(COMETBOE)
(COPREFCP)
/Elfric's First and Second Letter to Wulfstan;
/Elfric s Letter to Sigefyrth
/Elfric's Letter to Sigeweard; Wulfsige
/Elfric's Catholic Homilies (II)
AElfric' s Homilies (Suppl. II)
AElfric's Lives o f Saints
Ailfric's Preface to Cath. Hom.IJI; Lives o f Saints; 
Grammar
/Elfric's Preface to Genesis 
Bede's Ecclesiastical History 
The Benedictine Rule 
The Blickling Homilies 
Alfred's Boetius 
The Battle ofBrunanburh 
Chronicle MS A Early 
Chronicle MS A LATE (03)
Chronicle MS E (03/4); (04)
Alfred's Cura Pastoralis 
Fates o f Apostles; Elene; Juliana 
A Homily fo r  the Sixth... Sunday 
Genesis
Gregory the Great, Dialogues (MS C)
Wulfstan's ‘Institutes o f  Polity ’
Lacnunga
Leeceboc
Laws (Alfred's Introduction to Laws; Alfred; INE) 
Laws (Eleventh Century)
Laws (Late; Wiliam)
Marvels
The Meters o f Boethius
Alfred's Preface to Cura Pastoralis
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(COPREFSO)
(COOTEST)
(COWSGOSP)
(COWULF3)
(COWULF4)
Alfred's Preface to Sololoquies 
The Old Testament 
West-Saxon Gospels 
Wulfstan' s Homilies (03) 
Wulfstan Homilies (03/4)
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